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FOREWORD 
 
 This project began in 2013 when my doctoral supervisors, Prof. Stephan van Erp and 
Prof. Christoph Hübenthal, advertised two positions working on doctoral projects on the 
subject of Edward Schillebeeckx and public theology at Radboud University Nijmegen. I am 
very grateful that they, together with the selection committee, not only trusted me to do the 
work, but also allowed me to choose my own research angle on the topic. From the very 
moment I commenced work, in October 2013, I could always rely on their insights, critique 
and incessant encouragement, an invaluable support without which I could not imagine 
having written this dissertation. I would also like to thank my Master’s supervisor, Dr. Marcus 
Pound, for having encouraged me to apply to work at this doctoral project. 
 Prior to settling in Nijmegen in 2013, I was prepared to spend the next three and a half 
years in the city in which Edward Schillebeeckx had lived over half of his life. I had the 
pleasure of encountering many people whose paths had crossed with that of Schillebeeckx; to 
this end, I was privileged enough to get glimpses into the life of the person whose work I was 
beginning to study. Little did I know then, that this dissertation’s journey would lead me onto 
further, unknown places. From January 2015 onwards, when Prof. Stephan van Erp moved to 
Belgium in order to become a professor of fundamental theology at KU Leuven, I started 
visiting Leuven on a monthly basis. This led not only to my being accepted as candidate for a 
double doctorate, from RU Nijmegen and KU Leuven, but also to the provisioning of a six-
month stay in Leuven, from January to July 2016. Prior to that, I had just finished enjoying a 
four-month research period from August to December 2015 at the University of Notre Dame, 
Indiana. This was a great opportunity afforded by Prof. Mary Catherine Hilkert whom I would 
like to thank for the dedicated effort she put into inviting and accommodating me there, but 
most of all for the time and care she took to supervise my work during my stay at Notre 
Dame. I benefitted greatly, not only from her unparalleled knowledge of Edward 
Schillebeeckx’s theology, but also from the encouraging interest she took in my work. Special 
thanks also go to Prof. John Betz who arranged for me to present my work to graduate 
students of the faculty and whose availability to discuss critically the theology of Radical 
Orthodoxy contributed positively to the present shape that this dissertation has taken. 
 Very special thanks go to Prof. Kathryn Tanner and Prof. John Milbank who both 
generously made themselves available to meeting and discussing my work on their theologies 
with me; these opportunities proved to be greatly stimulating. At this point, I would also like 
to thank Prof. Erik Borgman for discussing my thoughts about Edward Schillebeeckx’s 
theology on several occasions with me, as well as Prof. Robert Schreiter, Prof. Gavin 
D’Costa, and Prof. Karen Kilby who all offered helpful comments on my work-in-progress 
during Master Classes organised by the Netherlands School for Advanced Studies in 
Theology and Religion (NOSTER). I am particularly grateful to Eleonora Hof and Jos Moons 
who organised monthly NOSTER meetings for doctoral students in systematic theology from 
the Netherlands, as well as to Prof. Stephan van Erp and Prof. Marcel Sarot for chairing these 
meetings and for sharing their expertise. The opportunity to share our work during these 
meetings proved immensely helpful and I would like to thank all of the members of that group 
for their critical comments on my emerging dissertation. Likewise, I would like to thank the 
members of the Research Group Theology in a Postmodern Context at KU Leuven for 
inviting me to participate in their monthly meetings, the members of the chair of systematic 
theology at Radboud University Nijmegen for our monthly reading groups and discussions 
about public theology and the members of the weekly Schillebeeckx reading groups, both at 
Nijmegen and at KU Leuven, for all the stimulating discussions. 
  
 I would not have been able to write this dissertation without the boundless support of 
my friends. Most specially, I would like to thank Dorothea Dechau not only for being the 
lovely and loving person that she is, but also for always patiently listening to my ponderings 
about my research without showing too many signs of boredom. From my time in Nijmegen, I 
would like to thank especially Joanne Vrijhof, Anne Siebesma, Anne van den Berg, Inigo 
Bocken, Irene Roding, Josh and April Furnal, amd the people from the Arnhem-Nijmegen 
Chaplaincy. I also would like to thank the Carmelites from the Titus Brandsma 
Gedachteniskerk whose prayerful stillness carried me through the heights and depths of past 
years. From my time in Leuven, I would like particularly to thank Trevor Maine and Lindsey 
Bryant, Marije Marijs, Derrick Witherington, Morris Ibiko and Christopher Cimorelli. From 
my time at Notre Dame, I would like especially to thank Julia Feder, Steven Battin, Chris 
Haw, and Xander Underdue. From elsewhere, I would like to thank Sylvia Grevel, Stephan 
Sahm, Charlie Pemberton, Sreemoyee Roy Chowdhury, Sarah Lovell, Jen Wingate, Meredith 
Parnes, Shashwat Ganguly, Alice Ford, Samantha Burton, Stuart Grout, Tessa Hobbs, Fr 
Stephen Gallagher, Bp Lindsay Urwin, Karthikeyan Pakriswamy, Lillith Stukenberg, Hanna 
Särkkä, Johanna Köhler, Kerstin Schipplick, Julia Schanzenbächer, Gabi Krebs, and Carina 
Schötz. 
 In particular, I would like to thank John O’Neill and Susann Kabisch who proofread 
and commented upon various drafts of this dissertation and who, amazingly, managed to 
voice their fine criticisms in the most encouraging of ways. Their generous help and 
friendship was all in the service of the great improvement of this text. Most particular thanks 
also to John Bosco Kamoga and Marijn de Jong, each of whom did not hesitate to embrace 
the role of paranymph at this special occasion of my doctoral defence, and whose most 
precious friendship I treasure far beyond.  
 Furthermore, I would like to thank my brothers Dominik and Josef, and my parents 
Heinz and Heidemarie, who, in their very distinct ways, each continued to spur my interest in 
God and in people. In this way, they have greatly inspired and supported my theological 
studies, and my engagement in this particular doctoral project. 
 Last, but not least, I would like to thank the congregation of All Saints Middlesbrough. 
Their gentle welcome helped me to rediscover my fascination for the mysteries of the 
Christian faith; a grace without which this dissertation would never have been written.  
   
 Christiane Alpers 
May, 2017 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Research Question 
 Faith-based contributions to political discussions have become an issue of contention 
in many Western societies in recent decades. On the surface, the debates seem to happen 
between convinced secularists who oppose any of these contributions and members of diverse 
faith traditions who refuse to separate their political views from the tradition in which they 
were raised. In this dissertation, I enter these discussions by concentrating not on faith-based 
contributions to secular politics in general, but on Christian theological contributions to 
political discussions in post-Christendom societies in particular; I presuppose that these 
general debates in contemporary Europe are related to the pronounced dissolution of the 
strong links between church and state which occurred in previous eras. From my particular 
perspective, I reflect upon the theological significance of the secularist opposition to faith-
based contributions to public political debates; this is a reflection which I have found missing 
in a broad swath of public theological literature. More precisely, I follow Edward 
Schillebeeckx in asking the question of whether those secularists could demonstrate, in their 
very opposition to theologically motivated political engagement, that they, themselves, follow 
God in a direction which Christianity has erroneously foreclosed during its imperialist 
Christendom past. In short, my question is: Can Christian theologians understand it as a grace 
that some of their contemporaries oppose any faith-based involvement in political 
discussions?
1
 Thus, my research question is part of the more overarching concern about the 
political role played by Christian theology in post-Christendom societies, and I follow the 
public theological intuition that Christian theologians should now pursue a different political 
trajectory than those associated with Christendom imperialism. Choosing to address the 
question from a Christian theological perspective, my hypothesis is that if the opposition to 
any theologically informed political engagement is received as a mediation of God’s grace, 
Christian theologians will learn to appreciate something about the reality of redemption, 
which they would otherwise take for granted. In this way, I contest the predominantly 
apologetic approach, which is characteristic of the most prominent answers proffered to the 
question of theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies. These apologetic 
approaches systematically deflect attention away from this secularist opposition’s theological 
significance.
2
  
 
Approach 
 Acknowledging the legitimacy, and even advisability, of also approaching the question 
concerning the political role of Christian theology in post-Christendom societies from the 
perspectives of other faith traditions, including secularism, I have chosen to approach the 
question from a distinctively Christian theological perspective for the following reasons: Most 
fundamentally, I presuppose that there is not one unanimous answer to the question of the role 
                                                 
1
 In this dissertation, I will not analyse any specific proponent of such an opposition, as my concern is 
with the theological reception of any opposition to theologically motivated political involvement in 
general. As it will become clear in chapter 5, however, further projects would have to include the 
examination of what specific grace is believed to be mediated by specific opponents to theologically 
motivated engagement in political discussions.  
2
 By apologetics I mean, in this context, a defence of the Christian faith in the face of those who 
oppose it. 
2 
 
played by Christian theology in post-Christendom societies, but that each answer depends 
significantly upon the particular traditional background of the one who answers. On this basis, 
I want my answer to contribute to the Christian tradition; here I understand ‘Christian 
tradition’ in the broad sense of coming into ‘dialogue with other Christian theologians and in 
consideration of what they have said before’. Finally, I want people from other faith 
traditions, as well as secularists, to understand some of the theological reasons proffered in a 
Christian answer to the question concerning theology’s political role in post-Christendom 
societies. 
 More precisely, and having decided to answer the question from a Christian 
theological perspective, I have chosen to opt for a systematic theological approach. In 
systematically assessing the insights and shortcomings of some of the most prominent 
answers to the research question that currently exist, my particular focus will be on how 
theological understandings of nature and grace, as well as Christology, correspond to the 
answers theologians provide to the question concerning theology’s political role in post-
Christendom societies. With this focus on nature and grace in mind, I join existing debates 
concerning the political importance of these particular doctrines, and add a focus on 
Christology as a corrective to one-sided understandings of nature and grace in the existing 
literature. Debates about nature and grace are connected to my hypothesis concerning 
apologetic approaches’ disadvantages, inasmuch as Christian theologians who approach my 
research question apologetically usually bypass any consideration of the ways in which God’s 
grace could be mediated by the secularist opposition to theologically informed political 
engagement. By contrast, I contend that a more Christocentric understanding of grace would 
demand a more sincere theological reflection about the theological significance of this 
secularist opposition to theologically informed contributions to post-Christendom politics.  
 Whereas the rejection of apologetics has traditionally been associated with post-liberal 
Protestant theologies, I question the apologetic approach from a Catholic perspective. Post-
liberals would reject apologetics, because they deny the translatability of the Christian faith 
into publicly accessible terms. From my more Catholic perspective, by contrast, I will 
question the legitimacy of defending the Christian faith in the context of contemporary post-
Christendom. Both positions are related to theological understandings of nature and grace. 
Post-liberals tend to identify revelation, and consequently the Christian faith which depends 
on revelation, with grace, and assume that everything non-Christian lies beyond the realm of 
revelation, thereby constituting a purely natural, un-graced realm. My own perspective 
assumes that grace abounds both within and beyond the Christian tradition, which is why non-
Christian insights and arguments can also possess a revelatory value. On this basis, I will 
claim that the revelatory value, and thus the theological significance, of the strong opposition 
to theologically informed contributions to political debates in post-Christendom societies 
should influence a theological answer to the question of theology’s political role in those 
same societies. 
  
Structure 
 The first chapter serves to briefly present the alleged dichotomy of the most prominent 
responses to my research question provided by public theology, on the one hand, and Radical 
Orthodoxy on the other. Beginning by introducing contemporary public theology as the 
emerging theological sub-discipline, which raises my research question concerning theology’s 
political role in post-Christendom societies, my particular emphasis lies in public theology’s 
contextuality. The specific post-Christendom context is connected to a new political situation, 
in which it is no longer unanimously accepted that Christianity should determine the social 
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order, and to a new cultural situation of pluralism, inasmuch as post-Christendom societies are 
no longer marked by a monolithic Christian culture. Those who oppose any theologically 
informed involvement in public politics pose a particular challenge for theology in this 
context. Public theology’s response to this challenge is determined by its apologetic defence 
of Christian theological contributions to political debates. I introduce the two most prominent 
apologetic justifications that recur in public theological literature, dividing them into a secular 
one, characterised by its reference to the common good, and a theological one, characterised 
by its reference to Christianity’s universality. Moreover, I present a third justification that 
concerns the establishment of public theology as a new theological sub-discipline in this 
unique post-Christendom context. This justification concentrates on the context’s 
characterisation as a pluralist culture, unapologetically stressing that theology has now been 
presented with the opportunity to discern the theological significance of non-Christian 
contributions to political discussions. These three justifications of the importance of public 
theological research, taken together, will guide the structure of my first two chapters. In 
Chapter 1, I begin to distance myself from the public theological apologetic approach to the 
question concerning theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies; this is performed 
by way of indicating how both apologetic justifications of theology’s political relevance lead 
public theologians to re-ascribe a central political role to Christian theology, even in a post-
Christendom context. In the final part of chapter 1, I briefly introduce Radical Orthodoxy, as a 
theological movement from which public theologians have distanced themselves, due to its 
allegedly different response to all three of the aforementioned justifications concerning public 
theology’s relevance. With regard to the first, public theologians criticise Radical Orthodox 
thinkers for being counter-cultural in their refusal to defend Christianity apologetically in 
secular terms. Concerning the second, public theologians seek to distance themselves from 
Radical Orthodoxy’s apparently imperialist construal of Christian universality and 
concomitant upholding of a remnant of Christendom. Regarding the theological significance 
of non-Christian contributions to politics in a pluralist culture, public theologians criticise 
Radical Orthodoxy for operating with an erroneous understanding of grace, one which 
predefines non-Christian positions as entirely un-graced and which allows Radical Orthodox 
authors to present Christianity triumphantly as solely graced with the position of being able to 
solve all political problems. 
 Chapter 2 serves to explain Radical Orthodoxy as alternative to public theology. 
Overall, I argue that both public theology and Radical Orthodoxy share a fundamentally 
apologetic approach to the research question, despite the different answer that each provides 
to the question concerning theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies. My 
argument proceeds by way of explaining Radical Orthodox theologians John Milbank’s and 
Graham Ward’s respective stances concerning all three aforementioned justifications of 
public theological research. Highlighting the differences between Milbank’s and Ward’s 
positions throughout, I show that Radical Orthodoxy is not principally counter-cultural 
regarding secular justifications of theology’s political relevance, but the movement raises 
certain concerns about secularist cultures in particular, which they accuse of perpetuating the 
very brand of Christendom imperialism that public theology seeks to thwart. Milbank then 
apologetically defends a Christian social order as a better alternative, while Ward 
apologetically defends Christian theology as perfecting the postmodern aspirations to 
overcome this secularist imperialism. Regarding public theology’s reference to Christianity’s 
universality as the second justification of theology’s political relevance, I explain how 
Milbank’s and Ward’s respective understandings of universality, in terms of the world’s 
participation in God, promise to be more dynamic than a secularist understanding of 
universality, and as such to be better able to accommodate a pluralist culture than secularism 
is. I then discuss the extent to which the ascription of a central political role to Christian 
theology in post-Christendom societies might be objectionable from a Christian theological 
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perspective. This concern will guide the remainder of the dissertation from the point at which 
I turn to Radical Orthodoxy’s understanding of the theological significance of non-Christian 
contributions to political discussions in post-Christendom societies. Examining Milbank’s and 
Ward’s respective understandings of grace, I argue that both Milbank and Ward present 
Christian theology’s relation to non-Christian positions as acting as direct imitation of 
Christ’s relation to creation, criticising that this proposal exhibits an insufficient 
acknowledgment of sin’s effect on their own theological vision of a better social order. This is 
why I then move into investigating responses proffered to the question of theology’s political 
role in post-Christendom societies that have been more unapologetically guided by 
Christology; specifically, those marked by a more emphatic stress on Christ’s uniqueness. 
 In Chapter 3, I introduce John Howard Yoder’s and Kathryn Tanner’s respective 
Christologies in relation to the research question asked. In both cases, I show how their 
conceptualisations of Christ’s Incarnation, Cross and Resurrection and the church’s role in the 
completion of Christ’s redemptive work are all related to their own assessments of 
apologetics, as well as to the political role they ascribe to Christian theology in post-
Christendom societies. In a second part, I explain how their respective understandings of 
grace correspond to their evaluation of non-Christian political positions’ theological 
significance. Yoder will be presented as a particular representative of post-liberal theologies, 
who principally rejects both apologetics and any remnant of Christendom for the sake of 
Christianity’s integrity. I distance myself from this principled rejection, inasmuch as I criticise 
Yoder for paralleling Radical Orthodoxy in conflating Christ and Yoder’s own theological 
vision of how the world’s redemption might be completed. Kathryn Tanner is then introduced 
as deflecting attention away from Christian theology, concentrating more on the redemption 
uniquely won by Christ, a redemption upon which Christian theology as well as any non-
Christian position rely equally. This leads her to reject the necessity for theology to adopt a 
central political role in post-Christendom societies, in favour of confessing theology’s own 
entanglement in sin. However, Tanner’s understanding of grace predisposes her to discard 
from the outset the possibility that the very opposition to theologically informed contributions 
to public politics might be theologically significant. I part ways with Tanner at the point at 
which she offers theological solutions to contemporary political problems in order to convince 
opponents that Christian theology can contribute positively to political debates in post-
Christendom societies, because I want to consider the theological significance of the 
opposition to any such contribution more sincerely.  
 Having consistently criticised the failure, of all of those theologians introduced, to 
consider the theological significance of the secularist opposition to theologically informed 
contributions to political discussions in post-Christendom societies, I then turn in Chapter 4 to 
Edward Schillebeeckx whose theology is marked by a remarkably non-defensive reception of 
atheist thought, despite atheism’s open rejection of Christianity in Schillebeeckx’s own 
context. While I began Chapters 1 and 2 with public theology’s and Radical Orthodoxy’s 
apologetic defences of Christian theology’s political relevance in a post-Christendom context, 
then going on to explain how this is related to their respective understandings of grace, 
Chapter 4 begins with an explanation of Schillebeeckx’s unapologetic approach to those he 
may have considered to be theology’s opponents. I argue, in the remainder of Chapter 4, that 
Schillebeeckx’s optimistic reception of atheism corresponds to a Christology that is better 
able to distinguish between Christ’s uniqueness and the sinful shortcomings of Christian 
theology than those of public theology, Radical Orthodoxy or post-liberal theologies. As a 
consequence, Schillebeeckx’s understanding of redemption differs considerably from all of 
the others introduced throughout this dissertation. While the others associate the Christian 
faith in redemption with theology’s ability to solve political problems, Schillebeeckx is more 
pessimistic regarding theology’s ability to solve problems and is more optimistic concerning 
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the reality of redemption in which the whole world always already participates nonetheless; 
this reflects a pessimism concerning humankind’s liability to sin and an optimism regarding 
God’s forgiveness. Consequently, theology’s most specific political task is to discern the way 
in which this forgiveness is mediated in the contemporary context, despite both Christianity’s 
and atheism’s shortcomings.  
 In Chapter 5, I assess the contemporary relevance of Schillebeeckx’s Christology to 
answering the question of theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies by way of 
tracing the way in which he continuously modified his own theology in accordance to what he 
understood to be contemporary mediations of God’s forgiveness. I argue that his approach, 
given that it is characterised by a merciful critique of non-Christian positions, focussing 
primarily on what Christian theology can learn and only secondarily on what must be refused, 
needs to be retrieved for contemporary public theological discussions. Finally, I return to 
public theology’s emphasis on the contexts of post-Christendom and pluralism by way of 
retrieving the way in which Schillebeeckx reshaped his theology through attending to the 
theological significance of these contexts, and conclude by applying Schillebeeckx’s 
hermeneutics of mercy to contemporary political questions.  
  
CHAPTER 1 
PUBLIC THEOLOGY: 
APOLOGETIC DEFENCES OF THEOLOGY’S POLITICAL RELEVANCE IN 
POST-CHRISTENDOM SOCIETIES 
 
 In this chapter, I critically introduce public theology as an emerging sub-discipline of 
Christian theology. First, I examine how public theologians define their own area of research, 
thereafter contextualising public theology in the second part. Thirdly, I analyse how public 
theologians apologetically defend the relevance of their own research. These self-justifying 
arguments will be divided into two apologetic and one unapologetic justification. An 
investigation into the latter aims to show that the theological concept of grace is crucial to 
public theology’s self-stated relevance. However, I will argue that the way in which 
theological understandings of nature, grace and sin all relate to the public theological question 
about Christian theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies has not yet been 
sufficiently explored. 
 I conclude the chapter with a brief introduction of Radical Orthodoxy as an alternative 
dominant approach to the question of Christian theology’s political role in post-Christendom 
societies. As well as presenting public theologians’ main reservations towards Radical 
Orthodoxy, this last part of Chapter 1 also constitutes the basis for Chapter 2 in which I 
explain Radical Orthodox theologians John Milbank’s and Graham Ward’s positions in 
greater detail.  
   
1.1 Definitions of public theology 
 
 Discussions about exactly which questions the emerging sub-discipline of public 
theology seeks to address are still ongoing. In the following two sections I introduce public 
theology, first by way of providing a definition of its field of enquiry. Thereafter, I give a 
systematic overview of the accounts of the present context, which has given rise to this 
relatively new theological sub-discipline. Altogether, I present public theology as comprising 
a contextual theology, one which specifically addresses problems arising in post-Christendom 
societies. 
 Definitions of public theology differ slightly with respect to the degree to which this 
sub-discipline is regarded as being predominantly a practice or a critically reflective and 
theoretical undertaking. Moreover, there are also differences regarding who is defined as a 
public theologian and who is not. Sebastian Kim categorises all Christian engagement with 
people outside the church on issues of common interest under the term ‘public theology’.3 In 
other words, all members of the Christian community, and the people with whom they 
interact, could be called public theologians. For Ronald Thiemann, public theology is not 
simply another term for practical Christian engagement in the public sphere, but is rather a 
theological examination of this engagement. He defines public theology as faith seeking to 
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understand the relationship between Christian convictions and the broader cultural context in 
which Christianity is set, something which is suggestive of a kind of Christian sociology.
4
 
Elaine Graham also defines public theology as a discipline that reflects on the interaction 
between Christian faith and the wider public. However, her definition of public theology as 
‘the study of public relevance of religious thought and practice, normally within Christian 
tradition’ reveals a different research focus than Thiemann’s.5 For her, what Christians think 
and do is not primarily studied in order to arrive at a fuller understanding of the Christian 
faith, but instead Christian public engagement is measured against whatever is defined as 
‘public relevance’. In other words, Thiemann’s definition suggests that public theology 
investigates the meaning of Christian political engagement for adherents to the Christian faith, 
while according to Graham’s definition, public theology examines the meaning of Christian 
political engagement for a broader public than Christians alone. These definitions remain very 
broad and somewhat vague. An examination of what is meant by the term ‘public’ will help to 
clarify the issue.
6
  
 Others have observed that public theologians may use the term ‘public’ as synonym 
for ‘universal’ or as a synonym for ‘common’, depending on their national context.7 The 
public is understood as a political category, particularly when ‘public’ refers to ‘common’. 
Public theological research, then, concerns theological contributions to a particular society’s 
common good. The public often refers to some notion of space in which people meet each 
other ‘not as family members or intimates, but neither as aliens or utter strangers’.8 The 
public, thus, ‘points to a realm of encounter and engagement characterized by a limited degree 
of plurality’.9 ‘A limited degree of plurality’ indicates that the public is always distinct from a 
larger global, as well as from a smaller intimate, community. This political understanding of 
‘the public’ is recognisably present in leading British public theologian Sebastian Kim’s 
thought. He argues that public theology, as a distinct sub-discipline, is rooted in the 
increasingly acknowledged need for greater interaction between theology and contemporary 
society, where public issues are concerned.
10
 Consequently, ‘[p]ublic theology is theology 
engaging with the main bodies in the public sphere and the Church’s attempt to contribute to 
wider society’.11 Public theologians in the UK tend to identify the public with the democratic 
forum in which theologians can voice their opinion as representatives of one societal group 
amongst many others.
12
 As will be clarified in the section below, concerning public 
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theology’s post-Christendom context, this means that ‘the public’ denotes a pluralist political 
forum, in contrast to the monolithically Christian political forum of previous eras. This raises 
the question of the legitimacy of Christian theological contributions to political debates, and 
the shape these contributions take.  
 A great deal of public theological literature has inherited the understanding of the 
public in terms of universal accessibility from Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory.13 A 
publicly accessible argumentation is one which is open to inspection and can be discussed by 
all.
14
 Others have referred to this aspect by explaining that the notion of the public is 
associated with visibility and transparency.
15
 This association has two consequences for 
public theology: On the one hand, Christian theologians are asked to contribute publicly 
accessible and intelligible insights to public discussions, and on the other hand, more internal 
Christian theological discussions might also be opened up to public inspection. Placing this 
aspect of public accessibility at the core of public theology has meant that the sub-discipline 
has been defined by its proponents as public, primarily because of its method.
16
 The method 
observes the procedural criteria of dialogue within a pluralistic public sphere.  
 However, the assumption of public accessibility often presupposes that there exists 
some neutral, in the sense of not culturally conditioned language, and understanding. The 
existence of this kind of neutrality has been most forcefully contested by Radical Orthodox 
authors, who argue that specific cultural influences and biases can never be transcended, as 
will be explained more explicitly in Chapter 2. A position, such as that of public theology, 
might tend to reify a society’s common good as a thing in itself that exists independently from 
different cultural interpretations of the term. Even if some public theologians understand each 
specific public as being historically contingent, due to its constitution in and through evolving 
social relations, it is still presupposed that each public involves some ‘common interests’ as 
well as a shared acknowledgement that some of these are problematic and necessarily 
debatable.
17
 If, however, the notion of ‘common good’ evokes very different associations by 
different people within the same public, depending on their socio-cultural background, that 
there is agreement concerning what counts as problematic and what counts as being politically 
advantageous project might be far less clear than public theologians presuppose. 
 In total, proponents of public theology are generally in agreement that the 
phenomenon to be examined by the discipline is the interrelation between the community of 
Christian faith and the wider public in which it finds itself. Public theology is defined as both 
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this interrelation itself, understood as an activity and as a theoretical reflection on this 
interrelation. In many West-European contexts, the overarching aim is to determine how, in a 
shared political forum, Christian theology and other public agents contribute to the common 
good. I analyse the context in which public theology is situated in the following section, in 
order to clarify why this should warrant a new theological sub-discipline, which devotes its 
full attention to the relation between the church and its surrounding society.  
 
1.2 The context of public theology 
 
 The context that gave rise to public theology as an emerging theological sub-discipline 
is marked by two main characteristics. First, there is the political context of post-
Christendom, which means that Christian theologians must reconsider the impact Christian 
theology can legitimately have upon the social order of a society. While Christian theological 
considerations might have played a significant political role in days gone by, it has become 
debatable in a post-Christendom context whether Christian theologians should be allowed any 
central role in political discussions. This primary post-Christendom context is, then, also why 
public theologians highlight that they operate within democratic systems. Second, there is the 
cultural context of pluralism, which is a result of the first. With the dissolution of 
Christendom, there is no longer one monolithic Christian culture, and Christian theology 
proceeds in an environment of increasing cultural diversity. In the exposition that follows, I 
argue that public theologians tend to connect this situation of a pluralist culture to the political 
challenge of reconsidering the common good which should unify such a society and that, in 
this way, public theologians re-ascribe to Christian theology a central political role in a post-
Christendom context.  
 
a) The end of Christendom: De-centring theology’s political role  
 
 The most important characteristic of the contemporary context, in reference to public 
theology, is the increasing loss of Christianity’s social and political hegemony in Western 
Europe. This provides for an unprecedented theological context, one which deserves 
particular attention. Some public theologians have referred to the current situation as the 
‘collapse of Christendom’.18 Christendom refers to the post-Constantinian form of governance 
where state and church were insolubly interrelated to such an extent that Christianity was 
identical with the whole of organised society, and thus Christian theology was closely linked 
to determining the overarching social order.
19
 Public theologians seek to respond to a context 
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in which Christianity has lost its privileged position. Agreeing that this situation deserves 
particular theological attention, I contend that public theologians have, thus far, insufficiently 
overcome the problems of Christendom’s imperialism. The public theological response to this 
new situation is to accept that political debates are no longer dominated by Christians, but 
rather shaped by politicians from a plurality of backgrounds. Presupposing that secular 
liberalism should determine the social order of post-Christendom societies, public theologians 
immediately move to the practical question concerning how, in a context in which Christian 
theology has lost its privileged position, Christian theological arguments might be defended 
apologetically.
20
 They argue that this new situation demands that religious arguments must be 
accessible to the scrutiny of all and are concerned with rendering Christian theological claims 
publicly assessable.
21
 In this pragmatic approach public theologians have tended to re-
advocate a privileged political position for Christian theology, as will become apparent in the 
course of this chapter. My concern is not to question the possibility of this translation, nor do I 
intend to join public theological discussions concerning what particular form of apologetics 
should be chosen in the contemporary societal context. Instead, I am concerned with the way 
in which this apologetic focus, on defending the Christian faith in a secularist context, has 
tended to deflect theological attention away from the issue at stake; namely, that theology’s 
political role has become contested.  
 At this point, it must be mentioned that there is an awareness among contemporary 
public theologians that present-day theology is faced with particular opposition from the post-
Christendom public. Unlike in previous eras, theology’s relevance for the public is no longer 
presupposed by society.
22
 This is why public theology seeks to respond to those 
contemporaries who think of ‘religion’23 as a merely private affair, and to those who 
vehemently reject any Christian theological contributions to public politics. Concomitant with 
their apologetic approach, public theologians seek to enable members of post-Christendom 
societies to trust and respect Christian theological contributions to public life once again.
24
 
This is perceived, on the one hand, as a practical issue insofar as some of the mistrust against 
Christianity has arisen due to the churches’ past political failures to meet their own 
propagated ideals. In this respect the churches have to win the public’s trust back by 
following their calling more faithfully. On the other hand, public theologians also seek to 
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respond theoretically to the more fundamental problem that theological arguments are no 
longer granted an a priori authority.
25
  
 The problem with their apologetic response to this opposition or mistrust of theology’s 
political role becomes apparent in the way in which public theologians present the role of 
Christian theology in a democratic context. Public theologians evaluate democracy as a 
favourable form of government, for politics is meant here to arise from the public and 
common life.
26
 Public theologians, therefore, want to contribute to this public policy-making. 
However, this would still involve discussions about the weight given to the Christian 
theological impact on the way in which a particular democracy is organised. In this regard, it 
is striking that some public theologians return to a position of advocating a central role for 
Christian theology in these matters, implicitly remaining within the problems associated with 
Christendom. Some still advocate a central place for theology in democratic life, associating 
Christian theology with the responsibility of developing a normative vision for the whole of 
democracy.
27
 This is not so much phrased in terms of providing the social order, as it is in 
terms of providing ethical guidance to the entire society.
28
 However, the entire argument that 
Christian ethics could and should be accepted by all relies on the implicit assumption that 
Christian theology is universal in a way that other traditions are not. And, this is precisely 
what those who oppose Christendom, as well as any theological involvement in public 
politics, reject. 
 Another public theological position wants the Christian churches to be responsible for 
the facilitation of dialogue needed in order to overcome conflicts in a democratic culture.
29
 
This position promises to enhance democratic life by acting as the mediator for conflicting 
parties. Public theology’s facilitation of democratic dialogue is furthermore advocated as a 
remedy to the systemic exclusion of marginalised groups from democratic debates. Following 
the lead of Latin-American liberation theologies, public theology seeks to empower these 
marginalised voices.
30
 This position would still cling to the belief that Christian theology 
plays a central political role in post-Christendom societies too. A Christian theological 
understanding of conflicts, appropriate dialogue, compromise, marginalisation and 
reconciliation would be necessary in order to establish churches as places that facilitate 
democratic dialogue. In summary, it can be said that both those who want Christian theology 
to offer the overarching normative vision or ethical guidance for society and those who want 
public theology to facilitate and enhance democratic dialogue ascribe a more central role, than 
that of being just one equal contributor to the democratic forum, to Christian theology. The 
same problem reappears with regard to public theological considerations of the role of 
Christian theology in a pluralist culture. 
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b) Pluralism: Christianity amongst a plurality of worldviews 
 
 The end of Christendom and the loss of Christianity’s hegemony in Western societies 
have led to a cultural and religious pluralism in which Christian theology represents the 
perspective of but one worldview amongst others. Public theology wants to counteract the 
danger that Christian theologians might interpret this pluralism in Western societies to act as 
an incentive to define Christianity as just one detached subsystem amongst others.
31
 Public 
theologians strive to uphold the church’s calling to redeem the whole world instead of seeking 
security within its own confines, even in a pluralist society. Despite this universalist tone, 
public theologians also want to respect the pluralist context by abstaining from any aspiration 
to return to a Christian monopoly.
32
 Public theologians, then, proceed by way of focusing on 
problems with contemporary pluralist cultures and by offering Christian theological solutions 
to these problems. 
 Two specific problems are connected to the pluralist context that public theology seeks 
to address. Firstly, public theologians attest a lack of common ground as to what the common 
good, for which all people should strive, actually is.
33
 This is a problem for public theology 
since representatives of the sub-discipline are convinced that a society is held together by its 
search for the common good. Secondly, there is the meta-reflection concerning the problem 
that, although a pluralist society legitimates and celebrates a plurality of worldviews, most 
faith traditions do not identify themselves as simply one worldview among others.
34
 One 
could say that there is a clash between a secularist outlook, which regards the plurality of 
worldviews as all formally equal, and the particular faith-based outlooks, which render the 
public sphere pluralist, even though they might regard themselves as uniquely valid. Many 
faith traditions claim to describe the whole of reality more truthfully than others.
35
  
 There are two prominent positions in public theology that respond to this pluralist 
context. One negates the essential reality of pluralism in Western societies. The plurality of 
worldviews is interpreted as a surface phenomenon which is, however, still held together by 
the same cultural foundation. Here, it is argued that theology is able and responsible to 
excavate this shared moral vision, which might organise the plurality of worldviews within a 
society. One representative of this is Max Stackhouse’s trust that our present society is still 
based on the Christian heritage that led to modernity and which simply needs to be recovered 
from over-zealous secularisation.
36
 Moreover, there is a current within public theology that 
understands the plurality of worldviews to be more fundamentally real. They regard 
Christianity as one worldview amongst other equally legitimate worldviews, and seek to 
discern the appropriate place for theology in this mélange.  
 Also connected to the pluralist context, public theology is a self-consciously 
international discipline, in which the Western-European and North-American contexts are not 
meant to be privileged over others. This is manifest in the International Journal of Public 
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Theology, which has established a theological debate that includes authors from a wide range 
of nationalities.
37
 In the face of the whole world’s increasing economic, infrastructural and 
political interconnectedness, public theology seeks to establish a theological discourse which 
reflects upon and harnesses this interconnection. Public theology, thus, strives towards a more 
inclusive globalisation.
38
 Increasing globalisation is believed to intensify the need to define 
the common good more than at any other previous point in human history.
39
 Public theology 
seeks to contribute to a more inclusive globalisation by connecting different contextual 
theologies in such a way that they enrich each other.
40
 Again, here public theology ascribes a 
mediating position to itself, seeking to mediate between globalisation optimists and the 
pessimists who plea for a radical re-regionalisation.
41
 Public theology appreciates both an 
unprecedented interconnectedness amongst all, and a variety of highly divergent regional 
developments.  
 In sum, I will continue to refer to public theology as a new theological sub-discipline 
that establishes itself in response to the end of Christendom. The end of Christendom has 
challenged theology’s political role, given that some contemporaries firmly oppose any strong 
Christian theological contribution to public politics. Public theologians respond to this 
opposition by defending the Christian faith apologetically. Representatives of the field seek to 
uphold the Christian theological responsibility to reflect on the whole of society’s redemption, 
which they most often phrase in ethical terms. At the same time, they are wary of re-
establishing a Christian social order, since this would amount to the re-establishment of 
Christendom. I have argued, however, that their apologetic approach tends to lead public 
theologians to re-advocate a central role for Christian theology in organising the societal 
whole. Some public theologians, following Max Stackhouse’s lead, advocate Christian values 
as providing the common ground, even for a pluralist post-Christendom society, while others 
ascribe a mediating position between conflicting parties to Christian theology, one which 
again would set the terms for how conflicts are successfully mediated.  
 I will continue, in what follows, to scrutinise public theology’s apologetic approach on 
the basis of my contention that public theologians have not yet fully overcome the problems 
associated with Christendom. To this end, I will now turn to the ongoing public theological 
debates about the political relevance of Christian theology in a post-Christendom context. In 
what follows, I analyse in greater detail the public theological contention that the political 
context of post-Christendom confronts Christian theology with the new challenge of 
defending theology’s public relevance apologetically. The cultural context of pluralism, on 
the contrary, is being associated with the particular opportunity, and challenge, to reflect upon 
the theological significance of non-Christian insights and practices. Overall, throughout the 
course of this dissertation, I will disagree with the former and agree with the latter intuition. 
More precisely, I will contest the former apologetic approach on the basis of my agreement 
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with the contention that the pluralist context offers the opportunity to discern the theological 
significance of non-Christian insights. 
 
1.3 Public theology as apologetics 
 
 The previous two parts of this chapter have provided a brief description of public 
theology, by way of examining its self-definitions, and the specific contexts to which public 
theologians respond. I have particularly highlighted the importance of the post-Christendom 
context to the emergence of public theology as a sub-discipline, on the one hand, and public 
theology’s insufficient overcoming of the problems associated with Christendom, on the 
other. Since this insufficient overcoming has been associated with public theology’s 
preference for an apologetic approach to any opposition of Christian theological contributions 
to public politics, I now wish to turn to the more critical investigation of a core concern in 
public theological literature, namely the ‘relevance’ of public theology.42 I distinguish three 
reasons given for the necessity of public theological research: the first, and this is the most 
contested justification for the relevance of public theology, concerns the argument that 
Christianity’s distinctiveness in a pluralist public context allows Christian theologians to offer 
unique contributions to public discussions. Since this justification concerns theological 
contributions to the common good, as it is defined by the surrounding society, I will call this a 
secular justification for theology’s public relevance.43 This justification is met with the 
criticism that ‘[t]ypically, “public theologies” are self-destructively accommodationist: they 
let the ‘“larger” secular world’s self-understanding set the terms, and then ask how religious 
faith contributes to the purposes of public life, so understood’.44 However, there are also two 
types of theological justifications of public theology, which each deserve separate attention. 
First, the task of contributing Christian insights to the wider public is also defended on the 
grounds that Christian theology is inherently public; it is not solely confined to serve the 
churches.
45
 In other words, theology’s public relevance is defended in association with the 
universality of the Christian message. I will call this a theological justification for theology’s 
public relevance due to this assumption of the Christian perspective. A second theological 
justification for the relevance of public theology concerns the argument that insights from the 
wider public can enhance the Christian self-understanding.
46
 I will call this the theological 
significance of the public. This is then no longer an apologetic defence of theology’s political 
relevance, but it is a justification for the necessity of a kind of public theological research, one 
which concerns Christian theology’s attentiveness to a pluralist post-Christendom context.  
 Overall, I emphasis, in what follows, the ways in which the first two justifications of 
theology’s public relevance are associated with apologetics and lend themselves to ascribing a 
central political role in post-Christendom societies to Christian theology. The third 
justification of public theological research, which would ascribe the task of interpreting the 
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pluralist context from the perspective of Christian theology to the sub-discipline, might allow 
public theologians not to return to such a remnant of Christendom.  
 
a) The common good: Secular justifications for theology’s public relevance 
 
 Many public theologians justify the relevance of their own sub-discipline with 
reference to the common good; this can take weaker or stronger forms. For Sebastian Kim, 
theology can contribute alternative, and otherwise unknown, solutions to public problems.
47
 A 
contribution to the common good can be made by drawing upon the resources that the 
Christian tradition provides for this undertaking.
48
 Theological insights are presented as an 
enrichment of public life.
49
 Some public theologians have highlighted that Christianity should 
not be given any privilege over other worldviews in the search for the common good.
50
 These 
are weaker, non-theological reasons for the pursuit of public theology in the sense that they, 
as mentioned above, presuppose that the public defines the common good, and that theology 
can contribute to this vision as one of many positions in the public sphere. One problem with 
this position concerns the very assumption that the public is still striving towards the common 
good, such as Christian theologians understand it, and this might still be an unjustifiable 
holdover from Christendom. In other words, the problem with this justification is not only that 
it runs the risk of accommodating the Christian faith to a secular agenda, but also to impose 
the Christian perspective onto the public, and not permit the public to develop in genuinely 
different directions. 
 The latter risk is evidenced in the writings of those public theologians who see public 
theology not just as one contributor to a publicly defined common good, but who position 
Christian theology at a more central place in debates of public concern. They regard the 
public as in such a dire need of theology that the whole of society would collapse if it did not 
draw upon theological resources. It is argued that secularism is unable to provide the values 
necessary to managing a harmoniously shared public life.
51
 Therefore, contemporary Western 
societies need religion in order to secure public discourse and to provide the platform on 
which consensus can be founded. This justification of public theology follows in Jürgen 
Habermas’ footsteps. Following his defence of secular reason, Habermas came to detect the 
insufficiency of secular argumentations to the task of establishing a harmonious society, 
which is why he came to reconsider the public relevance of theological arguments. Habermas 
now claims that moral and metaphysical ideals are necessary in order to argumentatively 
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maintain the dignity of human beings as a universal reference-point.
52
 Max Stackhouse, in a 
similar vein, has argued that public theology has to remind society that truth, beauty, justice 
and honesty transcend the realm of that which can be materially accounted for.
53
 This presents 
the secular as itself barren of values and consisting of material realities exclusively.  
 In Chapter 2, I will introduce Radical Orthodoxy as the theological movement that has 
most recently contested the underlying assumption of this justification. Far from being 
valueless, and in need of theology in order not to collapse, John Milbank argues that 
secularism works with a very specific metaphysical vision of material reality and the problem 
is precisely that secularism denies this vision and pretends to access materiality purely in its 
immanence, something which Radical Orthodox theologians reject. I will argue throughout 
the course of this dissertation that both the public theological understanding of secularism as 
valueless, as well as the Radical Orthodox countering of the specific values and metaphysics 
of secularism, ascribe a questionably central political role in post-Christendom societies to 
Christian theology. Both positions point to a problem within secularism (namely its inability 
to organise a society well, which public theologians associate with secularism’s supposed 
valuelessness and Radical Orthodox theologians associate with secularism’s supposedly 
erroneous metaphysics) in order to, then, apologetically present Christian theology as a 
solution to this problem. This apologetic approach readily becomes circular, inventing a 
problem associated with secularism, to which Christian theology is then offered as solution. 
Moreover, this apologetic approach circumvents the task of theologically discerning the 
theological significance of any vehement secularist opposition to theological contributions to 
post-Christendom politics, because the focus is one-sidedly on the secularist perspective’s 
supposed need of theological correction. This conflicts with the public theological self-
claimed sensitivity to the theological significance of the public, explained in greater detail 
below (under c).  
 
b) Universality: Theological justifications for theology’s public relevance 
 
 In distinction from those who criticise this first justification for being too 
accommodationist to Christianity’s surrounding public, I contend that this first justification of 
public theology’s relevance tends to re-ascribe too central a political role in post-Christendom 
societies to Christian theology. It is worth attending to the Christian theological justifications 
of theology’s public relevance. Here, Christianity’s relevance for the wider public is 
associated with the Christian mission to proclaim the gospel to the whole world in word and 
deed.
54
 This is primarily based on the fact that Christianity has no concept of some secret 
revelation for a select few, but that it confesses a God who has revealed Godself publicly.
55
 
Since the God Christians believe in has revealed Godself in the midst of the world, the 
Christian message should not be passed on as some type of secret wisdom, belonging only to 
the faith community. Whatever Christians have to say should be as publicly manifest as God’s 
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own self-revelation. This justification of Christianity’s publicness, then, does not yet cover 
any questions concerning the degree to which the public is served or the extent to which the 
public appreciates the Christian proclamation in its midst. A problem with this claim is that it 
is too vague and is hardly contested by any other Christian theologian. Not many Christian 
theologians would uphold Christian theology as a form of secret wisdom, but neither would 
all of them argue for the need of public theology.  
 In this regard it is important to note that public theologians often associate this 
publicness of Christianity’s message with the need to translate the Christian faith into the 
language of the surrounding culture.
56
 Elaine Graham even claims that public theology is 
distinct from both post-liberal theologies and Radical Orthodoxy due to its contrasting answer 
to ‘the question of the extent to which public theology should “translate” Christian language 
into speech acceptable and intelligible to a non-Christian audience in order to make any 
significant impact’.57 As will become apparent in the course of this dissertation, however, 
there is no necessary association between theological utterances, which are public in the sense 
of not being kept secret, and the translatability of Christian theology into a publicly accessible 
language. The refusal of some Christian theologians to translate the Christian faith is 
connected to their denial of the existence of some neutral, universally intelligible language. 
They regard such a neutral language to be a particularly modern conception, which is 
suspected of concealing its own rootedness in a particular tradition, and of thereby disguisedly 
perpetuating Christendom’s imperialism. Consequently, other theologians envision different 
ways of conceptualising Christian universality in order to overcome the problems of 
Christendom imperialism more successfully. It can be summarised that apologetic 
justifications of theology’s public relevance have neither managed to overcome the remnant 
of Christendom, nor have they yet confronted the problems concerning theology’s political 
role in post-Christendom societies exhaustively. 
 
c) Grace: The theological significance of the public 
 
 Apart from these apologetic defences of theology’s political relevance in post-
Christendom societies, public theologians also justify the necessity of their newly established 
sub-discipline with reference to Christian theology’s reliance on insights from the public 
realm. This justification is primarily associated with the aforementioned context of cultural 
pluralism, one which accompanies the political context of post-Christendom. In a society that 
is no longer monolithically Christian, Christian theologians are now presented with the task of 
discerning the theological significance of non-Christian positions, insights and practices, and 
are required to modify their own theological politics accordingly. In this regard, public 
theologians have, thus far, presented the pluralist public either as a corrective to already 
existing theological insights or as somehow expected to contribute original insights, insights 
which theology could not otherwise gain on its own. The stance of the public as corrective is 
implicitly advocated by Stackhouse, according to whom the universality of theological claims 
is tested and proven by theology’s ability to create greater inclusiveness, greater justice and 
greater mercy in society at large.
58
 The public would then serve as empirical evidence (or 
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falsification) of the Christian proclamation. The problem with this position is, however, that it 
simply assumes that the Christian understanding of, justice, for instance, is publicly 
acceptable. Appreciating true plurality might imply that the Christian understanding of justice 
is much more radically challenged by the way in which other traditions understand the term.
59
  
 Being more than just a corrective, David Tracy, another forefather of public theology, 
understands the plurality of insights from the public as something integral to the Christian 
tradition. For Tracy, Christian theologians must not simply repeat the Christian tradition in 
contemporary culture, but must recreate it in ever new contexts.
60
 The tradition has to be 
manifested anew in each historical circumstance. In other words, doing exactly the same thing 
as what has been done in the past would be a distortion, because the past activity belonged as 
much to a past context as the present activity has to belong to a present context. Conversation 
with the environment and a hermeneutics of suspicion which unmasks the distortions of the 
Christian tradition are inherent components of Christian theology. The public is, thus, a 
constitutive aspect of the faithful transmission of the Christian tradition within the 
contemporary context.  
 While Tracy’s proposal could be termed a philosophical hermeneutical reflection on 
the transmission of traditions throughout history, Graham puts this argument about the 
relevance of the public for theology in doctrinal terms. She argues that common grace and 
natural law theory oblige Christian theologians to discern God’s presence outside of the 
confines of the churches.
61
 Apart from common grace, she also refers to ‘the seeds of [...] 
redemption’ that are scattered throughout the world, in need of further cultivation by Christian 
theology.
62
 If the acceptance of God’s offer of grace is central to the Christian life, and the 
rejection of the self-same offer is regarded as being sinful, then Christian theology must 
attend to the public in order not to reject the offer of God’s grace prematurely. On the other 
hand, the public is presented as being in need of Christianity for the fulfilment of its ‘seeds of 
redemption’. Combined with public theology’s emphasis on dialogue, instead of ‘one-way 
preaching’, this means that the public is not just a passive field lying in front of theologians to 
be studied.
63
 Instead, public theology wants to provide a platform in which the public can 
actively contribute to theological discussions and receive the theological completion of its 
contributions. 
 In the chapters of this dissertation which remain, I shall agree with and further 
elaborate upon this understanding of the pluralist public as graced and the presentation of 
Christian theology with the task of discerning ways in which insights from non-Christians 
might be theologically significant. However, public theologians have not yet considered the 
question of how far the very opposition to theologically informed contributions to political 
debates in post-Christendom societies itself might be considered to mediate grace. My 
concern is related to an insufficient public theological engagement in theological debates 
about nature, grace, and sin. Throughout the course of this dissertation, I will show that 
different theological understandings of grace are connected to divergent understandings of the 
political role ascribed to Christian theology in post-Christendom societies. While public 
theologians erroneously criticise post-liberal, as well as Radical Orthodox, theologies for 
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neglecting mediations of grace in the non-Christian public, in order either to withdraw 
altogether from contributing theologically to political discussions (post-liberals) or re-install 
Christian theology as providing the best overarching social order for the whole of society 
(Radical Orthodoxy), I will argue that the problem is more complicated than that. While not 
many theologians deny that grace is also mediated by non-Christian positions, theology’s role 
in organising the societal whole is related to the understanding of the relation between graced 
nature, graced nature’s fulfilment in Christ, as well as to sin, and Christ’s overcoming of sin.64  
 
1.4 Public theology vs. Radical Orthodoxy  
 
 In order to pave the way to the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, I will now turn 
to two theological positions commonly rejected by public theologians and against the 
background of which they present their own approach as a third alternative. First, there is 
Radical Orthodoxy, which public theologians reject in relation to the movement’s supposedly 
inadequate response to both post-Christendom politics and the context of cultural pluralism. 
Radical Orthodoxy fails not only to appreciate the grace mediated by non-Christian insights 
but also seeks to uphold a remnant of Christendom.
65
 In the following section, I will briefly 
introduce Radical Orthodoxy as a theological movement as well as the main public 
theological concerns therewith. A more detailed discussion of the degree to which these 
criticisms are justified, and the way in which Radical Orthodoxy can challenge public 
theology in turn, will follow in Chapter 2.  
 However, at this point, it should briefly be mentioned that public theologians also 
reject a second theological position; namely, post-liberalism. Post-liberal theologies are being 
rejected, once more, in association with a presumably inadequate response to the political 
post-Christendom context as well as to the cultural pluralist context. Post-liberals erroneously 
interpret the context of post-Christendom to be an incentive to no longer reflect theologically 
on the organisation of the whole of society, and to limit theological reflection instead only to 
questions concerning the organisation of the church.
66
 Many public theologians agree with the 
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post-liberal idea that churches should be morally outstanding communities, but they contest 
the stark split between church and public, such as it has been postulated by post-liberals. 
Public theology holds fast to the idea that Christian theology should still search for solutions 
to the problems that concern the society as a whole. Moreover, public theologians criticise 
post-liberals, just as they criticise Radical Orthodoxy, for failing to recognise the grace 
mediated in non-Christian insights in a pluralist culture. In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, John 
Howard Yoder and Kathryn Tanner will be presented as two different theologians who are 
associated with the post-liberal tradition. John Howard Yoder counts as one of contemporary 
post-liberalism’s forefathers, while Tanner had been trained in this tradition and later 
distanced herself therefrom.
67
 Chapter 3 helps this dissertation’s overall argument, insofar as 
the remnant of Christendom upheld by both public theology and Radical Orthodoxy will be 
challenged. In turn, I will show that neither Yoder nor Tanner could be legitimately criticised 
for any sectarian withdrawal from secular politics. In what follows, I first briefly introduce 
Radical Orthodoxy for those who might not be familiar with the movement. 
  
a) Radical Orthodoxy as a theological movement 
 
 Radical Orthodoxy is a theological movement that was inaugurated with the 
publication of Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology
68
 in 1999, a volume edited by the then 
Cambridge-based theologians John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward.
69
 The 
movement’s aim has been ‘to contest secular culture’ and to counter ‘the side-lining of 
theology from academic and public discourse’.70 In other words, Radical Orthodoxy shares 
public theology’s opposition to the privatisation of Christianity, which is why the movement 
has been characterised as essentially a ‘world-oriented’ theology.71 Radical Orthodoxy aims 
to disclose the insufficiency of purely immanent accounts of reality, in order to oppose the 
privatisation of faith traditions. In this sense, their Christian theology is a way of cultural 
critique in a secularist culture. Part of the Radical Orthodox cultural critique is to contest the 
idea of there being some ‘neutral reason’ and to uphold, instead, the idea that reason is only 
truly reasonable within the framework of Christian theology.
72
 Radical Orthodoxy contests 
the secular understanding of immanent reality, as being objectively given, and regards it 
instead to be a contingent human creation, a view that is in agreement with postmodern 
philosophers.
73
 Truth claims, including Christian ones, are being valued as historically 
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conditioned.
74
 At this point, it is important to highlight that Radical Orthodoxy regards the 
privatisation of religion as being indissolubly interlinked to a purely immanent, secularist 
worldview, whereas some public theologians evaluate secularism in a less critical manner. 
 Some praise Radical Orthodoxy for offering helpful resources for imagining an 
alternative way of being in the world, due to its constructive goals.
75
 In sum, Radical 
Orthodoxy values and retrieves the Christian tradition as a fertile resource for contemporary 
church and society. The goal is to provide a comprehensive account of every aspect of the 
world from the Christian perspective.
76
 In doctrinal terms, this means that, as a constructive 
alternative to secularism, Radical Orthodox theologians uphold the idea of the participation of 
all of reality in God.
77
 This idea highlights, on the one hand, that immanent reality is other 
than God and that immanent reality can only be adequately understood in relation to God on 
the other.
78
 This analogical relation of the world to God is, for Radical Orthodoxy, not merely 
some static theory, but ‘[i]t is a living way of relating to God, best expressed in Christian life 
and worship’.79 
 While the term ‘movement’ could be associated with some singular agenda, Radical 
Orthodoxy is better characterised through its initiative and readiness to examine the realities, 
which one might always have assumed to be unambiguous or self-evident, from a different 
perspective.
80
 Radical Orthodoxy, thus, denotes a ‘certain spirit of theologically driven 
cultural engagement’.81 In conclusion of this very brief introduction of Radical Orthodoxy, it 
is noteworthy that, over the years, Radical Orthodox authors have become more nuanced and 
less confrontational with respect to those whose ideas they oppose.
82
 Graham Ward has 
distanced himself from the movement in recent years completely and refers to Milbank’s 
project as a ‘nostalgic’ retrieval of the ontology prior to Christianity’s supposed loss of 
orthodoxy in the Middle Ages.
83
 Nevertheless, it is important, where this dissertation is 
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concerned, that Ward still shares Radical Orthodoxy’s opposition to an exclusivist secularism 
and purely immanent understandings of reality.
84
 The similarities and differences between 
Milbank’s and Ward’s responses to the question concerning theology’s political role in post-
Christendom societies will be elucidated in Chapter 2. 
 
b) Problematic universality: Radical Orthodoxy’s remnant of Christendom  
 
 Amongst the many reservations held about Radical Orthodoxy by the theological 
community, there are two which are especially important in reference to the present 
discussion about public theology. The first accuses Radical Orthodoxy of a dualistic split 
between the Christian churches and the extra-ecclesial public, as well as between Christian 
theology and all non-Christian dialogue partners.
85
 Radical Orthodoxy is charged with being 
too concerned with upholding a distinct Christian identity over and against the non-Christian 
public.
86
 As is obvious from the above introduction, this split manifests itself in Radical 
Orthodoxy in the re-invention of a Christian ontology as the better alternative to the 
contemporarily prevalent secularist ones, and not in the sense of any sectarian withdrawal 
from the world. This is why the second important criticism of Radical Orthodoxy, with regard 
to public theology, concerns the movement’s supposed advocacy of the re-establishment of an 
oppressive Christian imperialism.
87
 Radical Orthodoxy’s aspiration to retrieve and reconstruct 
a particularly Christian reading of all of reality is associated with the desire to re-establish a 
privileged position for Christian theology in political debates.
88
 In other words, Radical 
Orthodoxy is criticised for seeking to restore the political primacy of Christendom. This is 
connected to Milbank’s advocacy of his Christian ontology as the only true one.89 These 
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criticisms are sometimes not as much aimed at the content of Milbank’s ontological vision as 
they are at his exclusivist rhetoric.
90
  
 Overall, public theologians are sceptical of Radical Orthodoxy’s cultural critique. The 
Radical Orthodox refusal to accept the prevailing secular ontology has been called counter-
cultural.
91
 It has been claimed that a particularly Christian interpretation of reality risks losing 
any foothold in the public realm. ‘Counter-cultural’ here is connected to the public theological 
self-contextualisation within a democratic public. It is argued that Milbank’s supposed 
animosity, vis-à-vis atheist secularism, might restrain many Christians from sufficiently 
engaging in the democracies in which they live.
92
 It is argued that Christians could contribute 
more effectively to public discussions if they accept that, in a de facto pluralist public realm, 
Christian arguments are best heeded where the theological presuppositions remain implicit.
93
 
This suggests that, in contrast to the Radical Orthodox understanding of each context as being 
ambivalently open to a multiplicity of interpretations, public theologians interpret the 
contemporary pluralist post-Christendom context either as an unavoidable given with which 
Christian theology must cope or even as a blessing for the Christian theological endeavour. In 
Chapter 2, I will argue that Milbank presents his Christian ontology precisely as a criticism of 
secularism’s disguised hegemony, apparent in such a postulation of one self-evident 
interpretation of pluralism. This then renders the public theological alliances with secularism 
suspect of perpetuating the problematic aspects of Christendom.  
 In significant contrast to Milbank’s project, most critics agree that Graham Ward is the 
Radical Orthodox author who displays the most amicable stance towards the non-Christian 
public.
94
 Ward’s theology has been appreciated for treading ‘on a similar territory to that 
conventionally occupied by public theology’.95 He also asks how contemporary culture might 
be transformed, how public institutions generate truth and meaning and how Christian 
practices relate to these truths. Ward’s theology is most significantly distinct from that of 
Milbank with reference to the criticism of Milbank’s assumption that Christian theologians 
can understand the whole of reality better than others. Ward, to the contrary, stresses the 
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limitedness and finiteness of Christian theological insights into reality.
96
 In contrast to 
Milbank, Ward is praised for respecting the otherness of his dialogue partners by suspending 
judgment on them.
97
 This more positive understanding of the public might be what allows 
Ward to reflect on the cultural influences which co-condition any theological thinking much 
more, an acknowledgment for which Ward has received positive critique.
98
 Ward then argues 
that theological sensibilities resurface in late-modern culture and that the sacred re-appears 
within the public.
99
 This aligns Ward more closely to public theological sensibilities than 
Milbank.
100
 
 And yet, Ward has been criticised for still advocating a position of Christian 
superiority, stopping half-way in his respect for non-Christian dialogue partners. He allegedly 
does not allow Christian theology to be sufficiently criticised by others.
101
 The problem is that 
Ward presupposes that only contemporary culture needs to be transformed, not Christian 
doctrine.
102
 Ward has been criticised for simply presupposing traditional Christian 
orthodoxy’s authority, despite contemporary cultural currents (such as feminism) that put 
certain doctrines into question.
103
 Consequently, Ward, like Milbank, has been criticised for 
his refusal to approach non-Christians in a dialogue that refrains from the use of non-
theological vocabulary.  
 This is linked to Ward’s agreement with Milbank concerning the preferability of a 
Christian interpretation of reality over a purely immanentist one.
104
 Contrary to some 
secularist assumptions, Ward seeks to show that the particularity of different faith traditions is 
not primarily problematic, but constitutes an enrichment of any shared public. On this basis, 
he embraces the Christian faith tradition whole-heartedly. This is why Elaine Graham’s 
criticism that Ward’s theology might lack an account of how theology could learn anything 
from the public, and why Ward regards the particularity of Christianity within the wider 
public to be unproblematic,
105
 should be reconsidered in my more nuanced examination of 
Ward’s position in the following chapter.  
 Having explained how both Milbank’s and Ward’s understandings of the political role 
of Christian theology in post-Christendom societies has been criticised for still exhibiting 
certain problems associated with Christendom imperialism, which public theologians strive to 
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overcome, I will now turn to criticisms that are related to the cultural context of pluralism and 
public theology’s focus on the theological significance of non-Christian insights. 
  
c) Ignoring grace: Radical Orthodoxy’s failure to appreciate a pluralist public 
 
 Regarding the question of an adequate theological interpretation of non-Christian 
insights, Milbank’s exclusivist rhetoric has been criticised for breaking with the content of his 
ontology insofar as he is unable to conceive of how his opponents participate at all in God.
106
 
In this vein, Milbank has been criticised for prematurely discarding all non-Christian insights 
as either irrelevant or even outright hostile to Christian theology.
107
 Radical Orthodoxy’s 
opposition to modernity in the wake of the Enlightenment has been particularly criticised for 
undermining the gains this era has brought to humanity.
108
 Doctrinally, public theologians 
relate this underestimation of the revelatory value of non-Christian insights to an erroneous 
understanding of the doctrine of common grace.
109
 Presumably, the presence of God’s grace 
within the Christian tradition is overemphasised at the expense of an adequate 
acknowledgement of non-Christian mediations of God’s grace.110 Radical Orthodoxy’s 
rejection of the idea of the public as a neutral realm is associated with the denial of the 
existence of any shared space in which common grace operates.
111
 Non-Christian 
conversation partners are either construed as being neutrally un-graced or as sinfully rejecting 
God’s offer of grace.112 Against this, public theologians hold that the doctrine of common 
grace implies that Christian theology cannot fully understand the implications of grace if it 
solely discerns how Christians are moved by grace. It should be acknowledged that grace 
moves non-Christians in different, but important and supplementary ways. 
 Ward’s opposition to any presumption of speaking from a God’s-eye perspective 
suggests that his understanding of grace might be closer to that of Elaine Graham than it is to 
that of Milbank. Graham also appeals to the doctrine of grace in order to argue that public 
theology should confidently remain fragmentary and partial in its contemporary 
proclamations, in the hope that God’s grace will fulfil the work.113 Nonetheless, Ward 
postulates Christ as the ordering principle of reality in his criticism of purely immanent 
ontologies and seeks to account for how all cultural occurrences exist in Christ.
114
 This means 
that all beings must be interpreted in terms of their submission to Christ.
115
 This could suggest 
that Christian theologians possess an overarching vision of reality more akin to Milbank’s 
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ambitious project than to Graham’s fragmentary public theology. How Ward combines these 
two, somewhat divergent, strands of thought in his theology will be examined in Chapter 2. 
 At this point it must be stressed, however, in defence of both Milbank and Ward, that 
more subtle critics have observed that it does not follow from Radical Orthodoxy’s cultural 
criticism that Radical Orthodox theologians would think that there is nothing of value in the 
secular public.
116
 This issue will be clarified in the following chapter by way of a more 
thorough examination of Milbank’s and Ward’s understandings of grace. It will then become 
apparent that they both understand non-Christian insights to be expressing an aspiration for 
grace — which is not nothing, but which is already partially good — and Christian theology 
as the fulfilment of this initial and fragmentary goodness.
117
 In other words, when their critics 
suggest that Radical Orthodox authors should not interpret their opponents as those who reject 
the True and the Good, but as those who distort it
118
, both Milbank and Ward might very well 
agree.  
 Regarding Radical Orthodoxy’s understandings of the doctrine of grace, it also 
deserves to be mentioned that, in contrast to those who criticise Radical Orthodoxy’s use of 
theological vocabulary in post-Christendom societies’ public forums, both Milbank and Ward 
have also been repeatedly criticised for their intensive engagement with postmodern 
thought.
119
 They are said to merely draw on theological resources in the interest of furthering 
philosophy. It has been claimed that Radical Orthodoxy is more grounded in a post-
foundationalist philosophy, which aims at a deconstruction of modernity, than it is grounded 
in Christian orthodoxy.
120
 In this vein, Radical Orthodox theologians have been criticised for 
not exhibiting the same respect for Christian Scripture and practices that has marked the 
Christian tradition throughout the centuries.
121
 Radical Orthodox authors appear to be 
speaking from intellectualist vantage points rather than from the perspective of a specific faith 
tradition, exhibiting no ‘signs of any kind of praxis of faith’ in their works.122 This close link 
to postmodernism, however, is why Radical Orthodoxy has also been evaluated more 
positively, as one amongst many other contemporary ways of criticising secularism.
123
 As 
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such, Radical Orthodoxy is regarded as being committed to pluralism in a way ‘that works 
against the totalizing tendencies of secularism’.124 In this vein, Radical Orthodoxy is expected 
to offer a creative alternative vision to all others who strive to overcome the problems 
associated with secularism. Putting the question that arises from these contrasting evaluations 
of Radical Orthodoxy’s engagement with postmodernism in theological terms, the question 
remains about the degree to which postmodern philosophies should be understood as a grace 
for Christian theology. I will argue, in Chapter 2, that Milbank focuses more on the flaws 
postmodern philosophies have, and which need to be repaired by Christian theology, while 
Ward presents postmodern philosophy as expressing an aspiration for grace that needs to be 
completed by Christian theology.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Thus far, it can be summarised that public theology is concerned with theology’s 
political contributions to post-Christendom politics, and sees the need for the creation of a 
new sub-discipline due to the altered context in recent decades. Christianity has lost its 
unquestioned central place in Western societies, which has given rise to the question 
concerning the communication between Christians and non-Christians in democracies, where 
issues concerning everyone are at stake. While I agree that this contemporary context 
deserves particular theological consideration, public theology’s apologetic approach to the 
issue raises a number of questions, which have remained unanswered. Based on the public 
theological literature introduced in this chapter, the main question of this dissertation is then: 
What should Christian theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies be? Public 
theologians, thus far, tend to assume the secularist social order as a given, and seek to 
contribute to it theologically. However, this chapter has shown that in so doing, public 
theologians re-ascribe a privileged position in the societal whole to Christian theology. My 
hypothesis is that the question about theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies 
can be better approached by way of an increased focus on the public theological incentive to 
discern the ways in which God’s grace is mediated, even in non-Christian positions and 
insights. In the course of this dissertation, I radicalise this incentive by way of suggesting that 
also the secularist opposition to Christian theological involvement in public politics should be 
understood as mediating God’s grace. What this would mean for theology’s political role in 
post-Christendom societies remains to be examined.  
 For now, I have begun to introduce Radical Orthodoxy as an alternative contemporary 
theological approach to public theological questions. This chapter has served to present the 
main public theological reservations against Radical Orthodoxy very briefly. These criticisms 
concern Radical Orthodoxy’s supposed aspiration to reinstall Christendom as the best form of 
government and the concomitant closure towards non-Christian dialogue partners, which has 
been associated with erroneous understandings of grace. In what follows, I will assess both 
Milbank’s and Ward’s respective understandings of theology’s political role in post-
Christendom societies in more detail. This assessment will include both an examination of the 
degree to which the public theological reservations against Radical Orthodoxy are justified, 
and an extrapolation of criticisms that Radical Orthodox theologians could voice towards 
public theology.  
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CHAPTER 2 
RADICAL ORTHODOXY: 
APOLOGETIC DEFENCES OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ORDER 
 
 This dissertation’s question concerns theology’s political role in post-Christendom 
societies, and I have discussed two public theological reasons for why Christian theology 
should be involved in the organisation also of post-Christendom societies. In confrontation 
with those who oppose any faith-based arguments in matters of public policy, these reasons 
turn into apologetic defences of theology’s political relevance. I have called the first a secular 
justification inasmuch as public theologians justify theological contributions to public politics 
by promising to contribute positively to whatever the wider society understands as being the 
common good. The second justification is theological inasmuch as public theologians here 
argue that theological claims are politically relevant for the entire society, due to Christian 
theology’s universality. As well as these two justifications concerning Christian theology’s 
political relevance for post-Christendom societies, there is also a third justification concerning 
the endeavour of public theology itself. This justification points in the opposite direction, 
postulating that theology gains the new task of reflecting on the theological significance of 
non-Christian contributions to public politics in the pluralist cultures that characterise post-
Christendom societies. This third justification had been associated with the doctrine of grace, 
and I have argued that the discussion could be elucidated with the help of a more nuanced 
examination of the relation between grace and Christianity, grace and non-Christian positions 
and the impact of sin upon each. 
 Moreover, I have briefly presented the ways in which public theologians construe their 
own sub-discipline in conscious distinction from Radical Orthodoxy. Regarding the first 
justification of theology’s public relevance in secular terms, public theologians criticise 
Radical Orthodoxy for being counter-cultural due to the movement’s firm resistance to any 
accommodation of Christian theology to secular culture. Concerning the second justification 
in reference to Christian theology’s universality, public theologians criticise Radical 
Orthodoxy for misrepresenting this universality to the effect that they advocate the re-
establishment of Christendom. Regarding the theological significance of non-Christian 
contributions to public politics in a pluralist culture, public theologians criticise Radical 
Orthodoxy for erroneously regarding non-Christian positions as entirely un-graced and, 
consequently, irrelevant for Christian theology.  
 Overall, public theologians suspect Radical Orthodoxy of presenting Christian 
theology as being solely responsible for establishing the social order, even in a post-
Christendom context. In this chapter, I will analyse the extent to which this suspicion is 
justified. Particular attention must be paid to the concerns that I have raised in the previous 
chapter, particularly my suspicion about public theology of being equally liable to re-
advocating a central political role for Christian theology in post-Christendom societies. 
 I proceed by way of presenting Milbank’s and Ward’s positions in relation to all three 
aforementioned public theological self-justifications. Regarding the secular justification of 
theology’s public relevance, I will argue that Radical Orthodoxy is not counter-cultural in 
principle, but that both Milbank and Ward provide considerable reasons why secularism in 
particular might be viewed with suspicion. Apart from presenting Radical Orthodoxy’s 
negative criticism of secularism, this first part of Chapter 2 also serves to present Milbank’s 
and Ward’s respective alternative proposals. In 2.2, I will present both Milbank’s and Ward’s 
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understandings of Christian theology’s universality, as the second apologetic defence for 
theology’s political contributions to post-Christendom societies, examining the charge of 
Radical Orthodoxy’s supposed advocacy of a re-established Christendom in this context. I 
argue that Milbank’s and Ward’s understandings of theology’s universality, in terms of its 
participation in God, renders it more dynamic than the public theological understanding of 
universality. Due to Milbank’s and Ward’s different understandings of God, however, this has 
different implications for how they each view theology’s political role in post-Christendom 
societies. Finally (2.3), I turn to the question concerning the theological significance of non-
Christian contributions to political discussions in a pluralist context by way of examining 
Milbank’s and Ward’s respective understandings of grace.  
 
2.1 Apologetics beyond commonality: Contesting secular justifications of theology 
 
 In the previous chapter, I have explained that public theologians justify the relevance 
of their discipline partly by way of arguing that Christian theology can contribute to the 
common good, as it has been defined by the surrounding society. Charles Mathewes’ criticism 
that this position risks accommodating Christian theology to the mainstream culture has 
already been briefly mentioned in this context. In what follows, I explain that Radical 
Orthodoxy does not reject the accommodation of Christian theology to the surrounding 
culture generally, but that Radical Orthodox authors are wary of very specific threats from a 
secularist culture, most significantly its disguised perpetuation of Christendom imperialism. 
Pretending to be neutral, in the sense of not being culturally conditioned, secularism now 
inhabits the central role of organising the entire society, a role which Christian theology had 
previously played. Part of the Radical Orthodox project is, thus, to contest secularism’s 
pretended neutrality. Both in the case of Milbank and in that of Ward, I begin with an 
explanation of what they oppose and then introduce what they positively offer as their 
alternatives. In section e), I speculate how the rejection of secularism, as determining the 
social order for post-Christendom societies, challenges the public theological apologetic 
answer to the question concerning Christian theology’s political role in those societies. The 
political implications of Milbank’s and Ward’s positions will be further developed in 2.2 and 
2.3. 
 
a) Milbank’s contestation of secularism: No neutral social order 
 
 The purpose of this section is to elucidate the fact that Milbank does not oppose any 
non-Christian culture, as a matter of principle, but that his criticism is directed against the 
particular cultural context in which he regards himself to be situated. The value of Milbank’s 
thoughts on the role of Christian theology, in determining the social order for post-
Christendom societies, can only be understood against the background of his disclosure of 
two contemporarily widespread understandings of reality as both tending to perpetuate the 
imperialistic problems of Christendom.
125
 The first, and somewhat primary, ontology 
contested by Milbank pretends to mirror reality directly in and through its statements and, in 
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so doing, denies being metaphysical.
126
 It presents its deliberations as objective truth, thereby 
concealing that it is but one interpretation of reality amongst others. I call this ontology 
modern positivism. The second, namely the postmodern understanding of reality, understands 
each interpretation of immanent beings as equally disconnected from the truth about reality (if 
such a truth exists at all), and seeks to overcome metaphysics by way of resisting the 
temptation to speculate about the interrelation of different immanent beings in the way, 
Milbank would argue, it is done by an overarching ontology. Instead, each particular 
immanent being is sought out in order to be appreciated in its individual difference from all 
others.  
 According to Milbank, both modern positivism and postmodernism deny the culturally 
specific ontology which they presuppose and upon which their entire endeavour of 
interpreting reality relies.
 
Milbank regards the positivist assumption that ‘nature’ self-
evidently and objectively reveals its own truth to humanity as being politically problematic.
127
 
This understanding of immanent reality undermines the necessity of metaphysical discussions 
about the truth about the immanent world. Associating these metaphysical discussions with 
politics, Milbank laments that people have short-circuited the political path towards truth in 
modernity by promising to guarantee an access to the truth about nature by way of employing 
the most adequate scientific method. Metaphysical discussions about this truth are of the 
greatest political relevance, if the truth about reality is believed to be more multifaceted than 
modern positivists would allow for. Political decisions are, then, no longer imposed by those 
who have the power to ‘read’ nature, but politics depends upon a collective consensus of the 
human community about the truth revealed in nature. In brief, the problem with positivism’s 
pretended neutrality is that it ascribes the most central role in organising the whole of society 
to itself. Metaphysical speculations, as well as cultural biases, are being discarded as 
politically irrelevant to discussions that take place in the public forum, and modern 
positivism, in its political variant of secularism, exempts itself from the charge of being 
culturally biased, which is why it alone is permitted to organise the whole of society.
128
 
 Milbank understands postmodernism not as overcoming but as perpetuating the 
problems of modern positivism. Postmodernism, despite its claims to abandon any ontology, 
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still disguisedly adheres to an overarching vision of reality.
129
 Milbank interprets 
postmodernism as yet another metaphysically biased position, which interprets all particular 
beings as equally cancelling any overarching metaphysical order among beings through their 
particular existence.
130
 The problem with this philosophy is that it generalises all particular 
different beings to the same univocal status of being different. The refusal of an overarching 
ontology is, therefore, disclosed as a disguised ontology which holds that, in reality, all 
differences are equal. As such, this interpretation of reality must also be viewed on the same 
level as any ontology that affirms the political importance of metaphysical speculation 
concerning (hierarchical) orderings among different particular beings.
131
  
This opposition to modern positivism and postmodernism clarifies why Milbank 
objects to apologetic defences of the relevance of Christian theology in secular terms, where 
the secular is marked precisely by these two positions. This justification risks agreeing with 
secularism, as determining the social order of post-Christendom societies, because it is 
erroneously believed that secularism is less culturally biased and more independent of 
metaphysical speculation than any faith-based social order could be. 
 Against the background of this opposition to all positions that claim some neutral 
access to reality for themselves, one could now expect that Milbank would assume a position 
which openly confesses its merely subjective and constructed status. Indeed, Milbank upholds 
the necessity of making the ontology through which reality is accessed explicit.
132
 Milbank 
openly affirms the dependence of his own ontology upon culturally contingent conventions 
and influences, thus respecting the postmodern intuition that all ontologies are social 
constructs and are, consequently, alterable.
133
 This is why he refuses to provide foundations 
that would account for the correspondence of his own ontology to reality. Instead, Milbank 
makes the weaker claim that one must ‘wager’ that his ontology corresponds to reality.134 At 
the same time, however, Milbank still maintains that his ontology objectively corresponds to 
                                                 
129
 This view is brought to the extreme in what Milbank calls ontologies of violence. These ontologies 
present all particulars, not as harmoniously ordered, but as violently or indifferently set against each 
other (Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 4; Milbank, “The Poverty of Niebuhrianism,” in The 
Word Made Strange, 236-237). 
130
 Milbank, The Monstrosity of Christ, 138; John Milbank, “Truth and Vision,” in Truth in Aquinas, 
eds. John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2001), 25; Milbank, “A 
Critique of the Theology of Right,” in The Word Made Strange, 8. 
131
 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, xvi; Milbank, The Monstrosity of Christ, 115-116, 134-135; 
Milbank, Beyond Secular Order, 3. Milbank refuses to interpret the constructed status of all ontologies 
as revelatory of their ultimate arbitrariness. When rendered into necessary arbitrariness, the 
indeterminacy of all human interpretations of reality would be conceived of as something ultimately 
determined (Milbank, “The Second Difference,” in The Word Made Strange, 189). 
132
 Milbank speaks of a necessary conjecture about the whole in order to perceive any particular being 
(Milbank, “Only Theology Overcomes Metaphysics,” in The Word Made Strange, 42-43).  
133
 See Gavin Hyman, The Predicament of Postmodern Theology: Radical Orthodoxy or Nihilist 
Textualism? (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), for a critical assessment of 
the degree to which Milbank accepts postmodern philosophies. Hyman criticises that Milbank uses 
postmodern thought only in order to then re-advocate his theological meta-narrative, thereby breaking 
with postmodern sensibilities (30). However, Milbank is also criticised, from the opposite side, for 
engaging with postmodern thought to the extent that the integrity of the theological concepts he uses is 
violated (Laurence Paul Hemming, “What Catholic Theologians Have to Learn from Radical 
Orthodoxy: What Radical Orthodoxy Has to Learn from Catholic Theology,” Louvain Studies 28 
(2003): 232-239). 
134
 Milbank, “On Complex Space,” in The Word Made Strange, 283; John Milbank, “Culture: The 
gospel of affinity,” in Being Reconciled: Ontology and pardon (Oxon: Routledge, 2004), 204-205. 
33 
 
 
the truth about reality.
135
 This characterisation of his own ontology, as simultaneously a 
culturally specific construct and objectively truthful, is in line with his opposition to the 
presumed self-evidence of postmodernism. Milbank accepts the contemporarily widespread 
belief that ontologies are humanly constructed, but refuses to accept that humanly constructed 
ontologies self-evidently deviate from reality itself. In other words, he contests the binary 
opposition between truth and human construction. That ontologies are constructed does not 
mean that they are necessarily superimposed on the true chaos of reality that can never be 
accessed by human thought. This conception would disguisedly elevate the observation of 
human construction onto the ontological level by granting it the last word about the 
relationship between human thought and reality.
136
 Before I explain why Milbank advocates 
his own ontology as better able to fulfil the central role in determining the social order for 
post-Christendom societies than secularism in 2.2, I will first examine where this refusal of 
secular justifications for the public relevance of Christian theology positions Milbank with 
regards to apologetics. 
 
b) Apologetically defending Christian theology: Solving secularism’s problems 
 
 The previous section has shown that, overall, Milbank fundamentally opposes any 
positivist worldview, which would hold that immanent reality could be understood non-
metaphysically or without the help of an ontological framework. But where does Milbank’s 
offer of an alternative ontology lead us regarding the question of apologetics? Milbank’s 
ontology has been criticised for displaying traces of fideism and a failure to rationally justify 
the leap of faith into Christianity he supposedly demands, due to his appreciation of 
postmodern non-foundationalism.
137
 Milbank’s refusal to provide foundations can be partly 
defended on account of his concern not to pretend to offer a neutral and self-evident access to 
reality. At the same time, Milbank’s equal rejection of the postmodern understanding of 
constructed ontologies as self-evidently deviating from the truth about reality, entails that his 
ontology cannot demand an entirely arbitrary leap of faith in order to be accepted. For 
Milbank, an overarching ontology is meant to attune people to perceive aright how particular 
beings in the immanent world reveal knowledge about the whole of reality.
138
  
 In what follows, I argue that Milbank apologetically defends his alternative ontology 
by presenting it as being the cure to all of the problems that he associates with secularism. 
Since the problem with secularism is its concealing of the overarching ontology upon which it 
depends, Milbank seeks to justify the political relevance of Christian theology precisely by 
openly construing an overarching ontology that is meant to enhance society’s wellbeing 
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overall, which partly consists in freeing Western imaginations from any claims to possessing 
a neutral access to reality.  
Against any pretended neutral access to reality, Milbank openly conjectures that the 
whole of reality is ordered harmoniously, which is why he refers to his vision as an ontology 
of peace.
139
 Adopting the postmodern appreciation of particularity, Milbank’s understanding 
of peace does not presuppose or seek out fundamental agreements, but peace is defined as ‘the 
sociality of harmonious difference’.140 According to his ontology of peace, particular beings 
belong both to a harmoniously ordered whole and exceed the whole in their very 
particularity.
141
 The excess of particulars over the ordered whole means that Milbank’s 
ontology must be continuously growing.
142
 As such, it is a cure to all fixed ontologies that 
undercut people’s appreciation of genuine newness or difference. 
 With regard to the criticism of fideism, Milbank’s critics are mistaken when they 
claim that the only way to see the truth of Milbank’s ontology of peace is to be overwhelmed 
by the whole story that theology would possess as sort of Gnostic secret knowledge.
143
 The 
mistake made by his critics is to read Milbank’s writings about a necessary wager in terms of 
an idealistic belief in harmony, despite the concrete evidence to the contrary.
144
 However, 
Milbank’s argument has shown that we can never reason from conflicting particulars to an 
overarching ontology. Supposedly conflicting particulars are not self-evidently falsifications 
of an overarching ontology of peace. To counter this perception, Milbank upholds both that 
reality is truly harmoniously ordered and that humanly constructed ontologies participate in 
this order to various degrees.
145
 Refusing the legitimacy to reason from immanent reality to an 
overarching ontology, Milbank interprets immanent reality through the lens of his ontology of 
peace and can then indicate where real harmony is already partially realised, even if we are 
sometimes confronted with conflicting particulars. In this vein, Milbank speaks of a 
foreshadowing of ontological harmony within the churches, which renders the wager in 
favour of his ontology more acceptable.
146
 People must not arbitrarily accept Milbank’s 
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ontology, but they must instead assume for a while that it might be an account that 
corresponds to reality and then interpret reality through this lens. If the ontology can stand the 
test, then people might be convinced that it is true. 
   
c) Ward’s appreciation of postmodernism: De-centring the secularist social order 
 
 Now that I have provided an assessment of Milbank’s rejection of public theological 
apologetics in secularist terms, I will introduce Graham Ward as a Radical Orthodox 
theologian who modifies this rejection. While Milbank’s critique is primarily directed against 
two (related) ontologies, Ward criticises only the first.
147
 Ward joins Milbank in criticising 
modern positivism, because it reads the world through an exclusively immanent frame, and 
denies that this reading is a culturally conditioned interpretation.
148
 Like Milbank, Ward thus 
objects to modernity’s assumed neutrality and concomitant imperialism in disguise.149 Ward 
calls modern positivism a myth in the sense that it naturalises that which is but a culturally 
specific social construct.
150
 Ward criticises contemporary culture for being deluded if it 
believes that the world, as it has been created by the West, is real.
151
 Concomitantly, Ward 
rejects modern secularism as the naturalised ontology that serves as the sole legitimate centre 
for the social order of many Western societies.
152
  
 Furthermore, Ward then joins Milbank in the appreciation of the postmodern 
understanding of every human access to reality as being culturally conditioned.
153
 Ward calls 
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this postmodern non-foundationalism a ‘weak hermeneutical ontology’.154 However, while 
Milbank rejects postmodern non-foundationalism, as perpetuating the positivist myth of 
neutrality through concealing its foundations, Ward shows a greater belief that the 
postmodern weak hermeneutical ontology corresponds to reality.
155
 Ward argues that the 
world has entered a postmodern order and claims that Christian theologians must presuppose 
a postmodern ontology for their own accounts of the world.
156
 While Milbank attempts to 
invent an alternative ontology, to those implicitly advanced by postmodern philosophies, 
Ward accepts postmodernism as an overarching vision of reality and tries to show that, if 
correlated with Christian theology, this ontology would reach its own ends more successfully 
than if correlated with secularism.
157
 In other words, the most crucial distinction between 
Milbank’s and Ward’s projects concerns Milbank’s rejection of the postmodern ontology, 
where Ward accepts it and seeks to fulfil its aspirations by means of Christian theology.
158
 
Postmodern philosophies must only be criticised according to the degree to which they still 
rely on modern metaphysics, a reliance which they aim to overcome.
159
 Ward argues that this 
can be achieved by way of examining the extent to which postmodern metaphysical 
assumptions accord with Christian theology’s analogical metaphysics.160 
 Ward’s less antagonistic position towards postmodernism can be explained in relation 
to the way in which he and Milbank each problematise modern positivism. Although both 
agree that modern positivism is a reductive interpretation of reality, Milbank thinks that this 
distorted interpretation is connected to an economic and social system which is sufficiently 
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perfect as to continuously cure its own defects.
161
 In this sense, the flawed ontology is more 
powerful than the truth which it continues to undermine. The only way to excavate the truth 
from underneath the distorted ontology, and to de-centre secularism from its position of 
organising the societal whole, is to offer an alternative ontology that is as holistic as the 
currently predominant one. Ward, to the contrary, is more pessimistic about the future 
viability of the distorted modern positivist ontology when he claims that, without a 
theological critique, modernity would collapse.
162
 In other words, modernity’s untruthfulness 
to reality predetermines modernity to be naturally extinguished at some point, and postmodern 
non-foundationalism is welcomed as the first sign of modernity’s collapse.163 Postmodernism 
is already understood as the de-centring of secularism. 
 Accepting the non-foundationalist assumptions of post-modern philosophies as true, 
Ward like Milbank refuses to provide a presumably neutral justification of theology’s political 
relevance. Where Milbank offers an alternative comprehensive account of reality, as the cure 
to all the problems he associates with secularism, Ward joins postmodernity in its own 
attempt to free Western imaginations from positivism, by way of enabling them to perceive 
the infinite wealth of meaning contained in the immanent world.  
 Accepting postmodernism as a new overarching ontology, Ward claims that ‘we’ live 
in a ‘constant vertigo of semiosis’.164 Words possess infinite possibilities of meaning. It is 
uncertain how precisely they relate to reality. Consequently, the Christian worldview must 
replace its truth-claims with weaker claims to authenticity.
165
 The Christian discourse is, thus, 
presented as a cultural product on the same level as any other.
166
 According to Ward, there is 
no assurance to be given why one system of beliefs should be better than another, but ‘[o]ur 
very believing rests upon a prior believing; reason gives way to persuasion’.167 At the same 
time, accepting postmodernity as more truthful to reality than modernity, Ward appreciates 
persuasion as the dissemination of truth produced by truth itself, while modern scientific 
reason presumably produces truth.
168
 In other words, it is important not to justify the public 
relevance of Christian faith in secularist terms, because any such justification would produce 
a truth that deviates from reality. Moreover, it seems as though Ward would defend a more 
marginal political role for Christian theology, seeing that he wants to position Christianity on 
the same level with any other faith tradition. It might, however, be the case that Ward would 
still ascribe to postmodernism a more central role in determining the entire social order than 
to others, which would then have to be assessed in relation to Milbank’s argument that 
postmodernity itself still perpetuates the tradition of Christendom imperialism. This issue will 
be further elucidated throughout the course of this chapter. First, I investigate in greater detail 
where Ward’s rejection of secularist justifications of theology’s public relevance leads him 
regarding Christian apologetics. 
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d) Apologetically defending Christian theology: Perfecting post-modernism 
 
 The non-foundationalist repercussions of Ward’s theology have invited the criticism 
that Ward is more influenced by postmodern philosophies than by the Christian theological 
tradition.
169
 Ward is said to escape the theological struggle of determining orthodoxy by 
merely appreciating the particularity of any religion as such in a postmodern fashion.
170
 This 
renders Ward more vulnerable to the criticism of fideism than Milbank. All particular faith 
communities are judged as being equally good because they resist the dominance of secular 
liberalism in contemporary culture.
171
 Ward then fails to specify the criteria by which 
Christianity in particular could be publicly justified. In other words, he simply accepts the 
framework of Christian doctrines as unproblematic on the basis of the postmodern conviction 
that the particularity of faith traditions must be maintained against the dangers of one 
monolithic culture.
172
 Contrary to these criticisms, I interpret Ward’s theology as being driven 
precisely by the predominant concern to justify the reasonableness of Christianity in 
postmodern terms. In other words, Ward offers an apologetics of Christianity for what he 
perceives to be a postmodern mainstream culture.
173
 
  Overall, Ward justifies theology’s political relevance by way of arguing that Christian 
theology is better able to attain the postmodern aim of overcoming modern positivism than 
any atheist postmodern philosophy.
174
 Ward conceives of a space that is opened up through 
the non-foundationalist suspension of being in possession of the truth.
175
 The Christian faith, 
just like any other belief system, is involved in the politics and metaphysics of organising this 
space. On this basis, Ward argues that atheistic postmodern culture uses this framework in a 
disadvantageous manner.
176
 He suspects postmodern culture of rendering non-
foundationalism into a new foundation, which should be prevented by Christian theology. 
Christian theology should use the postmodern non-foundationalist framework in a better way; 
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namely, to confront Christians with the lack of foundations of their faith continuously.
177
 As 
such, he strives to overcome the tendency to regard one’s own interpretation of reality as 
being self-evidently true. In other words, Ward’s correlation of a postmodern ontology with 
the Christian analogical worldview, far from resolving the instability of meaning, is actually 
geared to preserve it.
178
 Instead of offering an alternative vision of the whole of reality to the 
prevalent postmodern one, Ward apologetically defends theology’s relevance by promising 
that a continuous theological re-interpretation of the immanent world overcomes any 
reductive positivist reading of reality.
179
 
 Ward’s claim that ‘[n]ature cannot be natural without the spiritual informing it at every 
point’180, must be understood in the context of his opposition to modern positivism. His 
insistence that ‘[t]here is only one radical critique of modernity - the critique that denies the 
existence of the secular as self-subsisting, that immanent self-ordering of the world which 
ultimately had no need for God. The secular to be secular requires a theological warrant’181, is 
not meant to be as exclusivist as it sounds. Instead, anyone who does not regard their own 
interpretation of the immanent world as the only eternally valid one would participate in the 
theological critique of modernity.
182
 This is why, against positivism, Ward advocates a more 
general re-mythologisation of materiality with the aim to ‘learn to see things otherwise’.183 
His own Christology is then presented as one such way of escaping positivism through a re-
mythologisation of reality.
184
  
 At this point, leaving the postmodern level of granting to each faith tradition equal 
legitimacy, Ward moves to the specificities of the Christian faith. He claims that the solution 
to contemporary ills
185
 is to build a culture upon that which is ‘true and good and realistic’ 
and not on the ‘shifting sands of ephemeral human desires’.186 In the specific case of 
Christianity, to build a culture on that which is ‘true and good and realistic’ means to build a 
culture around Christ. For Ward, Christ orders reality in the sense that all cultural occurrences 
exist in Christ.
187
 Christian theologians must interpret all beings in terms of their submission 
to Christ.
188
 However, for Ward, this interpretation does not result in some all-encompassing 
ontology. To the contrary, he claims that understanding particular beings in relation to Christ 
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introduces some apophaticism concerning their meaning. Every particular being interpreted in 
relation to Christ is known only apophatically by a greater unknowing, instead of being 
unambiguously interpreted as this or that. This does not mean that the meaning of the being 
becomes entirely uncertain, but that in this very particular being’s relation to Christ more than 
one definite meaning can be perceived.  
 Overall, defending Christian theology apologetically for a postmodern audience, Ward 
is more hesitant than Milbank to pre-empt a wholeness and totality of reality prior to the 
eschaton. As such, Ward is closer to the position of public theologians such as Jeffrey Stout 
and Charles Mathewes. They agree that Christian theology affirms reality as one harmonious 
whole, but they deny that Christian theologians enjoy a privileged standpoint from which they 
can see how this harmonious whole is concretely constituted. For Mathewes, this means that 
Christians can believe that all reality forms one harmonious whole, but they cannot say how 
this is the case. Christian theology, therefore, cannot prescribe the social order for an entire 
society, because the theological affirmation of an ultimately harmonious reality remains 
unconvertible into concrete social structures to a considerable degree.  
 Despite this closeness to Mathewes and Stout, however, Ward’s thought could lend 
itself to ascribe a more central political role to Christian theology in post-Christendom 
societies. Ward promises to fulfil postmodern aspirations to overcome secularism’s 
imperialism, suggesting that everyone should perceive the infinite wealth of meaning in every 
particular being and, consequently, should concede that the harmonious order of reality 
cannot yet be fully captured by any single perspective. In contrast to Milbank’s upholding of 
the Christian ontology as the best overarching vision of the whole of reality, Ward advocates 
the adherence to particular religious ontologies as an escape route from the domination of 
secularism’s imperialist tendencies. Ward seems to assume that each faith tradition builds its 
culture on that which is ‘true and good and realistic’. This is then vulnerable to Milbank’s 
criticism of postmodernism: Ward assumes the most overarching perspective from which it 
can be seen that all particularities, except that of atheist secularism, are univocally legitimate. 
Since Ward moreover argues that Christian theology is better able to fulfil postmodernity’s 
good aspirations, he implicitly advocates Christian theology as best centre for the organisation 
of the whole of society.  
  
e) Questioning the secularist social order: Consequences for public theology 
 
  In sum, John Milbank’s and Graham Ward’s criticisms of modernity’s positivist 
understanding of reality are important for the present discussion, because they raise awareness 
of some problems with these (post)modern ontologies which are related to the question about 
theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies. Milbank and Ward agree with the 
postmodern critique that secularism is forgetful of its own culturally conditioned status and 
illegitimately presents its universal claims as being neutral. Secularism, thus, disguisedly 
perpetuates the imperialism of Christendom, insofar as the notion that secularism should 
determine the social order, due to its alleged neutrality, is beyond discussion. Milbank then 
sees this pretended neutrality further perpetuated by postmodern ontologies, while Ward 
appreciates the postmodern, weak hermeneutical ontology as the first sign of the overcoming 
of secularism’s disguisedly imperialistic assumption of some self-evident neutrality. This is 
why Milbank constructs an alternative ontology, whereas Ward seeks to fulfil the postmodern 
aspirations with the help of Christian theology. Milbank is, thus, apologetic insofar as he tries 
to convince people of his ontology by promising that it is able to cure the problems which he 
associates with secularism, whereas Ward is engaged in an apologetic defence of Christianity 
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for a postmodern context. He shows how, from a postmodern perspective, it would be 
reasonable to accept Christian contributions to the organisation of the entire post-Christendom 
society. Highlighting that both Milbank’s and Ward’s positions are significantly determined 
by an apologetic interest, returns us to my criticism that public theological apologetics are 
predisposed to underestimate the theological significance of the secularist opposition to 
Christian theological contributions to public politics. The extent to which Milbank’s and 
Ward’s respective apologetics are also vulnerable to my criticism, is something which will be 
examined in the context of their respective theologies of grace in 2.3. 
 Milbank’s and Ward’s criticisms of the implicit assumption of the neutrality of 
secularism applies to public theology insofar as public theologians believe that there is 
something like publicly scrutinisable reasons. Radical Orthodoxy, on the contrary, negates the 
reality of such neutral reasons that can be separated from specific cultures, viewing the 
assumption of the existence of these reasons itself to be a culturally particular, namely, 
modern secularist view. If the existence of such a neutral rationality is not assumed, however, 
the justification of Christian theology’s relevance in secularist terms becomes dubious. 
According to Milbank, the public is not a neutral space but is, instead, the realm that is 
constituted by the encounter of different ontologies.
189
 This implies that Christian theology as 
well as any other philosophy (religious or secular) must be understood as one particular 
interpretation of the whole of reality amongst others.
190
  
 Altogether, the argument of 2.1 shows that, in contrast to Mathewes, Radical 
Orthodoxy does not oppose secular justifications of the public relevance of Christian theology 
due to some general fear of accommodation to the surrounding culture. Instead, Radical 
Orthodoxy is cautious not to support the particular secularist social order, which 
imperialistically claims to be neutral. They disclose, as culturally specific, the very idea that 
there is a culturally independent common good to which people from different backgrounds 
collectively strive.
191
 This leads us to reconsider the public theological criticism that Radical 
Orthodoxy itself was imperialistic in what follows. 
 
2.2 Dynamic universality: Justifying Christian theology as renewed centre of the social 
order 
 
 Although Radical Orthodoxy is in agreement with public theologians who purport that 
Christian theology is also politically relevant in post-Christendom societies, public 
theologians think of this relevance in terms of theological contributions to democratic 
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discussions in a secular social order, whilst Milbank wants theology to offer an alternative 
understanding of the social order itself.
192
 Ward shows how Christian theology can contribute 
to a public realm that is organised along postmodern sensibilities. This antagonism against 
secularism is presumably the reason why Radical Orthodoxy has repeatedly been criticised for 
advocating a return to Christendom.
193
 Most particularly, his concerns the Radical Orthodox 
contention that the whole public would be a better place if it was understood in its relation to 
God, which leads us to the second public theological justification of theology’s public 
relevance.  
 As well as arguing that Christian theology can contribute to a secularly defined 
common good, public theologians also justify theology’s public relevance by way of 
highlighting the universality of Christian theological insights. This universality presumably 
implies that Christian theology should also contribute its insights to political discussions in 
post-Christendom societies. In the previous chapter, I have argued that, in relation to this 
justification, public theologians tend to re-ascribe to Christian theology a central political role. 
This conflicts with their own best intentions to imagine a less central role for Christian 
theology in the contemporary post-Christendom context. Nonetheless, public theologians 
object to the Radical Orthodox claim that Christian theology, due to its particular relation to 
God, possesses privileged knowledge concerning the organisation of the entire society. In 
order to examine the adequacy of this criticism, and to assess the differences between the 
Radical Orthodox and the public theological understandings of Christian universality, I will 
explore how Milbank and Ward understand reality in its relation to God, and how this 
influences their respective understandings of theology’s political role in post-Christendom 
societies in what follows. In both cases, that of Milbank and that of Ward, I will first explain 
what they mean by the Christian theological task of relating reality to God. Then, I will show 
the implications of these views for the political role played by Christian theology in post-
Christendom societies. At the end of this second part of Chapter 2, I will reconsider the way 
in which public theologians understand theology’s universality, in the light of this chapter’s 
discussion. 
 
a) Milbank’s expansive Christian universality: Participating in God’s ontological 
incomprehensibility 
 
 Milbank’s apologetic defence of his ontology is related to his understanding of God. 
Milbank understands God as superabundant goodness and as the self-reflexive reality in 
which the immanent world participates.
194
 God is at once everything in its absolute fullness as 
well as its original source. The immanent world participates in God, which means that the 
harmony of which Milbank’s ontology speaks is affirmed to exist primarily in God and by 
participation in this world.
195
 On the one hand, this means that Christian theologians must 
attend to particular immanent instances of harmony, because these are revelatory of God. On 
the other hand, Christian theologians must also acknowledge in some way that the harmony in 
God remains greater than the harmony found in this world. According to Milbank, to affirm 
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God, Christian theologians must affirm a reality which lies beyond their ontological 
comprehension and into which their ontology can, therefore, advance.
196
  
 It is important, however, that Milbank interprets God’s incomprehensibility not in 
epistemological but in ontological terms.
197
 God’s incomprehensibility is said to be an 
attribute of God’s very nature. God is intrinsically superabundant and self-reflexive.198 Since 
reality is itself then imagined as being incomprehensible, in terms of expanding through 
continuously created newness, Christian theology does not aim to possess the final grasp of 
reality. A human ontology cannot eternally capture God in abstract terms that remain the same 
throughout history, because God continues to reveal something new about Godself through 
the existence of each new particular being.
199
 Consequently, what God is can never be fixed in 
a universal abstraction or known in advance.
200
 Instead, each finite existence, in manifesting 
God, is an excess to God’s very nature and must further refine and expand the human 
knowledge of God, i.e. theology.
201
 In sum, the acknowledgement of God allows Milbank’s 
ontology of peace, then, to claim perfect knowledge of the harmonious whole of reality at 
present
202
, and to maintain that reality is still greater than this perfect knowledge.  
 Milbank cannot uphold his ontology as eternally valid, because he upholds that 
ontologies have to be constantly revised throughout the course of history in order to remain 
truthful to reality.
203
 Milbank claims that an ontology that is directed towards truth cannot 
remain within its own hermeneutical circle.
204
 From this it follows that Milbank’s positioning 
of his own ontology above others, is not meant to be the best option eternally. Instead, it 
should be understood as constituting one crucial step on the continuous path into a harmony 
which is still greater than the present construction. Milbank here conceives of this path 
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towards perfection, just as like any hierarchy, as self-cancelling insofar as it is meant to 
initiate people into the truth.
205
 The stages of this hierarchy are admitted to be conventional, 
whilst it is upheld that these conventions are not arbitrary, but are reasonable constructs.
206
 
The purpose of the hierarchy is to collectively preserve ‘standards of excellence’.207 There 
must be mutual judgment about the common order and, thus, about what is right, good and 
beautiful. How a society hierarchises its order is then not abstractable from some presumably 
rational principles, but the hierarchical ordering of apparently incommensurable differences 
must be discussed publicly. The order discovered is never definite then, but the discussion 
must be ongoing and the incommensurable individual must always be allowed to exceed the 
ordered whole.
208
 Moreover, it should be acknowledged that, insofar as all particularities 
participate in God’s goodness, the hierarchical degrees in which this goodness is mediated 
should be regarded as equalised on the most fundamental level.
209
 
 Altogether, Milbank’s ontology of peace is associated with universality precisely 
because it is not any fixed, abstract interpretative frame, but because it is flexible and 
dynamic. Milbank claims that Christian theology is the most universal in scope, because it 
must continue to incorporate all individual particulars, in their very uniqueness, into itself by 
way of relating their uniquenesses harmoniously to the already existing web of relations 
between all other unique particulars. Since this relation of unique particulars with each other 
is also believed to relate them to God, Christian theology must remain open to the future. God 
is believed to provide ever new unique particulars, which means that the Christian theological 
task of constructing a harmonious whole is eternally expanding. This also means that, 
precisely because Milbank affirms his own ontology as universally true, new unique 
particulars might expand and challenge the whole in such a way that his ontology of peace 
must be expressed differently in the future.  
 
b) Christian theology as the self-exceeding centre of the social order 
 
 On this basis, we can now examine the relation between Milbank’s understanding of 
theology’s universality to his apologetic defence of a Christian social order. In what follows, I 
will argue that Milbank promises to offer a better social order than secularism with regards to 
two issues that are related to post-Christendom. First, Milbank argues that far from 
undermining pluralism, his ontology is better able to celebrate plurality in its positivity than 
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secularism.
210
 And second, he claims that his ontology is better suited to advancing a society’s 
growth in the truly good at the point at which secularism is focused too one-sidedly at the 
restriction of damage. I will clarify both points in what follows. 
 Contrary to those who argue that Milbank’s ontology overwrites the reality of 
pluralism, Milbank shows that, one way or the other, there is an overarching ontology in any 
case, according to which a plurality of particulars is perceived. Whereas contemporary 
secularism interprets plurality as the confrontation of fundamentally antagonistic differences, 
Milbank understands differences as positive mediations of the good.
211
 Consequently, instead 
of understanding all worldviews that meet in post-Christendom societies as merely arbitrary 
interpretations of a reality that remains forever unknown, Milbank understands the encounter 
of different ontologies that constitute the public realm not to be chance encounters. Instead, he 
interprets these encounters as revealing bonds of sympathy between people that are more 
fundamental than the adherence to any particular worldview.
212
 The assumption of the 
existence of these bonds of sympathy at the most fundamental level of reality is no self-
evident or supposedly neutral empirical observation. It is rather on the basis of his own 
ontology that Milbank can assume that people are really interrelated by sympathy.
213
 In the 
same vein, Milbank upholds that there is a true good to which all socially constructed 
ontologies aspire and which they materialise to different degrees.
214
 Pluralism is, then, not 
interpreted as chaos to be managed, but in a way in which everyone must be viewed as most 
fundamentally belonging to one shared human culture.
215
  
 This means that Milbank conceives of ontologies on two levels: Every culture 
possesses an ontology in the sense of an overarching vision of how beings are constituted and 
interrelated. On a somewhat higher level, there is then his own ontology which embraces all 
others underneath itself by claiming that other worldviews make comprehensive sense of the 
whole of reality, but are unable to see that, on a more fundamental level, they are related to 
others.
216
 In this way, Milbank’s ontology of peace evaluates the pluralist public sphere 
positively instead of understanding it as the composition of self-enclosed communities based 
on equally singular self-subsistent ontologies.
217
 
  With regard to the question of a society’s orientation to the common good, Milbank 
rejects the view that people cannot attain an overarching vision of reality, but that everyone 
simply relates to the whole as that which remains unknown, for this view undermines a 
society’s advancement towards a better future.218 If the overarching whole, to which all social 
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relations belong, is believed to remain forever unknown, human beings can only be imagined 
as being bound together by negative restrictions on their otherwise unlimited freedom.
219
 This 
refusal to understand reality as a knowable web of hierarchical interrelations incurs the danger 
of being indifferent to the particularity of anyone and anything that occurs as long as it does 
not interfere with one’s own position. Milbank claims that such a conception can only confirm 
the liberal bourgeois world as it is. There is no possible argument for any substantial change 
to the social order, for no particular constellation of beings can be regarded as better than any 
other. Moreover, such an abandonment of ontological claims leaves room for dangerously 
irrational sects and cults to answer questions about objective truth and goodness.
220
 
 According to Milbank, only the affirmation of God, in the sense outlined above, helps 
a society to advance towards perfection and not to stagnate with the status quo.
221
 A politics 
based on the belief that reality is abundantly good is not one aimed at the mere minimalisation 
of damage.
222
 If God is excessive goodness, a politics that affirms its participation in God 
must aim to constitute an excess to the already realised goodness. Regarding the question of 
how a society knows what constitutes genuine goodness, Milbank claims that both praxis and 
political discussions about the common good should not be understood as secondary 
applications of something which has already been understood abstractly. Instead, praxis and 
discussions about the good intrinsically belong to the real excess of goodness.
223
  
 If God’s goodness itself still expands through each new mediation in the immanent 
world, politicians know their own aim of advancing in the common good only through the 
actual praxis of goodness, for this praxis further expands real goodness.
224
 In other words, 
political agents increasingly come to know more of the common good precisely in the 
instantiation of their projects.
225
 This conflicts with Stackhouse’s understanding of public 
theology, as the discipline that can indicate the probable direction, which history will take 
dependent on what fundamental worldview is adopted.
226
 Stackhouse might have an all too 
idealistic understanding of worldviews that cannot account for how worldviews develop their 
ideas through attention to historical praxes. 
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 Democratic discussions about the common good should manifest a particular society’s 
fiction of the good and ought to be complimentary to the political praxis of goodness.
227
 
Political discussions about the common good are seen not as secondary attempts to describe a 
good which exists independently; instead, the human discourse about the good co-determines 
the historical development of goodness, and therefore the particular direction of the excess of 
the truly good.
228
 Although Milbank calls this a fiction, it should nevertheless be determined 
as closely as possible by the good itself. To this end, the good must be allowed to act upon the 
people involved in these democratic discussions. In order for this to occur, one should defend 
one’s own particular understanding of the best project, insofar as this is accompanied by an 
opening up of oneself to failure and correction by the truly good, which could be better 
mediated by someone else.
229
  
 Overall, this shows that Milbank apologetically defends theology’s central role in a 
pluralist post-Christendom society by promising that Christian theology is able to appreciate 
the positive differences of a plurality of worldviews, and to organise this plurality along the 
lines of an ever-expanding, good social order. This leads us to reconsider the criticism that 
Milbank is advocating the re-establishment of Christendom. This criticism must be further 
nuanced by separating the concrete church and Christian theology in Milbank’s conception. 
Despite Milbank’s considerable confidence in Christian theology, to serve as adequate 
promoter of the common good, he does not defend any simplistic return to established 
Christendom.
230
 He does not understand the church, in the sense of a pre-given social 
structure, to be the solution of all the problems that exist within society at present.
231
 Instead, 
Milbank offers an ontology based on material from the Christian tradition as opening up a 
better future than contemporary secularism does.
232
 Milbank’s church is, then, the emergence 
of something genuinely new; the church is the double excess of theological thinking and 
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practices.
233
 At the same time, Milbank ascribes to Christian theology the most central 
political role in post-Christendom societies, and in this sense rejects the criticism of those 
opponents to Christendom who deem this role to be unacceptable. 
 The contextuality of Milbank’s apologetic defence of Christian theology against 
secularism appears inasmuch as he advocates the superiority of his own Christian theology 
over secularism. Whether Christian theology should also be as central in the organisation of 
societies, which are not dominated by secularism, is a matter that would have to be 
demonstrated separately. One problem with Milbank’s apologetic defence concerns his quick 
conclusion from the observation of the failure of all attempts to date to overcome the situation 
in which one all-encompassing ontology determines the social order for a pluralist society 
that, therefore, such an overcoming is in principle impossible. In this context, Ward’s 
theology can be understood precisely as the attempt to appreciate anti-imperialist critiques in 
a post-Christendom context more sincerely, and to re-envision a Christian theology which no 
longer presents itself as the centre. How this is connected to Ward’s understanding of the 
theological relating of all of reality to God will be analysed in the following section. 
 
c) Ward’s disruptive Christian universality: Participating in God’s epistemological 
incomprehensibility 
 
  My assessment of Ward’s understanding of Christian theology’s universality proceeds 
once more in two steps, of first explaining Ward’s conception of the Christian theological task 
of relating all of reality to God and of examining how this impacts upon the political role 
ascribed to Christian theology in post-Christendom societies thereafter. 
 Overall, Ward affirms that Christian theology aims for a universal vision on 
everything.
234
 As a comprehensive view about reality, Christian theology must be open and 
attentive to everything that occurs in the world. As with Milbank, the affirmation of God 
assures that Christian theology is not a closed system, but remains intrinsically open, for 
Ward.
235
 Whereas Milbank has referred to God’s ontological incomprehensibility, Ward 
regards a Christian ontology as being inherently open due to God’s epistemological 
incomprehensibility. God is the ultimately unknowable. The emphasis on God’s 
unknowability means that, for Ward, it is important to acknowledge the possibility of divine 
interventions in any Christian understanding of reality.
236
 Talk about ‘divine interventions’ 
suggests that Christian theological deliberations about reality might not just need to be 
constantly expanded, as in Milbank’s vision, but can also be corrected and revised more 
substantially.  
 Ward refers to an experience of ‘vertigo’ if reality is read through the lens of his own 
Christian theology.
237
 For him, to perceive an immanent being in its relation to God, is not to 
perceive of how it blends into a greater harmonious whole, but means to perceive of an 
infinity of possibilities of what it might mean. To overcome the errors of positivism, 
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Christians ought to interpret immanent beings ever anew in their relation to God.
238
 This 
indicates that Ward might side with public theology, regarding the question of the human 
oversight of the harmonious whole of reality. Whereas Christians know that a continuous 
fracturing of reality leads to a greater harmony, the vision of that harmony is the sole privilege 
of God. Christians merely trust that the instability does not ultimately lead to dissolution, but 
to fulfilment.
239
 
 The stress of God’s unknowability means that, unlike Milbank, Ward refrains from 
promising that his own Christian theology more adequately corresponds to reality than its 
alternatives. Ward emphasises that there is no assurance that God exists, which is why he 
regards nihilism as being an equally legitimate interpretation of reality. According to Ward, 
the faithful surrender to God always remains ambiguous. It is bound to remain uncertain 
whether the faithful are really attracted by God or whether the desire for God is merely a 
human projection.
240
 For Ward, the act of faith should not resolve this ambiguity. To the 
contrary, living with this risk is intrinsic to the life of faith.  
 This identification of God’s otherness with God’s unknowability has been criticised 
for insufficiently examining how certain attributes of God have been positively, albeit 
apophatically, attributed to God in the Christian tradition.
241
 If instead of searching for the 
right speech about God in the contemporary context, Ward is merely concerned with 
upholding God’s unknowability, then everything can be attributed to the Christian God as 
long as it is simultaneously destabilised. At this point, Ward’s alleged denial to promise the 
correspondence of his theology to reality, can be turned against himself.  
 Correlating the postmodern weak hermeneutical ontology with Christian theology, 
Ward calls his vision of reality ‘the truth’.242 Ward returns to universal claims when he 
generalises that it is redemptive to follow one particular faith tradition, without ever aiming in 
so doing to either grasp or explain God.
243
 The faith tradition must be inhabited as a way 
through which reality is interpreted and engaged.
244
 Ward advocates a fideistic obedient 
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following of the Christian understanding of God, and reality as narrated in Christ, because 
contemporary culture needs to be redeemed from its striving to control reality.
245
 It is in this 
sense that orthodoxy can ‘deliver the “salvation” promised by God’.246 This suggests that 
Ward’s position is more disguisedly universalist than Milbank’s.247 From his Christian 
perspective, Ward evaluates positivists as those who must be converted to a more adequate 
understanding of reality.
248
 Simultaneously, Ward appreciates any other (faith) tradition that 
equally opposes what he regards as being the major contemporary cultural ill.
249
 In other 
words, he appreciates other worldviews precisely to the extent that they overlap with his own 
understanding of reality. At one point, in a text about Christianity, he even claims that ‘[i]n 
fact, ‘Christian theology’ in this text could be replaced with any other cultural practice’.250 
This means that Ward assumes that Christianity’s particularity is universal in such a way that 
it adequately knows what is good about other worldviews, without attending to their 
particularities.  
 Overall, on the one hand, Ward’s emphatic denial, of his possessing privileged 
knowledge of reality on the basis of his adherence to the Christian faith, could be said to lend 
itself less to the accusation of perpetuating a Christian imperialism than Milbank’s. On the 
other hand, however, Ward presents it as universally true that God is unknowable and that, 
consequently, the meaning of the whole of reality is unstable, open to change at any moment 
in accordance with a new divine intervention. The consequences of this understanding of 
universality for the political role of Christian theology in post-Christendom societies remains 
to be assessed in the following section. 
 
d) Christian theology as disruptive centre of the social order 
 
 Regarding the criticism that Radical Orthodoxy defends a remnant of Christendom, it 
is important to highlight that Ward calls Christianity ‘intrinsically imperialist’.251 Imperialism 
has always been a part of the Christian worldview, because the territory inhabited by any 
                                                 
245
 This is not a literal following of the biblical texts, but a continuation of the interpretation of reality 
and God that has been initiated by the Christian scriptures. 
246
 Graham Ward, “Receiving the Gift,” Modern Theology 30 (2014): 85. 
247
 That Ward assumes a universal human nature prior to culture is evident for example in his 
investigation of what makes humans believing beings in Unbelievable: Why We Believe and Why We 
Don’t. He assumes that there is a shared human nature, ‘an anthropological a priori’ disposition to 
belief (Ward, How the Light Gets In, 260), and that the different kind of beliefs humans have are 
variations of this more fundamental disposition. 
248
 Burrus, “Radical Orthodoxy and the Heresiological Habit,” in Interpreting the Postmodern, 37. He 
is accused of flattening their positions into one reductionist philosophy, one which can then be 
defeated (43). Milbank has been criticised for the same mistake of generalising his opponents into one 
defeatable position (Rowan Williams, “Saving Time: Thoughts on Practice, Patience and Vision,” 
New Blackfriars 73 (2007): 320); Hyman, The Predicament of Postmodern Theology, 3).  
249
 Ward, Politics of Discipleship, 74. For example, Ward praises green parties and environmentalists, 
or critical theories originating in the Frankfurter Schule (Ward, “Radical Orthodoxy and/as Cultural 
Politics,” in Radical Orthodoxy? - A Catholic Enquiry, 103-104). This proves those critics who claim 
that Ward fails to see anything good outside Christian theology and the church wrong (Graham, 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 129). For more examples of what Ward appreciates in 
contemporary culture see Ward, Politics of Discipleship, 218-219. 
250
 Ward, Cultural Transformation, 8. 
251
 Ward, Politics of Discipleship, 84. 
51 
 
 
present church has never been regarded as the whole of reality.
252
 Like Milbank, Ward also 
distinguishes between the role of the church and the role of Christian theology in a pluralist, 
post-Christendom society. Let me first explain Ward’s understanding of the church, and then I 
will examine, subsequently, Ward’s understanding of the role of Christian theology regarding 
the need to contribute to the entire society’s common good and to organise a democracy. 
 Concomitant with his understanding of God as unknowable, Ward claims that the 
church needs to be continuously unsettled and displaced by others in order to remain true to 
itself.
253
 At the same time, he refers to displacement in terms of a movement accompanying 
expansion.
254
 The church expands towards its eschatological end through being constantly 
fractured.
255
 Ward does not refer to the church’s expansion in triumphant imperialist terms, 
but in terms of brokenness and woundedness.
256
 This view highlights the church’s suffering 
due to its dependence on its surroundings. Ward stresses that the church is constantly 
relocated, as it lives ‘on the edge of both itself and what is other’.257 Ward, like Milbank, 
highlights that the incorporation of individuals into the church should not eliminate their 
unique particularity.
258
 Individual differences can be harmoniously blended into one whole, 
according to Milbank, whilst they effect an endless fracturing according to Ward. This 
suggests that, on the level of ecclesiology, Ward resists the charge of perpetuating 
Christendom imperialism. The integration of other cultures into the church is no longer 
thought of in terms of adapting the other culture to Christianity primarily, but in terms of 
unsettling the church through the confrontation with the other culture and, in this sense, in 
terms of a continuous re-modelling of the church. How Ward envisions theology’s political 
role in post-Christendom societies remains to be examined. 
 For Ward, acknowledging God as active governor and regarding Christian theology as 
participating in this government means, participating in the entire world’s perfection, a 
position not unlike Milbank’s.259 For Ward, however, working towards the world’s 
eschatological perfection does not mean interrelating unique particulars into an ever-
expanding harmonious whole. Instead, each particular being is perfected insofar as its identity 
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is continuously displaced. Any stagnation, prior to the attainment of eschatological perfection, 
must be prevented. Perfection is, thus, understood not in terms of growth, but in terms of a 
dynamism in contrast to fixity.
260
 While Milbank understands the perfection of a being in 
terms of its excess to the expanding whole, Ward’s displacement of immanent beings towards 
their perfection in God means to continuously disrupt the whole. 
 This emphasis on displacement figures into how Ward envisions a Christian 
theological contribution to democracy. Whereas Milbank defends a Christian social order by 
promising to ensure a positive evaluation of pluralism, Ward argues that Christian theology 
can help to achieve true plurality through stirring dispute and contestation.
261
 Liberal 
tolerance should be replaced by dispute, which is why a theologically grounded assertion of 
one’s own position, as well as a clear naming of one’s opponent, is needed.262 In other words, 
whereas Milbank suggests that Christian theology can enhance democracies through ensuring 
that discussions are directed towards growth in the truly good, Ward promises to rejuvenate 
democracies by ensuring that everyone gets to participate in the discussion, and in this way to 
counter the widespread fatigue with politics. Again, this would, however, re-ascribe a central 
role to Christian theology in the social order, since it is Ward’s Christian conviction that this 
dispute and contestation would lead to greater harmony and not to warfare. 
 In sum, Ward’s understanding of the political role played by Christian theology in a 
post-Christendom context must be appreciated for taking into account, more than Milbank 
does, that the re-establishment of an overarching Christian social order has become 
problematic.
263
 He, thus, shows greater respect to those contemporaries who, for various 
reasons, object to any such project. However, Ward’s affinity with postmodern philosophies 
might render him vulnerable to Milbank’s criticism of the latter. Ward follows postmodernism 
in perpetuating an implicit overarching ontology, tending to value worldviews that are 
structurally similar to his own over those that are genuinely different. Moreover, Ward’s 
position ends up re-ascribing the most central role in organising post-Christendom societies to 
Christian theology. As in the case of public theology, this is connected to Ward’s apologetic 
approach. He defends the political relevance of Christian theology in a postmodern context to 
the effect that Christian theology is advocated as best able to organise the entire society. 
 
e) Questioning secularism’s understanding of universality: Consequences for public theology 
  
 Overall, both Milbank and Ward offer ways of understanding Christian universality in 
dynamic terms that, on the level of ecclesiology, serves to evade the criticism of advocating a 
return to Christendom. Both Milbank and Ward understand the church to be a community of 
people that must continuously adapt its organisation and structure in accordance with insights 
derived from surrounding cultures. Nevertheless, both Milbank and Ward remain within the 
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problems of Christendom insofar as they apologetically defend Christian theology as being 
best able to organise the entire society. Milbank re-envisions a Christian social order; Ward 
holds Christian theology responsible for organising the encounter between different 
worldviews in such a way that the social order of the whole will continue to be disrupted and, 
in this way, correspond to his own theological vision of reality.  
 Appreciating Milbank’s positive and harmonious evaluation of pluralism, I remain 
sceptical regarding the question of whether this Christian theological understanding of 
pluralism should be used apologetically to defend Christian theology’s public relevance and 
to effectively re-ascribe the most central political role in post-Christendom societies to 
Christian theology. This apologetic defence risks undermining the theological relevance of 
criticisms of Christendom imperialism and the opposition to theological contributions to 
public politics. In the course of this dissertation, I will introduce arguments as to why 
Christian theologians should use this positive understanding of pluralism as a hermeneutical 
lens for their interpretation of reality, whilst not demanding the acceptance of this 
hermeneutic lens by non-Christians as well. 
For now, it can be observed that public theologians are so concerned with not re-
establishing a position of Christian hegemony that they tend to co-opt a secularist dismissal of 
a more positive understanding of pluralism. They say that Christianity must be identifiable as 
one particular tradition amongst others in a post-Christendom context.
264
 This would, 
supposedly, be an adequate adaption of Christianity to ‘the realities of pluralism’.265 The 
discussion above has made clear that there is no neutrally given understanding of the reality of 
pluralism, but that pluralism must be interpreted from the perspective of some particular 
ontology.
266
 A closer investigation of the public theological understanding of pluralism shows 
that the sub-discipline tends to operate within a secularist ontology of violence, one which 
might be too fixed and might inhibit a society’s growth towards eschatological perfection.  
  Many public theologians rely on Max Stackhouse’s engagement with pluralism, who 
at first glance seems to be in agreement with Milbank when he claims that a shared 
framework is necessary for meaningful public debate to take place.
267
 However, for 
Stackhouse, this shared framework is not an alternative ontology to the prevalent one; he 
thinks of a normative framework that can guard a society against potential disorder, thus 
exhibiting an underlying belief in what Milbank calls ‘ontologies of violence’. As a 
theological ethicist, Stackhouse understands faith traditions to be endowed with a restraining 
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function of the spiritual powers which otherwise lead the world towards chaotic 
destruction.
268
 He speaks of ‘globalising powers’ in the face of which complex civilisations 
must be generated, restrained or guided.
269
 On this basis, public theology is then presented as 
being endowed with the task of managing pluralism, which is understood as real chaos 
without this management. Following Milbank, we could retort that the existence of these 
antagonistic powers, which need to be restrained by public theology, is far less evident than 
Stackhouse might assume.  
 Where Stackhouse wants Christian theology to establish the normative framework for 
post-Christendom societies, Elaine Graham assumes that there are shared norms regarding 
intelligibility, truth, and reciprocity on the basis of which issues can be publicly analysed.
270
 
Christian theology should defend its contributions on the basis of these ‘publicly intelligible’ 
criteria.
271
 The problem with this presupposition is that it uncritically accepts the nation state 
or the prevalently dominant culture as being able to provide the guidelines for political and 
civic actions.
272
 Both Milbank’s and Ward’s arguments have made us aware that such a 
unified vision might not be presupposed in the contemporary context. According to Milbank, 
these norms might simply be restrictive and, in this way, exhibit the lack of a common vision 
oriented towards societal growth. According to Ward, these norms might be understood too 
unambiguously and theology’s task would be to reopen people’s imaginations to different 
norms.  
 Overall, the problem with the public theological interpretation of pluralism is first that 
it (unconsciously) accepts the supposedly neutral overarching understanding of difference, as 
antagonistic, and in this way returns to an implicitly imperialistic positioning of all particular 
differences underneath its own overarching gaze.
273
 And second, this understanding of 
pluralism is politically problematic as it tends to subscribe to the regulative power of the 
nation state as necessary means by which to restrict the otherwise antagonistic plurality of 
worldviews. Once any assumption about pluralism has been dismantled as being culturally 
specific, Milbank’s understanding of pluralism, as intrinsically harmonious, offers itself as a 
better alternative Christian theological understanding of plurality in the post-Christendom 
context. However, what remains problematic is Milbank’s unconcessional advocacy of a 
privileged position for Christian theology.  
 Thus far, it has only been argued that Milbank and Ward both fail to envision a less 
central political role being played by Christian theology in post-Christendom societies than it 
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used to play in previous eras. However, I have not yet argued why such an advocacy of 
Christian theology, as being central to the social order, should be objected to. Since my 
hypothesis is that the objection should come from the perspective of Christian theology itself, 
it is now time to analyse the theological underpinnings of Milbank’s and Ward’s respective 
arguments. Whereas it has already been made apparent that the central role played by 
Christian theology is associated with the theological task of relating all of reality to God for 
both, how they envision all of reality as participating in God must be examined more closely. 
In terms of Christian doctrine, this issue can be elucidated by analysing Milbank’s and Ward’s 
respective understandings of grace, sin, and redemption. The question concerns the degree to 
which they regard non-Christian positions and insights as mediating the world’s graced 
relation to God, in how far they regard them as sinfully rejecting their relation to God and in 
how far Christian theology is believed to participate actively in the world’s redemption 
through also relating non-Christian insights to God. 
 
2.3 Completing plural aspirations for grace: Fulfilling the theological significance of the 
public 
 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Milbank has been repeatedly criticised for 
prematurely discarding the theological significance of non-Christian interlocutors
274
, while 
Ward is most frequently applauded for being the Radical Orthodox author who displays the 
most amicable stance towards non-Christian dialogue partners.
275
 Milbank’s critics say that he 
is bound to overlook the theological significance of other worldviews, given that he simply 
overwrites everything else with his Christian ontology.
276
 Instead of seeing how they might 
contribute to the harmony he advocates, dissonant voices are simply being excluded.
277
 Ward, 
on the contrary, is said to acknowledge that theological sensibilities resurface in late-modern 
culture and that the sacred re-appears within the post-Christendom context.
278
 Nevertheless, 
Ward has been criticised for stopping half-way in his respect for the theological significance 
of non-Christian insights. Ward’s theology, not unlike Milbank’s, is also primarily aimed at 
the transformation of contemporary culture by an apologetic ‘defense of the Christian faith’ 
against the dominant cultural currents.
279
 In this vein, he allegedly does not sufficiently allow 
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Christian theology to be informed and corrected by insights drawn from the surrounding 
context.
280
 The continuous negotiation between Christian theology and its surrounding context 
is one-sidedly presented in terms of a theological address to the cultural ‘malaise’, more than 
it is in terms of a reciprocal exchange between worldviews.
281
  
 These criticisms have been connected to Milbank’s and Ward’s supposedly erroneous 
understandings of grace. They presumably associate grace with Christian theology one-
sidedly and, thus, overlook how grace is also mediated by non-Christian positions.
282
 Overall, 
I argue that Milbank’s and Ward’s understandings of grace are more nuanced than their critics 
admit. The first part of my respective expositions of Milbank’s and Ward’s theologies of 
grace consists of explaining how each understands non-Christian positions as aspirations for 
grace. For Milbank, these are already good and can be perfected by Christian theology, 
whereas non-Christian aspirations for grace are neutrally open, according to Ward, and can be 
completed through Christian theology. In the second part of my exposition of Milbank’s and 
Ward’s respective understandings of grace, I turn again to their advocacy of theology’s 
central political role in post-Christendom societies. One might suspect that their relatively 
positive understanding of non-Christian positions, as aspirations for grace, might allow one of 
these positions to take centre-stage without leading to societal disaster. This is why I examine 
Milbank’s and Ward’s respective understanding of sin, showing how their promise to 
overcome secularism by way of Christian theology depicts secularism as being sinful 
primarily. I conclude my discussion by way of criticising the way in which both of their 
respective positions are marked themselves by that which they define as being sinful and their 
shared failure to differentiate sufficiently between Christ’s fulfilment of nature’s aspiration 
for grace and Christian theology’s sinful, and thus often failed, furthering or completion of 
Christ’s redemption. 
 
a) Milbank’s self-excessive grace: Perfecting non-Christian goods  
 
 Milbank understands grace in terms of a gratuitous excess. Grace always effects more 
than the filling of a lack.
283
 Grace is the structure of ‘outcome exceeding occasion’.284 This 
structure applies to both the grace of creation and the grace of Christ: The occasion for 
creation was to create another to God, but the outcome was creatures who were open to 
deification. The occasion for Christ’s Incarnation was to redeem humankind from sin, but 
instead of merely reinstating the original state of creation, human nature now became united 
with God.
285
 Highlighting the consistent structure of grace, Milbank focuses primarily upon 
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the continuity of all that which Christian theologians understand as grace.
286
 At the same time, 
however, and in line with the aforementioned explanation of Milbank’s understanding of the 
excessive goodness of reality, grace is not to be understood in terms of an abstract, general 
principle but in terms of the very specific gift or talent which individuals receive from God.
287
 
Consequently, Milbank stresses explicitly that the content of grace cannot be circumscribed 
by theology because grace can be mediated by the yet unknown stranger.
288
 This allows for 
unknown variations of the content of grace, which defeats the accusation that Milbank cannot 
conceive of how non-Christians are moved genuinely differently by God’s grace than 
Christians. 
 To the contrary, Milbank applies his understanding of grace in terms of ‘outcome 
exceeding occasion’ to the encounter between Christians and non-Christians. Reconciliation 
between two, presumably conflicting, positions does not mean settling for a compromise, but 
involves searching for a new disclosure which is more extreme than both positions.
289
 This 
would mean that if Christian theologians seek to renew their tradition, through receiving non-
Christian insights, then these insights can never be directly applied, but the renewal must be 
found in the excess to both positions once they are harmoniously blended.  
 Accordingly, Milbank argues that his ontology is not a wishful return to some prior 
age, but that he renews traditional Christian understandings of reality by incorporating all 
which is good and valuable in those criticisms voiced by modern secularists.
290
 In other 
words, Milbank acknowledges that even those positions, which he dismisses, contain some 
truth which must expand his own vision of the harmonious whole. In line with an 
understanding of grace’s fulfilling of the natural desire for grace, Milbank does not advocate 
any wholesale dismissal of secularist ontologies, but aims to show how the secularist 
discourse remains less perfect without the help of Christian theology.
291
 The embrace by 
Christian theology does not destroy non-Christian positions, but must manifest the arrival of 
grace to them.
292
 When Milbank claims that, from the perspective of his Christian ontology, 
any secular realism is unable to ‘understand the world aright’293, this does not mean that they 
are entirely erroneous, but that they remain partial. When his critics suggest that Milbank 
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should not interpret his opponents as rejecting, but as distorting the truth
294
, Milbank is likely 
to agree. 
 From the perspective of Milbank’s theology of grace, it only follows that other 
positions are not treated as integral wholes which need to be preserved. Instead, how they 
blend with Milbank’s own account of reality into something new must be examined. 
However, his understanding of grace leaves us with the question as to why Milbank seeks to 
replace the secularist social order with his theological alternative. The way in which he 
discards secularism suggests that, on this more overarching level, Milbank does not focus 
primarily on all that is good in secularism, but on the problems with secularism that need to 
be overcome by Christian theology. This approach would better chime with an understanding 
of grace as filling a lack than with grace in terms of the excessive fulfilling of an already good 
nature. The issue can be clarified through a closer analysis of the way in which Milbank 
understands how grace overcomes sin.  
   
b) Overcoming the sin of pride: Depending on the grace of Christian theology 
 
 According to Milbank, the Fall originated in the human refusal of God’s immeasurable 
grace and love.
295
 More precisely, Milbank associates this refusal with humankind’s prideful 
mistrust in the overall goodness of God and reality. Due to the abundance of grace, there is an 
uncertainty concerning what precise grace one will receive and what precise grace one will 
pass on in every encounter with others.
296
 Sin, then, involves mistrusting the goodness of 
reality insofar as people refuse the risk involved in the gift-exchange of unknown goods. It is 
sinful to read the unknown ‘as source of threat [...] rather than potential or gift’.297  
 Regarding the effects of sin, Milbank upholds that sin has no effect on God. The real 
superabundance of goodness exists perfectly in God, despite the Fall.
298
 God continues to 
relate to all of reality. Rejecting any ontologisation of evil, evil is not regarded as a necessary 
part of reality, but as a contingent occurrence in the world.
299
 However, the Fall has an effect 
on human nature and, consequently, upon reality’s relation to God. Milbank associates sin 
with the distortion of the human desire for God.
300
 Subsequent to the Fall, people no longer 
mediate only the superabundance of goodness, which is why there are now ‘impossible 
interval[s]’ in nature which do not participate in God’s grace.301 Evil is a real intrusion into 
                                                 
294
 Mathewes, A Theology of Public Life, 125. 
295
 Milbank, “Forgiveness,” in Being Reconciled, 46-47; Milbank, “Postmodern Critical 
Augustinianism,” in The Future of Love, 344. 
296
 Milbank, “Grace,” in Being Reconciled, 150.  
297
 Milbank, “Grace,” in Being Reconciled, 150. This also explains why Milbank agrees with Luther 
that the Augustinian understanding of original sin as pride should be buttressed by interpreting this 
pride as originating in an even more fundamental fear (Milbank, “Can Morality be Christian?,” in The 
Word Made Strange, 230).  
298
 Milbank, “The Second Difference,” in The Word Made Strange, 182-183. 
299
 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, xviii. Milbank claims that only the doctrine of the Fall 
allows him to maintain the claim that reality is good and harmonious and to acknowledge, this 
notwithstanding, the reality of evil (Milbank, “Out of the Greenhouse,” in The Word Made Strange, 
263; Milbank, “Grace,” in Being Reconciled, 149). 
300
 Milbank, “Evil,” in Being Reconciled, 10.  
301
 Milbank, “The Second Difference,” in The Word Made Strange, 182. Milbank situates these 
impossible intervals between the economic and the immanent Trinity. The logic seems to be that the 
59 
 
 
graced reality.
302
 Nature, in the sense of immanent history, is an apocalyptic mixture of grace 
and evil.
303
 Evil is the opposing force that continues to distract the harmonious whole. 
 Grace, then, overcomes sin by restoring the distorted desire for God. This is mediated 
whenever people are moved by the superabundant goodness of reality, despite all of their 
inhibitions and incapacities.
304
 So, in order to overcome evil, people need to take the hopeful 
risk that the harmony, and not the opposing force, will ultimately win.
305
 Human policies 
based on grace need to continuously determine the precise evil that inhibits a fuller realisation 
of the Good. Every evil must be traceable in terms of a lack of integration into the harmonious 
whole. More fundamentally, however, Milbank stresses that Christian politics are not 
primarily oriented at the elimination of evil, but at the advancement of a society in the truly 
good.
306
 Consequently, a Christian interpretation of reality must commence with redemption 
and not with evil.
307
 In other words, Christian theologians must take the risk of reading world 
history always through the interpretative lens that, ultimately, all reality is graced and, thus, 
harmonious. Historical occurrences of evil or of suffering cannot be understood as 
falsifications of the ultimate goodness of reality. Disregarding what happens, Christians 
cannot deny that God relates to the world, as this most overarching outlook is not just one 
more fact which could be verified or falsified by empirical evidence. 
 Concerning the question of how Milbank’s understanding of grace and sin influences 
his understanding of the relation between Christian theology and non-Christian positions, it 
must first be stressed that it is precisely his understanding of grace in terms of self-excess that 
allows Milbank to advocate Christian theology as centre of a not exclusively Christian 
society. Milbank argues that even though non-Christians and Christians rely equally upon, 
and participate in, God’s grace, this participation in redemptive grace does not oblige people 
to become Christian.
308
 Instead, those who become Christians constitute an excess to the 
ongoing work of redemption. Analogously to grace’s relation to sin, Christianity must be 
more than the filling of a lack. This means that Christians and non-Christians could likewise 
participate in the social order that corresponds to Milbank’s theology of grace.  
 At the same time, however, concerning the fallen world, Milbank highlights that God 
did not redeem humankind from sin by way of any supernatural intervention, but by tracing a 
way towards redemption in Christ.
309
 Apart from Christ, people might not see that they are 
related to God, and even if they do see this, they might not be able to respond to God’s grace 
in their actions.
310
 This does not imply that all non-Christians only intrude sinfully into the 
graced harmony, but it means that only those who read reality in relation to Christ, i.e. 
Christian theologians, possess the restored vision of how true harmony will be achieved. This 
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claim constitutes the first theological reason for Milbank to advocate a theological social 
order for post-Christendom societies too.  
 Secondly, his apologetic defence of a Christian social order, against the strict 
secularist opposition to theological involvement in politics, can be related to Milbank’s 
interpretation of secularism as being primarily sinful and Christian theology as being 
primarily graced. In correspondence with his understanding of grace and sin, Milbank calls 
sinful any ontology that posits good and evil as being on the same ontological level.
311
 This is 
an understanding that denies the human dependence on grace.
312
 Humans are imagined as 
being able to choose freely between good and evil, which means that the goodness of the 
world would depend on human choice. This is precisely the way in which secularism 
organises a society, focusing primarily on people’s freedom, not on people’s dependence. At 
this point, Milbank’s theology of grace is not so much the excess to the secularist conception 
as it is its overcoming.  
 The first theological problem with Milbank’s theological rationale for a Christian 
social order concerns Milbank’s failure to see that, in apologetically defending Christian 
theology against the secularist opposition to theologically informed political involvement, he 
perpetuates his own understanding of sin in terms of ‘proud mistrust’.313 Milbank presents his 
Christian theology as being the cure for all problems with secularism, instead of taking the 
hopeful risk that, despite its many shortcomings, this secularist opposition to Christian 
theology still mediates God’s grace. In other words, his defensive apologetics prevents 
Milbank from perceiving the grace that might be mediated by the vehement opposition to 
Christian theological contributions to politics in post-Christendom societies. Milbank’s 
persistent focus on the failure of secularism could, then, be read as Milbank’s proud attempt 
to save the world by his own efforts.
314
  
 This problem can be related to a more fundamental theological problem with 
Milbank’s position, namely that he insufficiently distinguishes between Christ’s redemption, 
including the restoration of the human vision, and the Christian theological sinful participation 
in this redemption. He fails to acknowledge that, as sinners, Christian theologians still fail to 
see clearly the way towards redemption that has been traced in Christ. Kathryn Tanner will be 
introduced in Chapter 3 and Edward Schillebeeckx in Chapter 4 as two theologians who are 
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more sensitive to the continuous failure of Christian theological attempts of seeing how 
Christ’s redemptive work can be further realised on earth.  
 
c) Ward’s kenotic grace: Accepting non-Christian goods 
 
 The greatest theological difference between Ward’s and Milbank’s understandings of 
grace is that while Milbank understands grace in terms of self-excess, Ward understands grace 
in terms of a simultaneous double-movement of kenosis and completion. This once more 
appertains to the grace of creation as well as to the grace of the Incarnation. After a brief 
exposition of both graces, I will consider the implications for the way Ward can appreciate the 
theological significance of non-Christian positions and then move on to an examination of the 
way in which this influences his apologetic defence of theology’s central political role in post-
Christendom societies (section d). 
  While Milbank understands creation as excessive surplus to God, Ward understands 
creation as the kenotic self-emptying of God, which is ‘extravagant and costly’.315 God 
created a void to be filled. Although Ward denies the existence of a void as such, because the 
movement of kenosis is immediately accompanied by a movement of completion
316
, the 
understanding of creation in terms of God’s kenosis still allows Ward to conceive of there 
being a ‘place for suffering as a passion written in creation’.317 There is a risk of suffering, 
even prior to the Fall.
318
 The risk is not only a risk for humankind, but it is even a risk for 
God. This indicates that Ward gives more room to thinking about some positive lack than 
Milbank does. For Ward, the lack is in order to be completed. For Milbank, to the contrary, 
the nothingness which comes into existence with creation is really nowhere. Ward refers to 
the movement of kenosis and completion in terms of a suffering (the opening up to the other) 
which at the same time glorifies (the completion).
319
 Milbank criticises these kenotic 
theologies that account for suffering and evil in reference to God’s providential creation, 
because by presenting evil as part of a greater good, the gravity of evil is diminished.
320
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 In a similar vein to his kenotic understanding of creation, Ward understands the 
Incarnation in Christ as incomplete, and therefore as in need of further completion by the 
church. In his argument, Ward differentiates between the divine Logos and the Logos as it is 
incarnated in the life of Jesus Christ. The divine Logos is the perfected and completed human 
nature that exists in God.
321
 This perfect human nature is incarnated in Jesus only initially, 
and must still be brought to its completion through the continuous integration of all other 
human beings into itself.
322
 The Incarnation is not fully accomplished before all of humankind 
has reached its perfection.
323
 The church’s continuous imitation of Jesus Christ, for the further 
completion of the Incarnation, must be an interplay between subjection to Christ and 
interpretative freedom.
324
 This means that Ward does not regard the church as one-sidedly 
depending on God’s offer of redemption, but as actively and creatively completing the 
redemption once begun in Christ.
325
 He argues that ‘something of what it is to be God […] 
comes about by an identification with what is human’.326 
 Overall, Ward conceptualises grace differently than Milbank. Milbank understands 
grace in terms of excess, while Ward thinks of grace in terms of self-emptying completion. 
For Ward, God is already the completion of all goodness in Godself which God, however, 
abandoned for the creation of the world. Whereas the fullness of goodness is with God, the 
world is merely the secondary appearance of this goodness.
327
 Whatever is good in the world 
does not coincide with what is good in God, but the worldly goodness must be made to 
coincide with God’s goodness through the world’s return to God. That creation was a risk for 
both God and creation means that the return of creation to God is a completion for both God 
and creation. Whereas Milbank conceives of the return in terms of an excess for both God and 
creation, Ward refers to the return in terms of self-identification within difference.
328
 God is 
further differentiated within, but not positively expanded upon, in the sense that Milbank 
imagines. 
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 This conception of grace, in terms of God’s kenotic self-emptying, would entail that 
non-Christian positions must be regarded as the grace of equally ‘empty’ material, which can 
be taken up by Christian theology in order to complete the world’s redemption. Ward, thus, 
argues that ‘[t]he secular age, [...], is neither good nor bad in and of itself. Rather, it is just the 
time we have been given to redeem’.329 Non-Christian positions are not regarded as evil or 
sinful, but as incomplete. Likewise, God and the Incarnation of the Logos are incomplete, 
which seems to position Christian theology even more centre-stage than it was in Milbank’s 
theology of grace. Christian theologians are responsible for the redemption of the world as 
well as for the completion of God.
330
  
 Whereas this conception of grace explains Ward’s treatment of postmodernism, in the 
sense of an aspiration for grace which is completed by Christian theology, it does not explain 
why Ward opposes a secularist social order for a post-Christendom society. In the following 
section, I argue that Ward does not present Christian theology as the completion of 
secularism, but as its overcoming, which again can be elucidated through an investigation of 
Ward’s understanding of sin and grace’s overcoming of sin. 
  
d) Overcoming the sin of domination: The disruptive grace of Christian theology 
 
 For Milbank, sin was the mistrust in the fundamental goodness of reality and the proud 
belief that the goodness of reality depends upon humankind, instead of acknowledging 
humankind’s own dependence on God’s grace. If, according to Ward, creation itself is 
ambiguous, mistrust in the goodness of reality cannot be sinful. If worldly reality is a mixture 
of emptiness and completion, then a certain mistrust, regarding that which one will receive by 
opening oneself up to the world, should be legitimate. For Ward, then, sin is ‘the lust to 
dominate’.331 The attempt to dominate and control reality is disobedient to God, because God 
created reality in a manner that is ambiguous and uncontrollable.  
 Ward depicts the overcoming of the lust to dominate in terms of an unconditional 
opening up of oneself to the reception of grace, in whatever shape it is given. Ward associates 
the Fall with a situation of being lost, in which we still live, and theology’s redemptive task is 
to begin with losing oneself in this fallen world.
332
 Affirming Christ in some way as objective 
redeemer of the world, Ward argues that the suffering of immersion into the world can only 
be born ‘insofar as Christ as the pioneer of our faith has borne all things and brought all things 
in submission to him’.333 At the same time, however, Ward immediately emphasises that the 
human recognition of Christ is integral to Christ’s work of redemption.334 If Milbank places a 
strong emphasis on the active theological effort to redeem the world from sin, Ward places an 
even stronger emphasis on the same point. According to Ward, humanity’s sinful lust to 
dominate reality must be re-oriented through following Christ’s privileging of grace over 
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security and stability.
335
 That this is more a duty than a gift is apparent in Ward’s suggestion 
that Christ’s suffering is redemptive. Christ’s suffering manifests the redemptive freedom of 
living without precisely knowing what is going on.
336
 Whereas Milbank has claimed that 
Christians can open themselves up to the historical mixture of grace and sin, because they 
know that grace will annihilate sin eventually, Ward claims that people must open themselves 
up to the mixture of good and evil in history, because they will redeem the world from sin in 
this way. Instead of speaking of an inherent attraction to grace, Ward refers to a conversion to 
grace, which can only occur if one is already transformable.
337
 In other words, human beings 
must be of a certain kind (namely transformable) before they can receive grace.  
 Ward then continues to equate this human transformability with vulnerability. 
Vulnerability is associated with exposing oneself to the exterior world. One’s own boundaries 
must be transgressed towards the not-yet-fully-known. Since reality is understood as being 
most fundamentally ambiguous, participation in the movement of grace demands a continuous 
self-abandonment as contrasted to self-protection, fear, or narcissism.
338
 In other words, 
people must sacrifice certain dispositions in order to receive grace.
339
 The sacrificial self-
abandonment simultaneously bestows grace onto others, insofar as one draws their suffering 
into oneself.  
 Regarding the question of how the above exposition impacts upon the way in which 
Ward ascribes a central political role to Christian theology, it is important to highlight that 
Ward does not view non-Christians as entirely un-graced. He explicitly argues that only God 
can see who rightly imitates Christ and who truly belongs to the ecclesial community of the 
saved.
340
 Moreover, non-Christians could be acknowledged to be moved genuinely differently 
by God’s grace, depending on what the ambiguous world offers. The only people who can be 
definitively called un-graced are those who prevent the open reception, i.e. modern positivists 
with their firm definitions that are being presented as self-evident, and political secularists 
who likewise present their own political order as being best due to its supposed independence 
from specific cultural influences. 
 Ward’s apologetic defence of theology’s political relevance for post-Christendom 
societies then takes a different route to that of Milbank. Milbank’s positive understanding of 
grace stressed a prior dependence upon God’s offer of grace for any active human completion 
of God’s redemptive work. Ward’s emphasis on the ‘continual self-abandonment’341 for 
human participation in grace, on the contrary, downplays any sense of theology’s joyful 
reception of non-Christian insights. Instead, Ward defines faithfulness as that which remains 
when nothing appears to be given and when one solely lives for a future that others can enter 
into.
342
 Ward argues that in order to receive grace, there must be a lack and a sense of 
dissatisfaction with what one has.
343
 Theologians should ‘scream into the darkness “Save 
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me”’.344 Accordingly, Ward evaluates the present situation in terms of us ‘all’ being able to 
‘[...] see that the world is fucked up’ and us ‘all still hoping for something that can stop it 
from being so fucked up’.345 In other words, Ward’s interpretation of the current state of the 
world, as remarkably un-graced, helps his apologetic defence of theology’s task to complete 
the world’s redemption once begun in Christ.346 Ward’s universalising ‘we’ at this point of 
interpreting the contemporary situation as particularly problematic, is remarkable. 
 On this basis, Ward then explains how situating oneself within the Christian narrative 
can help people to develop a habit of opening themselves up to the ambiguous reality for the 
further redemption of the world.
347
 To ‘speak of, through and by revealedness’ redeems 
people from the sinful lust to dominate.
348
 Events in the contemporary context must be related 
to the Christian narrative in order to ‘open up a space between what we think we know and 
what is true’.349 The narrative must be followed faithfully and imaginatively without there 
being any final understanding.
350
 The Christian narrative, thus, serves to dislodge fixed and 
settled understandings of the world in order to let the superabundance of the truth shine 
forth.
351
 Adhering to the Christian narrative forges a way for people through the world that 
prevents them from providing final explanations or definitions.
352
 Reversely, also cultural 
references to Christ from non-ecclesial contexts, perhaps uttered by non-Christians, are 
theologically significant for Ward.
353
 There is, then, no final explanation or reason as to why 
the specific Christian narrative should be followed, but Ward shows how the Christian 
narrative can be followed as one possible way of preventing any domination and control over 
reality.
354
 Theologically systematising thought is also not meant to finally render the Christian 
tradition manageable, but to form disciples of the ‘Unsearchable’ God whose works are 
‘incomprehensible’.355  
 At the same time, however, Christian theology is defended as being best able to see 
how the secularist social order ought to be overcome and would, as such, replace secularism’s 
central position. Here, it is not clear how Ward’s account of how people can live in the world, 
without dominating reality through their explanations, would escape becoming the dominating 
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explanation of how to best live in the world. Like Milbank, Ward risks perpetuating the sin he 
wants to overcome on the most overarching level, because he is so concerned with defending 
theology’s political relevance for post-Christendom societies apologetically, which he 
strongly associates with theology’s ability to solve societal problems. 
 Moreover, Ward also fails to differentiate between Christ and theology’s sinful 
completion of Christ’s work. Overall, Ward’s theology leaves the impression that we live in a 
fallen reality and that Christianity is endowed with the task of redeeming the world from its 
sinfulness. On the basis of Ward’s understanding of Christ as only the incomplete incarnation 
of the divine Logos, it becomes impossible to indicate where and how Christians fail in 
completing the redemption initiated by Christ. If Ward suggests that Christian theology 
should scandalise people in a Christ-like manner
356
, Ward does not account for how not only 
the Christ-likeness but also the sinfulness of Christian theologians might cause their 
deliberations to be scandalous. Even when Ward admits that theological language can be 
impacted by sin, he exempts liturgical acts and language from this sinfulness, claiming that in 
the celebration of the Eucharist theological language is being ‘made to appear pure, innocent, 
and free from ideology’.357 The confession that theological language is impaired by sin is then 
nearly undone when he continues to deny any strict distinction between the church’s liturgy 
and theological reflection upon this liturgy, arguing that both are indissolubly interwoven.
358
 
Ward’s strong focus on the Christian duty to suffer for the world’s complete redemption, and 
his presentation of vulnerability and fracturedness as something which Christians have to 
attain heroically in order to redeem the world, leads to the question of whether Christians 
should not instead acknowledge to always already be vulnerable and fractured because they 
are sinful. Should the argument not rather go this way: Christians should open themselves up 
to grace, because only in this way can they receive the gift which cures them of their sin?  
 If I argue that Ward depicts the world too one-sidedly as being fallen, or that he 
associates Christian theology too one-sidedly with the promise of the whole world’s 
redemption, it must be acknowledged that Ward also seeks to distance his own theology from 
any nostalgic reproaches that might be voiced against Milbank’s project due to the latter’s 
focus on the lapse from Christian orthodoxy in the late Middle Ages.
359
 Ward still claims to 
interpret history, despite this lapse, in terms of ‘an ongoing adventus’ of Christ’s salvation, 
not as the advance towards history’s apocalyptic end.360 At this point, Ward distinguishes 
between Christ and the church, arguing that, however much the church has failed, it cannot 
quench the Christian hope for the entire world’s salvation. Importantly for this dissertation, 
Ward here refers to Schillebeeckx’s trust in the reality of salvation outside of the church361, as 
well as to Schillebeeckx’s call on theologians to actualise the universality of Jesus’ message 
in changing situations.
362
 Ward, at this point, weaves Schillebeeckx’s position into his own 
theology, interpreting this actualisation of Jesus’ message in terms of a call upon theologians 
to relate the contemporary situation to the biblical narrative of Jesus. Together, Ward’s 
argument suggests, then, that the church’s past failure can be redeemed by the hope of 
contemporary Christian theologians who believe in the world’s salvation nonetheless. In this 
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way, Ward fails to acknowledge the way in which the church’s past failures also impair the 
vision of what contemporary Christians should rightly hope for.
363
 In this respect, Ward’s 
position does not constitute an alternative to Milbank’s who similarly does not advocate a 
return to some idealist past, but who instead focuses on problems in the past and present in 
order to voice his theological promise of a better future. The difference merely appertains to 
their respective promises.  
 My exposition of Schillebeeckx’s theology, in Chapter 4, will provide a more distinct 
alternative. I will interpret the passages in his work referred to by Ward as suggesting that 
Christ’s universal salvation, despite the church, is a reality here and now, which Christian 
theologians must attend to in order to gain new hope. The task of Christian theologians is then 
not to promise a better future, but to discern how the contemporary situation mediates the 
reality of redemption, and to name this redemption in reference to the life of Jesus of 
Nazareth. 
 If the emphasis was not so much laid on the Christian theological ability to redeem the 
world, and more upon the Christian theological dependence on the redemption which has 
already been offered, then Ward’s theology of grace would still provide some helpful insights. 
It could be learned from Ward that in their opening up to grace, theologians might also 
receive the sin and suffering of a fallen world with the concomitant risk of being drawn right 
into it. Contrary to Ward, it should then be emphasised that this is not something which 
theologians must do, but something which they can dare to do precisely because they can trust 
that grace will raise them up again eventually. On this basis, then, Ward’s repeatedly 
criticised and strong reliance upon postmodern philosophies should be applauded. Trusting in 
the superior power of grace, Christian theologians do not have to be afraid of the 
shortcomings of atheist postmodernism, but should be concerned primarily with receiving 
aright the grace that postmodern thought can offer. This would also be a cure for both 
Milbank’s and Ward’s anxiety with overcoming all of the world’s sinfulness by way of 
Christian theology. Instead of pointing to the other’s failures, and to the way in which 
Christian theology can repair them, a focus on grace might allow Christian theologians to be 
with others in their failures.  
 
e) Questioning univocal abstractions from grace: Consequences for public theology 
 
 It is now time to assess the roles attributed to grace and Christ in contemporary public 
theological literature, in light of the discussion above. Public theologians have referred to 
Christology, thus far, mainly in reference to questions concerning ontology and 
apologetics.
364
 Ontological references concern the claim that the revelation in Christ leads to a 
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greater insight into the workings of the world, whereas apologetic references appeal to the 
church’s mission to publicly confess Christ.  
 As most prominent representative of the ontological public theological interpretation 
of Christ, Max Stackhouse abstracts universal knowledge from the revelation in Christ. The 
existence of a divinely established order of the world is presupposed and it has been claimed 
that society must mirror this order as perfectly as possible in order to flourish.
365
 It has been 
abstracted from Old Testament revelation that covenantal relationships are the essential basis 
of any democracy.
366
 Christ is, then, interpreted as revealing that love is the inner spirit of 
covenantal relationships. Public theology’s apologetic references to Christ are closely 
connected to this ontological interpretation of Christ’s public relevance. The public 
theological claim that witnessing to Christ in secular democracies should take the form of 
witnessing to universally intelligible core values that promote the common good is a concern 
closely connected to the claim that the revelation in Christ provides universal knowledge.
367
 A 
more explicit witness to Christ is dismissed as this is associated with Christianity’s search for 
a privileged place in society. Instead of advocating that the social order should be explicitly 
Christ-centred, public theologians argue, on the basis of the biblical identification of Christ 
with truth, that they seek to recognise Christ wherever truths are spoken in the democratic 
forum.
368
 ‘It would […] be arrogant to assume that one knows in advance which human 
voices are speaking truly’.369 Similarly, Graham argues that the Incarnation has revealed that 
‘the practical – the human – discloses, embodies and shows forth the theological’.370 God’s 
grace is primarily revealed in activities of healing and caring for others.
371
 Christ is here 
interpreted as the transformer of culture who urges Christians to cooperate constructively in 
an incarnational manner for the sake of the world’s redemption.372 ‘The primary expression of 
public theology, then, will be in practical demonstrations that authentic faith leads to 
transformation, as a matter not just of interpreting the world but changing it’.373 This 
argument is meant to present doctrinal expressions only as secondary additions to this primary 
theological language of practice.
374
  
 The problem with these understandings of Christ is that, contrary to public theology’s 
intentions, they do not overcome Christendom imperialism. The public theological account 
suggests that the positions of non-Christians are still being evaluated according to that which 
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Christian theologians abstract from the revelation in Christ.
375
 It is not at all clear how 
Christian theologians would further the world’s redemption and transform the world to what 
they believe is good if they were confronted with non-Christians who understand the terms 
‘good’ or ‘a healed human nature’ differently. If these apologetic defences of Christian 
involvement in public politics can indeed convince non-Christians, because the word ‘Christ’ 
is being avoided, then this seems to depend upon the similarity between what Christians and 
non-Christians understand to be ‘core values’ to a large extent. 
 At this point, public theologians might highlight the importance of conversation 
between conflicting positions. Jürgen Habermas argues that, in secularised pluralist societies, 
a plurality of groups should each transcend their own particular perspective in order to arrive 
at a more expanded common vision.
376
 However, this whole agenda remains entirely within 
the bounds of one particular interpretation of the Christian tradition as is evidenced in the 
public theological elaboration that all religions are undergirded by something deeper than 
themselves.
377
 ‘Religions’ are seen as organising the immanent world, including their own 
societies, according to what they perceive as being the ideal laws of reality.
378
 On this basis, it 
is then argued that there are abstract universals, such as integrity, justice, and truth, which can 
function as objective measures against which each particular religion could be assessed.
379
 
Overall, this argument favours abstraction over unique particulars in exactly the same way in 
which the abstraction of core values was favoured over the unique particularity of Christ. The 
logic of the argument, thus, remains entirely within the logic of one particular Christology. If 
Christ is interpreted in an abstract way, then Christian theology can once again be placed at 
the centre for the organisation of a not-exclusively Christian society. That other faith 
traditions might see the world, and the relation between concrete reality and abstract 
universals, radically differently is something ignored by this position. Instead of appreciating 
the theological significance of non-Christian positions, this public theological Christology 
tends to have everyone conform to its own theological position in disguise.  
  
Conclusion 
 
 Overall, Milbank’s and Ward’s theologies are of great value for the discussion about 
theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies because they challenge the self-
proclaimed neutrality of secularism. This has shown that public theology’s acceptance of the 
secularist social order risks disguisedly perpetuating Christendom’s imperialism.  
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 Challenging secularism’s fixed understanding of universality, which tends to evaluate 
all cultures according to some univocal standard, Milbank then offers an alternative Christian 
social order. Milbank apologetically defends his alternative, theologically informed, social 
order by promising to guarantee the harmonious, enriching co-existence of a plurality of 
cultures within the same society, as well as the entire society’s growth in the truly good. In 
sum, Milbank’s apologetic approach leads him to advocate a Christian social order as the 
replacement of its secularist counterpart. Although Milbank argues that Christian theology 
can evaluate all other worldviews positively, on the basis of its understanding of grace, he 
presents secularism as being entirely opposed to Christian theology. On the most overarching 
level, concerning who should determine the social order, he presents Christian theology not as 
a perfection of secularism, but as its overcoming and replacement. With this move, Milbank 
undermines that human sinfulness also impacts upon the theological vision of redemption. 
Whereas some have criticised Milbank for failing to read ‘the history of the church [... as] a 
history of redeemed failures’380, my criticism suggests that Milbank presents the history of the 
church as one big failure. The problem is that he claims to see how contemporary theology 
can redeem this failure all at once. An acknowledgment of the impairment of the theological 
vision would question the legitimacy of promising that a Christian social order would enhance 
the whole of society. 
  Ward equally seeks to replace the secularist social order, but understands 
postmodernism as already breaking with the secularist imperialism in disguise. He then seeks 
to complete postmodern aspirations with the help of Christian theology. Fixed understandings 
of universality are continuously being displaced through attention being paid to unique 
particulars that break with the universal abstraction. Whereas Ward respects the criticism of 
Christendom imperialism more than Milbank does, he partly fails in overcoming it insofar as 
he repeats and perpetuates postmodernity’s concealed universalism, measuring any other 
worldview in accordance with the standard set by his own. I have argued that this is again 
connected to Ward’s apologetic defence of Christian theology against secularism, directed 
towards a postmodern audience. The displacement of the secularist social order becomes a 
replacement of secularism by Christian theology as the new centre, one which organises how 
different cultures can live most harmoniously in one shared society. Ward’s account could 
also be helped through acknowledging the impacts of sin onto the theological vision, 
particularly regarding any ability to see how the work of redemption once begun in Christ will 
be completed.  
 The theological weakness of Milbank’s and Ward’s positions concerns their 
insufficient differentiation between Christ and Christian theology. They reason too quickly 
from Christ’s redemptive work to theology’s participation in that work. Christian theology’s 
central political role in post-Christendom societies is, then, too one-sidedly defended in 
connection to the promise of contributing positively to the entire society’s political life. On 
the one hand, this paints the contemporary situation very bleakly, thereby downplaying the 
Christian focus on thankfulness and joy for the redemption that has already been won by 
Christ. On the other hand, Milbank and Ward risk downplaying the traditional importance of 
confessing theology’s own deep involvement in sin and our continuous reliance upon Christ’s 
forgiving grace. In other words, Milbank and Ward both lack a more substantial theology of 
failure and, for this reason, all too triumphantly present Christian theology as the faith 
tradition endowed with the task of universal redemption.  
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 I have argued that the apologetic defences of Christian theology, against the secularist 
opposition of theology’s political involvement in post-Christendom societies, permeate public 
theology as well as the alternatives advanced by both Milbank and Ward. This apologetic 
approach hinders all of them from appreciating the grace that might be mediated by this 
secularist opposition. Although I have already hinted at the difference an acknowledgment of 
Christian theology’s sinfulness would make to Milbank’s and Ward’s respective visions of a 
Christian social order, the exact relation between acknowledging Christian theology’s 
entanglement in sin, restraining from defending apologetically a central political role for 
Christian theology in post-Christendom societies, and interpreting the secularist opposition to 
such a role as mediating God’s grace remains to be elucidated in more detail.  
 Thus far, it might be assumed that Christian theology’s entanglement in the sin of the 
world would disallow theology to play a central political role in any society as a matter of 
principle. My own contention is, however, that Christian theology’s political role must be 
discerned ever anew in each context with regard to the measure by which grace is mediated 
by Christian theology on the one hand, and the surrounding society on the other. My 
hypothesis is that receiving the post-Christendom criticism is a grace for Christian theology 
and exposes Christian theology’s own sinful implications in Christendom imperialism in 
Western Europe at this moment in time, and that, therefore, Christian theology should refrain 
from seeking to play a central political role in this context. In order to advance my argument, I 
will now turn to two representatives of Christocentric approaches to the question of Christian 
theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies. These two thinkers both provide 
reasons as to why theology’s political contributions should never be central in a non-
exclusively Christian social order. Their arguments have to be assessed in order to 
differentiate my understanding of theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies from 
their own.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
CHAPTER 3:  
CHRISTOCENTRISM: 
PRINCIPLED REJECTIONS OF APOLOGETICS AND CHRISTENDOM 
 
 It has become clear that, contrary to the criticism of Radical Orthodoxy’s alleged 
return to Christendom, Radical Orthodoxy is not concerned with a nostalgic return to pre-
modern times, but seeks instead to envision a better social order than the currently prevalent 
secularist one. Milbank discloses how atheist alternatives are still implicitly promoting some 
version of imperialism, insofar as their own position’s cultural contingency is denied and an 
unjustifiable neutrality is propagated. Milbank goes on to apologetically defend his Christian 
ontology of peace as something that promises a more peaceful social order than any of its 
secularist counterparts. Ward, in contrast, conceives of postmodern positions as already 
initiating a successful overcoming of modern imperialism and reconfigures his theology 
accordingly as a fulfilment of this aspiration. In so doing, he still perpetuates a problematic 
postmodern form of universalism, one which celebrates particularity as such, but which 
secretly judges the particularity of others according to the univocal standards set by one’s own 
position.  
 Much of secularist thought’s imperialism in disguise, as criticised by Milbank, has 
been discovered to also be operative in a great deal of public theological literature — Max 
Stackhouse’s influential thought being one eminent example. Public theologians frequently 
accord a central role in the politics of post-Christendom societies to Christian theology. In this 
sense, both Radical Orthodoxy and a great deal of public theology can be criticised for 
insufficiently recognising the theological significance of the opposition to any Christian 
theological involvement in secular politics. In light of my assessment of Milbank’s theology, 
it should be conceded that the post-Christendom context does not, as such, present us with one 
new social order, but that the establishment of a truly anti-imperialist, pluralist social order 
still demands much political discussion. The possibility that Christian theology would play 
the most central role in also organising post-Christendom societies cannot simply be 
discarded on the grounds that we now live in a post-Christendom context. Milbank argues that 
the evaluation of Christendom, as something either good or bad, depends on how Christian 
theology uses its power and that any power used for the sake of love should be welcomed.
381
 
This stance, however, has invited criticism from within the ranks of Christian theology, which 
is why this chapter presents Christian theological reasons for the rejection of any ‘remnant of 
Christendom’.382 My own assessment of Milbank’s and Ward’s understandings of grace has 
already cast some doubts, regarding the Christological underpinnings of their respective 
rationales for ascribing a central political role in post-Christendom societies to Christian 
theology.  
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 I will now move to the second theological position against which public theology 
seeks to distinguish itself as an emerging theological sub-discipline. As briefly mentioned in 
Chapter 1, public theologians reject post-liberal theological responses to the post-Christendom 
context, as well as those stemming from Radical Orthodoxy. First, I will turn to John Howard 
Yoder who has convinced many that, on Christological grounds, Christian theology cannot 
determine the social order for a non-exclusively Christian society.
383
 I will then introduce 
Kathryn Tanner who, like public theologians, Milbank and Ward, advocates her Christian 
theology as a contribution to the wider society’s search for solutions to contemporary political 
problems. However, her emphasis on the church’s sinfulness and liability to failure renders 
this advocacy less triumphalist.
384
 In contrast to all of the other theologians introduced thus 
far, who focus so greatly on the church’s active participation in Christ’s redemptive work that 
the church is being presented one-sidedly as a positive influence on the surrounding society, 
Tanner to a greater extent highlights the way in which the church fails in accomplishing its 
own mission. She, thus, opposes any sectarian understanding of the Christian church not only 
because this could paralyse the church’s political engagement, but also because such a 
sectarianism downplays the importance of external criticism for the correction of the 
church.
385
 The extent to which Tanner not only accounts for the sinfulness of the church, but 
also for the effects of sin on her own theological vision, is something that remains to be 
investigated in this chapter.  
 My presentations of Yoder’s and Tanner’s Christologies are structured similarly. First, 
I will explain their Christologies, with a particular focus on how their Christological 
arguments are related both to their stance towards apologetic defences of theological 
engagement in politics and their rejection of the necessity for Christian theology to play a 
central role in the politics of post-Christendom societies. Yoder is presented as rejecting 
Christendom and apologetics for post-liberal reasons, interpreting them to be a danger to 
Christianity’s integrity. Tanner, on the contrary, embraces a postmodern form of apologetics 
and rejects any remnant of Christendom because this might deflect theological attention away 
from acknowledging God’s grace, as it is mediated outside of the Christian tradition, often in 
spite of the church. In the second part of my presentations of both Yoder and Tanner, I will 
proceed by examining how each conceives of the ways in which God’s grace is mediated by 
non-Christian positions more precisely, paying particular attention to the question of the 
degree to which these can challenge their own understanding of Christian theology’s political 
role in post-Christendom societies. 
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§ 1 John Howard Yoder 
3.1 Problematising Christian universality: Against apologetics for theology’s integrity 
 
 John Howard Yoder’s theology is important for the present discussion because he 
provides some considerable Christological reasons that challenge the very idea that Christian 
theology could provide the social order, or the overall ethical guidance, for a pluralist society. 
As one of the most renowned theological critics of Christendom, Yoder offers two main 
objections to apologetic defences of a central political role for Christian theology in a non-
exclusively Christian society. The first concerns God’s freedom, while the second concerns 
human freedom. Both are related to God’s self-revelation at the Cross, to which any Christian 
political position should conform; this is a contention that will be unpacked throughout the 
course of this presentation.
386
 
 First, Yoder rejects any apologetic defences of theology’s political relevance for a 
pluralist society where this justification takes the form of promising to contribute to the entire 
society’s common good. One problem with these justifications is that they risk replacing 
Christianity’s proper orientation toward its eschatological goal with secular concerns.387 Due 
to God’s freedom, the goal to which Christians aspire might be less foreseeable than a 
promise of contributing to the achievement of the wider society’s goals would demand.388 
And second, a central political role for Christian theology in a pluralist society would imply 
the imposition of Christian rules onto non-Christians, thereby undermining human freedom, 
most particularly the necessarily free assent to the Christian faith.
389
 Christian politics could 
not be imposed onto non-Christians because, Yoder claims, Christian discipleship primarily 
consists in the free assent to suffer for the further redemption of the world.
390
 Yoder’s 
Christology, thus, poses two main challenges to both public theology’s and Radical 
Orthodoxy’s apologetic defences of theology’s central political role in post-Christendom 
societies: the integrity of Christianity might be undermined, and the freedom of non-
Christians might be disrespected. As an alternative, Yoder claims that the Christian faith 
demands the nonviolent subordination to the ruling social order, not the establishment of a 
Christian social order or the apologetic defence of theological contributions to the existing 
social order.
391
  
 Both these criticisms must be assessed with reference to possible counter-criticisms 
from public theology’s side. Yoder’s first criticism that Christian theologians should not be 
concerned with contributions to the common good, as it is defined by the surrounding society, 
is vulnerable to the public theological criticism of post-liberal sectarianism. When Yoder 
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claims that ‘the very existence of the church is its primary task’392, this seems to be at odds 
with the public theological conviction that, in a post-Christendom context, ‘[t]he salvation of 
the world, and not the survival of the Church, is and should be the guiding principle of public 
theology’.393 However, Yoder’s stance cannot be as easily connected to the withdrawal from 
political engagement as the public theological criticism might suggest. Quite the contrary, 
most contemporary scholars reject sectarian readings of Yoder’s theology and appreciate the 
contemporary political relevance of Yoder’s Christology.394 In the first part of this chapter 
(3.1) it will become apparent that, for Yoder, being pre-occupied with the integrity of the 
church is not a form of sectarian self-centredness, but the church’s integrity is meant to 
complete the entire world’s redemption. In other words, by way of directing theological 
reflection at the church’s integrity, Christian theology indirectly contributes to the 
surrounding social order — indirectly in the sense that, due to their different convictions, non-
Christians might not recognise this as comprising a positive contribution. 
 Yoder’s second criticism, concerning the imposition of Christian politics onto non-
Christians, can be connected to the public theological criticism of overlooking the way in 
which God’s grace is mediated by non-Christian positions.395 Yoder’s strict distinction 
between Christian theology, whose ethic is determined by a commitment to Jesus Christ, and 
the wider society whom Christian theologians must call to faith in Christ
396
 is as vulnerable as 
Radical Orthodoxy to the public theological criticism of downplaying the importance of non-
Christian mediations of God’s grace. The Christian churches, as exemplary communities of 
restored humanity, and the Christian theologians who work within their bounds might be 
arrogantly presented as superior to anyone else, and would as such be immunised from any 
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non-Christian criticism.
397
 On the contrary, however, Yoder’s theology has been characterised 
as particularly open to self-criticism.
398
  
 In the first part of my exposition of Yoder’s theology (3.1), I will explain Yoder’s 
political Christology in greater detail in order to critically assess the extent to which it indeed 
constitutes a legitimate challenge to any central political role being attributed to Christian 
theology in post-Christendom societies. Here, I explain both the Christological rationale for 
Yoder’s rejection of apologetic defences of theological contributions to the politics of post-
Christendom societies as well as his alternative understanding of the church’s political role. 
The second part of my exposition of Yoder’s theology (3.2) then serves to analyse the extent 
to which Yoder is able to appreciate non-Christian mediations of grace. Here, I relate Yoder’s 
position to the discussion of the previous two chapters in order to highlight those aspects of 
his thought that are valuable for this dissertation, and to distance myself from Yoder’s post-
liberal principled rejection both of apologetics and of theology’s central political role in any 
not exclusively Christian society.
399
  
 
a) Incarnation: God’s free ordering of reality 
 
  Yoder’s rejection of Christendom is related to the particular way in which he 
correlates divine and human freedom. His kenotic understanding of the Incarnation leads 
Yoder to understand God’s freedom in terms of unpredictability, and he strongly associates 
human freedom with ethics. Yoder interprets the Incarnation in terms of Jesus Christ 
revealing the perfect world order.
400
 However, due to his kenotic understanding of Christ’s 
divinity, Yoder differentiates between Christ’s perfect ordering of history and God’s perfect 
ordering of reality. At the Incarnation, the divine Son empties Himself out into the humanity 
of Jesus, and thus simultaneously leaves the ordering of the cosmos to the Father and the 
Spirit. It is then the Son’s self-emptied humanity which is exemplary to the rest of 
humankind. The human Jesus is the one who rightly orders the world, precisely by renouncing 
divine dominion over the world.
401
 Jesus in his humanity, and not God in God’s divinity, 
should be exemplary for any Christian politics. The connection between the ethical focus in 
this presentation of Jesus as exemplary for the rest of humankind and Yoder’s appreciation of 
God’s freedom is clarified in his argument’s biblical underpinnings. 
  Yoder draws from the Old Testament command to ‘Be Holy as I am Holy’ (Lev. 
19:2) in order to argue that knowledge of God is only necessary insofar as it aids the human 
ethical imitation of God.
402
 Believing that people attempted to follow this command, he 
conceives of a whole Jewish tradition of imitating God which culminates in Jesus who 
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perfectly imitates God to the effect that God is most adequately known in Jesus.
403
 In the 
aftermath of the Incarnation, imitating God means to be a follower of Christ.
404
 Yoder then 
moves on immediately from the Incarnation to ethics and claims that Christian theology 
defines a perfect human life as the imitation of God in Christ.
405
 Read in light of Yoder’s 
kenotic understanding of the Incarnation, the imitation of the human Jesus prevents any 
idolatrous imagining of God’s ordering of the cosmos, who remains free from human 
expectations. At this point, Yoder’s Christology remains reconcilable with a central political 
role being taken up by Christian theology, even in post-Christendom societies, since his 
argument suggests that following Christ is the best for all human beings universally. The 
second public theological justification of theology’s public relevance operates through this 
exact logic. 
 However, Yoder’s definition of a faithful following of Christ leads him to disassociate 
theology’s universality from justifications of theology’s central political role. Despite the 
universal exemplary nature of Jesus’ humanity, people must follow this example 
voluntarily.
406
 It is precisely Jesus’ free acceptance of his suffering and death which must be 
imitated by the rest of humankind.
407
 In my exposition of Yoder’s theology of the Cross, I 
will explain how both aspects, that of freedom and that of suffering, are the reason of Yoder’s 
rejection of apologetic defences of theology’s political relevance in post-Christendom 
societies, particularly in their interrelation. 
  
b) Cross: Rejecting apologetics for Christianity’s integrity 
 
 I will now turn to Yoder’s theology of the Cross in order to clarify Yoder’s emphasis 
on the free human choice to follow God’s rule. This will elucidate how Yoder’s kenotic 
understanding of the Incarnation is related to the way in which he understands divine and 
human freedom. This section presents that which people are freed from, and that which 
people are freed for, when following God’s freedom, according to Yoder. Yoder’s 
understanding of divine and human freedom serves as the basis through which to explain his 
principled rejection of any apologetic defences of Christian theology’s contributions to what 
the wider society regards as being the common good.  
 Regarding the question of what humankind is freed from, Yoder understands the Cross 
as freeing humankind from sin. According to Yoder, sin consists in the idolisation of social 
structures to the effect that obedience to God is prevented.
408
 It is sinful, namely idolatrous, to 
obey social structures as though they were in charge of the order of reality. At the Cross, Jesus 
was redeemed from sin insofar as he obeyed to God alone, even though the Roman social 
structures were inimical to God’s ordering of reality at the time of his crucifixion.409 People’s 
sinful absolutisation of these social structures was reversed precisely through Jesus’ freely 
chosen nonconformity. This nonconformity shows that, in reality, these social structures are 
not absolute. The Cross triumphs over the Fall because Jesus confirmed here that ‘he was free 
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from the rebellious pretensions of the creaturely condition’.410 Whereas this might suggest 
that Yoder celebrates freedom for its own sake, and always prefers freedom in the sense of 
unpredictability over structured order, it must be stressed that he also upholds some positive 
definition of God’s rule and, therefore, some positive orientation for human freedom. 
 Regarding freedom’s orientation, Yoder explains that Jesus’ freedom consisted in his 
choice for obedient faithfulness to God’s rule of love.411 Obedience to this love implied that, 
in spite of his knowledge of the sinfulness of the surrounding social order, Jesus did not strive 
to replace this order violently by some revolutionary enforcement of a new social order. 
Yoder writes that Jesus’ single-hearted directedness towards God’s love put him at the mercy 
of his neighbours.
412
 At the Cross, it becomes apparent that leaving the ordering of the cosmos 
to God means, at the same time, leaving the ordering of history to other humans.
413
 That God 
did not intervene reveals that God does not rule over humankind by sovereign power. To the 
contrary, the Lordship of both Son and Father is a nonviolent servanthood that respects 
people’s freedom not to obey. This means, however, that God’s nonviolent rule does not so 
much respect human freedom as it respects people’s sinfully binding themselves to social 
structures that limit their freedom.  
 Thus far, Yoder’s theology of the Cross shows that people’s following of God is 
meant to free them from sin. Sin is the unfreedom of uncompromisingly following the 
established social order, even if this conflicts with God’s rule of love. Love is understood in 
terms of a rule of strict nonviolence, suggesting that Jesus followed God’s rule of nonviolence 
as a new principle which demands obedience in any circumstance. The following of the rule is 
established as that which prevents the tendency to cling to a pre-established order. On this 
basis, Yoder rejects any apologetic defence of Christian theological contributions to the 
common good, because Christian theology must uphold the coincidence of means and ends. 
Yoder argues that Christ’s obedience to God’s nonviolent rule was not meant to guarantee a 
perfect social order. To the contrary, Christ’s principled nonviolence demanded his 
renouncing his goal of establishing a peaceful society.
414
 When peace could not be established 
by peaceful means, Jesus gave himself and his mission over to Roman rule instead of ensuring 
the attainment of his goal within the immanent world. The overarching end to which Jesus 
was directed was not the establishment of his reign on earth, but he was single-mindedly 
oriented towards the eschatological goal of peace.  
 That there might be a disparity, between humanly set goals and the eschatological 
goal, is related to God’s freedom. Christ’s Resurrection reveals the unpredictability of the 
effects of God’s rule in history, which means that God’s rule is not calculable with reference 
to immanent laws of causes and effects.
415
 By already promising to achieve a certain goal in 
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the immanent world, Christian theologians would compromise their faithfulness to God’s 
surprising rule. As followers of Christ, Christian theologians should, thus, not be as concerned 
as public theologians presuppose they are about their desire to ‘make things move into the 
right direction’.416 Focussing their attention on the successful attainment of immanent goals 
could distract Christian theologians from being oriented to their proper eschatological goal. 
Yoder argues here that the goal to which Christians aspire should never be established as 
‘itself a good in the name of which evil may be done’.417  
 The theological inability to promise the achievement of a positively set goal is 
furthermore heightened by the manner in which Yoder understands Jesus’ free and non-
violent subordination to his crucifixion, not only as paving the way to redemption, but as 
redemption itself: ‘The cross is not a detour or a hurdle on the way to the kingdom, nor is it 
even the way to the kingdom; it is the kingdom come’.418 In other words, the true goal of 
nonviolent peace which Christians hope for might radically differ from anyone’s 
expectations.
419
 Whereas people had expected that God would save the world, no one had 
expected that salvation would manifest itself at the Cross. Yoder, thus, stresses that people 
could know that Christ’s nonviolent subordination to his crucifixion accords with God’s rule 
only at the Resurrection and that nonviolence is, therefore, ultimately more powerful than any 
dominating rule.
420
 Faith in Christ’s Resurrection, thus, renders any apologetic defence of 
theology’s positive contributions to politics to those who do not believe in the Resurrection 
impossible.  
 In sum, Yoder thus rejects any theological promise of contributing positively to 
political projects, as they have been defined by a society, because for want of a sufficiently 
positive image of its goal, Christian theology solely possesses positive knowledge of the 
means by which the world will reach its proper eschatological goal. Christianity’s 
eschatological goal, then, cannot be apologetically defended in the public forum because 
God’s laws of redemption differ from the laws governing the immanent world, which means 
that the effectiveness of the Christian rule of nonviolent love cannot be verified or argued 
over in terms of immanent causes and effects. Christian theologians should be primarily 
concerned with the world’s redemption, but they must admit that the consequences of their 
commitment to this redemption remain unpredictable to a great degree. Theologically 
informed political action should only be oriented towards the principle of nonviolence, which 
could be unattractive to those who do not believe in the superior power of powerlessness. 
Thus far, the argumentation suggests that, like other post-liberal theologians, Yoder rejects 
apologetic defences of Christian theological contributions to the common good for the sake of 
safeguarding Christianity’s integral orientation to its proper goal. 
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c) Ecclesiology: The church’s duty to redeem society 
 
 We should now turn to the possible public theological objection to Yoder’s 
Christology: The strong separation between secular society’s goals and Christianity’s goals in 
Yoder’s Christology could lend itself to advocate an apolitical withdrawal of the churches 
from political engagement in the surrounding society. To the contrary, I argue that Yoder 
presents theology’s political relevance in terms of its replacement of a goal-oriented with a 
rule-oriented politics, defining adhering to its political rule, in order to complete the whole 
society’s redemption, as comprising one of the church’s primary tasks. According to Yoder, 
God does not redeem the world by a purely supernatural intervention, but the church must 
continue to redeem history in imitation of Christ.
421
 Yoder emphasises Christ’s primary role 
in this redemptive work, something important regarding my criticism of Milbank and Ward 
for conflating Christ and church. Christ is the one who actively defeats all that which remains 
sinful, whilst Christians need only to distance themselves from sin.
422
 They can trust that God 
will protect and save them in a way that they would not violently have to defend themselves 
against their enemies.
423
 This suggests that Yoder envisions a way in which Christian 
theologians can criticise what they regard as a sinful social order without aiming to replace 
this social order with their own alternative. 
 Yoder’s rejection of any apolitical withdrawal from public politics by the churches is 
evidenced in his translation of the principle of nonviolence into a Christian political duty. 
Christians are asked to complete in their ‘bodies that which was lacking in the suffering of 
Christ’ (Col. 1:24).424 Yoder identifies that which was lacking in Christ’s suffering with 
further suffering. Since this makes sense only to those who believe that Jesus Christ is the 
self-revelation of God, this universal rule can only be obeyed by those who choose to follow 
Christ.
425
 Christians are called to obey amidst suffering and to trust God that a not yet 
discernible victory is yet to come.
426
 Faith is an assurance of the hoped for and a conviction 
that the unseen exists.
427
 The unseen, then, is not a positive image of the eschaton, but it is the 
principle of nonviolence which one believes to be more powerful than one’s present suffering 
under other people’s dominion.  
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 This then leads Yoder to conceive of immanent history as being apocalyptically 
divided into two co-existing orders. The Cross already establishes the eschatological kingdom 
ontologically, but as well as this new age ruled by the kenotic Christ, there is also the old age 
in which sinful dominion still rejects this kenotic rule. The existence of the old order is its 
rebellion against the true Christological order of reality. Although the Cross conforms to 
God’s ontological reign of peace, this does not yet effect the transformation of the social order 
into one harmonious whole.
428
 To the contrary, the Cross reveals precisely that history is not 
restored to ontological peacefulness by imposing this ontological vision onto the entire 
society.
429
 The Cross reveals that, although this imposition of peace might seem effective due 
to calculations in a fallen historical order, it is not effective in reality.
430
 True efficiency is not 
guaranteed by effective human rule, but by God’s creative power. The old order dominates in 
history because God’s order is not imposing itself powerfully. The new order will only reach 
its final eschatological consumption once all of the old has been overcome by non-violent 
subordination. 
 In sum, the whole of this chapter’s first part has clarified Yoder’s Christologically-
based opposition to any apologetic defence of theological contributions to the organisation of 
a non-exclusively Christian society. He argues that following Christ must be a matter of free 
decision, and cannot be imposed upon non-Christians. Moreover, theologians cannot promise 
to contribute positively to the surrounding society’s politics, because they lack a positive 
vision of the goal which they seek to attain and Christian political action should be guided by 
the rule of non-violence, instead of being oriented towards a positive goal. Any apologetic 
defence of theology that includes a promise of contributing positively to a better social order 
might violate the integrity of Christianity’s pursuit of its proper goal. Instead of following the 
rule of nonviolent love in order to reach Christianity’s unpredictable goal, a humanly 
calculable goal is fixed and the way towards it is calculated.
431
 This risks opposing God’s free 
ordering of reality, which is not bound by this-worldly chains of causes and effects.  
 It should be highlighted that Yoder is the first theologian who has been presented in 
this dissertation who can criticise the social order, and yet refrain from advocating a Christian 
theological replacement. Christian theologians ought to motivate Christians to participate 
patiently in Christ’s redemptive suffering under the sinful social order until it has been non-
violently subverted. Yoder’s Christology, thus, presents us with a principled rejection of any 
central place of Christian theology in determining the social order for not exclusively 
Christian societies. This principled rejection shows that the strong secularist objection to any 
remnant of Christendom seems not to affect Yoder’s theological vision. Yoder’s rejection of 
apologetics, in order to safeguard Christianity’s integrity, instead suggests that he evaluates 
the theological significance of non-Christian insights to a lesser extent than either public 
theologians or Radical Orthodoxy. This evokes the question of whether Yoder’s theological 
vision might undermine a sufficient acknowledgement of the workings of God’s grace in 
unexpected places, which would confirm the public theological reservation against post-
liberal theologies. In what follows I examine Yoder’s theology for an answer to this question. 
In light of my criticism that Milbank and Ward have insufficiently acknowledged the 
restrictive impacts of sin on their theologically envisioned social orders, my particular focus 
will be on the degree to which Yoder is open to recognising non-Christian mediations of 
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grace, which might correct some fundamental shortcomings in his understanding of God’s 
nonviolent rule of love. 
 
3.2 Kenotic grace against Christendom: Submitting non-violently to the non-Christian 
social order 
 
 In this second part of my exposition of Yoder’s Christology, I turn to examine his 
position more critically regarding the public theological objection that his separation between 
the Christian community that follows Christ on the one hand, and the rebellious world which 
still rejects Christ’s rule on the other, might insufficiently acknowledge extra-ecclesial 
mediations of God’s grace. Examining the implicit understanding of grace in Yoder’s 
Christology, I clarify the degree to which Yoder’s Christology allows for some genuine 
Christian theological learning from non-Christians. Overall, I contend that Yoder is unable to 
acknowledge the restricting impacts that sin has on his theological vision. My discussion of 
Yoder’s Christology will conclude by way of connecting Yoder’s principled rejection of 
apologetics and Christendom, in order to safeguard Christianity’s integrity, with his failure to 
acknowledge any restricting impact of sin on his own theological vision.  
 
a) Extra-ecclesial grace: The principled integrity of the theological vision  
 
 Yoder claims to respect both, the integral otherness of non-Christian communities as 
well as their theological relevance, against the suspicion that his strict separation between the 
church and the non-ecclesial public could underestimate the import of common grace.
432
 
Despite his Christocentrism, Yoder does not deny that God’s grace is also mediated in a non-
Christian society. He affirms that God’s continuous creative grace also acts through 
established social structures.
433 
In other words, God’s grace is not only mediated by the 
church, but also by the structures that order society in a good way.
434
 Sin does not prevent 
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 John Howard Yoder, “Meaning after Babble: With Jeffrey Stout beyond Relativism,” Journal of 
Religious Ethics 24 (1996): 132-133. He rejects the post-liberal theological assumption that different 
communities in a pluralist public are fundamentally incommensurable and insists instead that it is 
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universal perspective and language, as public theology would suggest. 
433
 Yoder, Politics, 140-141. Instead of grace Yoder speaks of power as he lends this imagery from 
Hendrikus Berkhof’s interpretation of the Pauline letters (Hendrikus Berkhof, Christ and the Powers 
(Scottdale, Pa.: Herald, 1962). 
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 Yoder has been criticised, however, for predefining the state as sinful and always as a distorted 
image of the true politics of the church, because the state as Yoder defines it necessarily follows an 
ethics of dominion (Dorothea Bertschmann, “The Rule of Christ and Human Politics - Two Proposals: 
A Comparison of the Political Theology of Oliver O’Donovan and John Howard Yoder,” The 
Heythrop Journal LVI (2015): 430). Consequently, the state is now being pulled towards a reality of 
which it can never be part (434-435). Others, however, argue that Yoder provides a theologically 
grounded conception of the state which might serve public theology’s engagement in and with 
governmental structures (James King, “Theologizing the State: What Hauerwas Could Have Learned 
From Yoder,” International Journal of Public Theology 8 (2014): 313-329). Somewhat more in 
support of the first interpretation, Yoder restrains from ratifying the state as such and refers merely to 
God’s providence as sometimes using state government for good purposes (Yoder, Politics, 198). 
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God from still creatively acting through these structures and from affecting new order.
435
 
Contrary to the suspicion that the churches’ social structures are set up as perfect examples 
that always mediate God’s grace, Yoder acknowledges that the extra-ecclesial public can 
sometimes mediate God’s grace more truthfully than the church and can, consequently, 
demand the revision of ecclesial structures.
436
 For example, in line with the previous 
argument, grace might be mediated in all instances in which people are defended from 
adversaries without using any violence. This indirect defence could be mediated by the 
churches and non-Christian groups alike.  
 In terms of Christology, this can be explained with reference to Yoder’s assumption 
that the fullness of God has already been revealed in Christ on the one hand, and that the 
human understanding of what this means is extended over time, on the other.
437
 In order for 
the extended understanding to be truthful to the original revelation, the truth of every new 
event must be tested against the measure of Jesus. These Christ-like occurrences can be found 
in churches as well as in the non-Christian public.
438
 
 If we ask how non-Christian worldviews can further the understanding of Yoder’s rule 
of non-violent love, Yoder explains that Christian theologians should penetrate into other 
worldviews, deeply enough to utter their own message in the words and concepts of the 
other.
439
 Contrary to public theological suspicions of post-liberal theologies, Yoder does not 
appreciate contemporary pluralism as the occasion that finally allows Christian theologians to 
concentrate on the life of the church alone as one self-sufficient community amongst others. 
To the contrary, Yoder appreciates the pluralist context because he believes that by 
penetrating other worldviews, Christian theologians may see something about the Gospel 
which had previously been invisible.
440
 One purpose of this endeavour might be to discern 
whether certain non-Christian practices and rules should also be obeyed by Christians or if 
they should be non-violently endured. 
 However, Yoder places Christian theology on a level above both the church and the 
pluralist society in which it exists, despite this acknowledgement of possible ecclesial failures 
and the theological significance of non-Christian worldviews. Yoder distinguishes between an 
overall insight into reality, which Christian theologians most completely possess, and the 
practical following, as well as the further explication of this insight. Christian theology must 
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read reality as being ordered by a good Creator God and then judge everyone accordingly.
441
 
Although this reading is partly aimed at the self-critique of current ecclesial structures and 
practices, Yoder fails to account for the possibility that grace could ever be mediated in a way 
that would demand the critical revision of his rule of nonviolent love.  
 Yoder’s suggestion that Christian theologians should judge other worldviews as well 
as ecclesial practices and structures against the standard of his principle of nonviolence is 
problematic, specifically in relation to his own cautioning not to pre-empt obedience to God’s 
freedom through pre-established structures. Seeking to free people from sinfully following 
social structures to the detriment of following God’s unpredictable rule, Yoder now presents 
us with God’s supposedly eternal nonviolent rule.442 Is this not equally limiting any 
appropriate acknowledgement of God’s unpredictable freedom? While Yoder might allow for 
the critical revision of ecclesial structures, and the addition of further nuances to his theology, 
he could not admit any new and surprising act of God in history that would demand a more 
substantial revision of his rule of nonviolent love.
443
 Yoder does not allow God ever to 
deviate from Yoder’s principle of nonviolence.444 This is particularly pertinent insofar as 
Yoder has been criticised for downplaying the importance of all biblical events that do not 
confirm his own Christology.
445
 How this connects to Yoder’s understanding of human 
freedom, which I will examine in relation to the issue of the gratuity of grace, remains to be 
assessed in the following section. 
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this biblical witness also stems from a particular context. If an interpretation of the Scriptures is 
questioned by new scientific insights, however, it is never the reality to which the Bible refers, and 
always the interpretation of that reality which must be regarded as faulty and revisable. Yoder’s aim is 
then to read the Bible in such a way that the reality itself, to which the Scriptures bear witness, comes 
to speak, without being unnecessarily limited by the contemporary understanding of the world (Carter, 
Politics of the Cross, 101). Yoder’s focus on the church as the community that reads the Bible most 
adequately has been called ‘ecclesial epistemology’ (Doerksen, Beyond Suspicion, 64).  
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criticised for reducing the New Testament to its ethical and political implications (Doerksen, Beyond 
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b) Undermining gratuity: Imposing the theological vision on the church 
 
 The explanation of Yoder’s Christology has, thus far, suggested that he conceives of 
grace as God reigning for humankind, in the sense of freeing humankind from the burden of 
planning for the future. Grace allows people to simply follow the unpredictable God to 
wherever He leads them. And yet, I have argued that Yoder’s God is not as unpredictable as 
Yoder pretends God is. Yoder’s God is bound to conform to Yoder’s principle of nonviolent 
love. If we now look at the human side and investigate the extent to which humans are free to 
accept Yoder’s principle of nonviolent love as a grace, it is striking that Yoder’s strong stress 
on the ethical duty to align oneself with God’s grace has been criticised for downplaying any 
sense of grace’s gratuity.446 Yoder’s account insufficiently portrays grace as a free gift to be 
enjoyed. The gratuitous character of this grace is undermined when Yoder speaks of an ethical 
practice of grace that is rewarded with grace.
447
 According to him, ‘only one who practices 
grace can receive grace’.448 This binds God once again to the principle of nonviolence, not 
allowing God to bestow grace onto the violent, and thus refusing to understand God’s rule in 
terms of forgiveness.
449
 Accordingly, Yoder’s theology has been found to be lacking an 
adequate account of human limitations in the ongoing work of redemption.
450
 He is said to 
verge on the presentation of the church as ‘superhuman’.451 In my presentation of 
Schillebeeckx’s Christology, in the subsequent chapters, it will become apparent that an 
understanding of grace in terms of God’s forgiveness allows Christian theologians to discern 
new mediations of grace more dialectically, even in instances that on the surface deviate from 
their predefined theological understanding of grace. 
 In order to understand the implications of Yoder’s theology for human freedom, we 
should reconsider Yoder’s understanding of the Resurrection, primarily as necessary 
revelation, to enable people to follow God’s rule. People first have to be rationally convinced 
that redemptive grace is really in their greatest interest (eschatologically), before they can 
align themselves with this grace, and before they will be rewarded with grace. This emphasis 
on the knowledge of grace’s ultimate victory, as well as the emphasis on the necessary 
suffering for redemption, downplay any notion of an inherent attractiveness of grace as that 
which enables Christians to align themselves with God’s grace even when it is difficult at 
times. This then negatively affects Yoder’s otherwise high appreciation of human freedom. 
Once suffering is presented as a duty for the further redemption of the world, it becomes 
questionable to what degree this suffering can be freely accepted. To what extent does Yoder 
not simply present us with a new rule, which might bind the freedom of church members and 
close their eyes to God’s true rule which might unpredictably direct them elsewhere? It could 
become impossible for those educated by Yoder ever to refuse the nonviolent suffering which 
is demanded of them for the sake of the world’s redemption.452  
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c) Reconsidering Yoder’s principled rejection of Christendom  
 
 In order to conclude this assessment of Yoder’s Christology, I will now return to the 
question of theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies, re-examining the results of 
my assessment in relation to the discussion of the previous chapters. The particular question 
addressed in this dissertation concerns those contemporaries in post-Christendom societies 
who oppose any theological involvement in public politics. Against this opposition, public 
theologians apologetically defend this involvement by way of arguing that Christian theology 
can positively contribute to the common good as it is defined by a pluralist society. I have 
argued, however, that in their apologetic countering of any opposition to theological 
involvements in secular politics, public theologians tend to re-ascribe to Christian theology a 
central political role also in a pluralist society. In this way, public theologians fail to 
overcome the problems of Christendom sufficiently.  
 The Radical Orthodox theologians Milbank and Ward both perceive secularism to be 
perpetuating Christendom imperialism. They then go on to defend theology’s central political 
role in post-Christendom societies apologetically, by promising that Christian theology is 
better able to overcome the imperialist aspects of Christendom than its atheist alternatives. 
They, thereby, neglect that the opposition to any theological involvement in secular politics 
could be theologically significant, and simply counter it with their own, presumably better, 
vision of a perfect social order. At the same time, Milbank and Ward downplay the ways in 
which sin could impact upon the theological vision of a social order, the acknowledgment of 
which would call Radical Orthodoxy’s promises concerning a better future into question. 
 In order to conclude my discussion of the value of Yoder’s Christology to answering 
the question concerning theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies, it can first be 
said that, in contrast to public theology and Radical Orthodoxy, Yoder questions the very 
possibility of defending the Christian theological involvement in secular politics 
apologetically. His most interesting objection to these apologetic endeavours, in reference to 
the present discussion, concerns Yoder’s claim that Christian theologians lack the positive 
vision of the goal towards which they strive. The promise of contributing towards the 
attainment of a set goal risks compromising Christianity’s faithful discipleship of Christ by 
the greater concern about the effectiveness in moving towards this goal.
453
 Yoder reminds us 
that Christians who are primarily called to follow God’s rule might not be as concerned with 
the desire to ‘make things move into the right direction’454 as most advocates of a central role 
for Christian theology in organising post-Christendom societies might be. According to 
Yoder, the effects of God’s rule are less predictable, because God rules through nonviolent 
powerlessness, rather than through the imposition of a set social order onto others.
455
 This 
                                                                                                                                                        
Failure to Bind and Loose: Responses to Yoder’s Sexual Abuse,” The Mennonite (1.12.2015), 
https://themennonite.org/feature/failure-bind-loose-responses-john-howard-yoders-sexual-abuse/ 
[accessed: 15.07.2016]). 
453
 Yoder, Politics, 230. 
454
 Yoder, Politics, 228; 238. 
455
 This understanding of God as free from human expectations associates Yoder more closely with 
public theologians like Mathewes and Stout as well as with Graham Ward than with John Milbank. 
Having recently received positive attention from the side of postmodern philosophers for presumably 
according with an ontology that prioritises particularity over determinative laws and rules (Daniel 
Barber, “The Particularity of Jesus and the Time of the Kingdom: Philosophy and Theology in 
Yoder,” Modern Theology 23 (2007): 63-89; Nathan Kerr, “Transcendence and Apocalyptic: A Reply 
to Barber,” Political Theology 10 (2009): 143-152), Yoder’s understanding of Christianity’s 
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would question both public theology as well as Radical Orthodoxy insofar as their promises 
of a better society are indicative of a positive vision and a desire to move society towards it. 
In the remaining part of this dissertation, I will retain this rejection of apologetic defences of 
Christian theology with reference to an acknowledgement that Christ might set a different 
goal than that envisioned by Christian theology.  
 However, I do not follow the way in which Yoder accounts for this difference between 
eschatological goals in Christ and positively set immanent goals. Yoder claims that Christian 
theologians do perfectly know the means by which to reach their eschatological goal. The 
only problem of justifying these means apologetically, against those who oppose any 
Christian involvement in secular politics, is that these apologetic defences risk compromising 
the integrity of the Christian pursuit of the proper goal set by Christ through adaptation to the 
goals set by the surrounding society.
456
 Yoder then rejects apologetics in principle because 
non-Christians will never be convinced by the attractiveness of the Christian goal, and 
likewise he rejects Christian theology having a central role in organising a pluralist society in 
principle, because such a role would always compromise the Christian pursuit of its proper 
goal. At this point, I contend that Yoder claims to possess too considerable a theological 
insight into how the world is ruled by God; a claim which I primarily contest inasmuch as 
Yoder insufficiently acknowledges that the Christian theological vision of the means to 
achieve the goal set by Christ also remains tainted by sin and is, thus, more imperfect than 
Yoder admits.  
 Accepting Yoder’s doubts, concerning the theological ability to promise to society the 
achievement of a set goal, I will part ways with him concerning the reasons behind these 
doubts. Contrary to him, I want to distinguish between the perfect goal set by Christ and the 
imperfect theological vision of that goal, due to theology’s entanglement in sin. Consequently, 
I would not principally reject apologetics and Christendom in order to safeguard 
Christianity’s integrity. This argument no longer holds once it has been acknowledged that 
Christianity’s integrity has always already been damaged by sin. Christian theology would, 
then, be much more on the same level as all of the other worldviews, all being most 
fundamentally distinguished solely from Christ’s unique perfection. Consequently, mediations 
of God’s grace in different ways than those envisioned by Christian theology should be 
appreciated to a much higher degree than Yoder’s Christology allows for, particularly as 
possible cures for Christian theology. Christian theologians at this point of time in Western-
Europe should refrain from defending Christian theology’s positive contributions to the 
politics of post-Christendom societies apologetically, not due to the unwillingness to follow 
Christ’s rule on the part of the surrounding society, but due to the insufficient understanding 
of Christ’s rule on the part of Christian theology. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
nonviolent rule could be closely related to Ward’s weak hermeneutical ontology by the help of which 
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§ 2 Kathryn Tanner 
 
 Thus far, I have presented contemporary public theology alongside three theologians 
who, despite the different ways in which they have elaborated on it, all share a strong 
emphasis of theology’s redemptive role in relation to the surrounding society and have all run 
the risk of conflating God’s redemption in Christ and the Christian theological vision of this 
redemption. In the case of both public theologians and Radical Orthodoxy, theology’s vision 
of the world’s redemption in Christ was associated with the theological ability to offer 
solutions to contemporary societal problems, whereas Yoder offered his vision of God’s rule 
of the world as a blueprint for Christian political action, irrespective of the question of 
whether these actions solve societal problems in any way society would deem as being 
effective. By stressing theology’s (ethical) task of completing redemption, all of them have 
failed to acknowledge that, even though Christ has indeed traced the perfect way to 
redemption, Christian theology itself might be so closely entangled in the sin of this world 
that theologians could lack the vision of a perfect political order or a perfect rule by which to 
realise eschatological peace on earth. Although all of the theologians discussed acknowledge 
the church’s sinfulness and liability to fail in its practice, they do not consider the way in 
which sin might impact upon theology’s vision of redemption. All of the authors introduced 
thus far are in agreement that a theological drawing from the Christian tradition will provide 
an adequate answer to the question concerning Christian theology’s political role in post-
Christendom societies. Against this agreement, I contend that this theological endeavour 
would only answer the question where the theological visions are trusted not to be themselves 
entangled in the sin they are meant to overcome. 
 I will now turn to Kathryn Tanner in order to proceed along this path towards a more 
humble answer concerning theology’s ability to contribute positively to post-Christendom 
societies’ political order at this moment of time. Tanner’s theology is insightful in its focus on 
the grace that remains extrinsic to the church, given by God to the church and to the world, 
despite the church’s many failings to receive it and to pass it on. Acknowledging human and 
ecclesial sin, Tanner is more hesitant than Milbank, Ward or Yoder to argue for the church’s 
active completion of redemption, and stresses the church’s dependence upon Christ’s 
uniquely perfect redemptive work, much more than the rest of them. Tanner’s Christocentrism 
allows her to escape the charge of advocating any ecclesial superiority, removed from public 
criticism and correction, over non-Christian positions.
457
 Since all of the theologians 
introduced thus far have acknowledged the church’s liability to failure, whilst not admitting 
theology’s own impairment by sin, one particular focus will be on the question of whether 
Tanner’s heightened emphasis on the church’s sinfulness is paired with a similarly heightened 
awareness of the impacts of sin on her Christian theological vision of redemption.  
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  In the first half of my presentation (3.3), I will explain Tanner’s Christology and 
ecclesiology, with a particular focus on her understanding of grace as something extrinsic to 
the church, in order to then (3.4) discuss her understanding of the extent to which grace is 
mediated by non-Christian insights and what this means for the political role of Christian 
theology in post-Christendom societies, compared to the arguments advanced by Milbank, 
Ward and Yoder. 
 
3.3 Extrinsic universality: Self-forgetting apologetics for society’s redemption 
 
 In order to understand the political role Tanner ascribes to Christian theology in post-
Christendom societies, I will commence by explaining her understanding of the Incarnation as 
being revelatory of the way in which grace perfects nature. Subsequently, I turn to Tanner’s 
conception of the Cross for an answer to the question of how grace overcomes sin. Together, 
this paves the way for understanding the way in which Tanner distinguishes between Christ’s 
uniqueness and the rest of humankind, in a way that was found to be missing in the accounts 
of Milbank, Ward and Yoder.
458
 Furthermore, I examine how Tanner still conceives of the 
church’s active participation in Christ’s redemptive work, leading to my analysis of her 
conception of the political role played by Christian theology in post-Christendom societies in 
the last part of this chapter (3.4).  
 
a) Incarnation: God’s egalitarian bestowal of grace 
 
 Exhibiting an equally strong, but different, Christocentrism to Yoder, Tanner calls the 
Incarnation ‘the center of [her] theology in a most thoroughgoing way’.459 Not unlike Yoder, 
Tanner understands Christ in terms of setting a perfect example for the rest of humankind.
460
 
Contrary to Ward and Yoder, however, Tanner does not understand God’s assumption of 
humanity in kenotic terms. She criticises kenotic Christologies for erroneously upholding a 
binary separation between a being’s full divinity or its full humanity.461 Rejecting this 
competitive understanding of the relation between humanity and divinity, Tanner understands 
                                                 
458
 The underlying logic of my presentation of Tanner’s theology is: Christ is exemplary for 
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God’s redemptive power to be fully present throughout Jesus’ fully human life.462 Calling 
God the self-subsistent fullness who ‘provides to the world [...] its non-divine existence, and 
all that it includes: life, truth, beauty, goodness in their finite forms’463, Tanner understands 
God as the source of the whole of reality as well as the immediate source of every particular 
being.
464
 This conception of God allows Tanner to understand Jesus’ divinity in terms of 
Jesus’ continuous drawing on God’s fully present redemptive power, which gradually 
perfected Jesus’ humanity for the world’s redemption.465 Christ’s fully human life is then 
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God’s own insofar as it is lived in strict union with God.466 This understanding reverberates in 
Tanner’s understanding of the way in which grace fulfils human nature. 
 Tanner understands grace as the environment in which humankind exists, equally 
reaching out to all human beings from outside.
467
 Human nature in itself, on the contrary, is 
merely the empty vessel which can receive grace.
468
 Human nature is particularly malleable 
and open in order to attain divine likeness eventually.
469
 Being more malleable than other 
creatures means that anything that impresses itself upon humans becomes an element of their 
constitution. God’s offer of grace to the world is, thus, mediated by the development of 
initially empty human lives into particular positive forms. In short, humans are not by nature 
united or even similar to God, but they are naturally made for a relationship with God.
470
  
 Tanner then presents sin as the denial of the world’s continuous dependence upon God 
as the transcendent source of its goodness. Not unlike Milbank, Tanner also understands sin in 
terms of humankind’s mistaken view that people are good due to their own achievements, 
instead of duly acknowledging that any such goodness is given to them from their graced 
environment.
471
 For Milbank, original sin was to imagine proudly that reality is a mixture of 
good and evil and that, consequently, reality’s goodness would be achieved by the human free 
choice for the good. Subsequent to the Fall, however, reality becomes a mixture of good and 
evil, and Christian faith is drawn upon in order to apologetically defend the Christian social 
order by promising to overcome this fallen situation.  
 Tanner, on the contrary, is more hesitant to position the effects of sin in the reality 
external to humankind. Even though she argues that graced reality is no longer as accessible 
in fallen history as it originally was, this is connected less to a change in the environment and 
more to a change in humankind. This change is not a change of human nature as such, in the 
sense of an inherited sinfulness, but the same original empty human nature when sinful is 
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filled up with ‘the wrong inputs’ to the effect that human beings are less capable of receiving 
God’s grace.472 Tanner claims that the more people imagine themselves as the authors of their 
own good, the less receptive they are to the reception of new gifts of grace from God.
473
 In 
this way, a human being becomes ever more estranged from its fully graced eschatological 
ideal. A graced life now exists ‘in competition with another potentially all-embracing [...] 
pattern of existence marked by futility and hopelessness’.474 In short, what could be termed 
Tanner’s extrinsic and non-anthropocentric understanding of grace is paired with a 
remarkably anthropocentric understanding of sin.
475
  
 Until this point, Christian theology could still be defended apologetically as best being 
able to determine the social order of a non-exclusively Christian society, since the underlying 
assumption is that people are universally dependent upon God’s extrinsic bestowal of grace 
and everyone’s acknowledgment of this dependence might lead to the entire society’s 
overcoming of sin. This is why we should now turn to Tanner’s understanding of how Christ 
is not only the exemplary human, but how he also uniquely redeems humankind from sin.
476
 
This clarifies why Tanner could be less concerned, than the theologians discussed already, 
with translating her understanding of how grace fulfils nature into a political program that 
promises to enhance the existing social order.  
 
b) Cross: Questioning apologetics in respect of Christ’s uniqueness  
 
 Having explained Tanner’s understanding of humankind’s dependence on God’s 
grace, now it is possible to move on to the way she conceives of Christ as redeeming 
humankind from sin. First, I will show how Tanner explains Christ’s redemption from sin in 
terms of an example that can be imitated by Christians, to then analysing how Tanner 
conceives of Christ not only as an exemplary human, but also as distinct from the rest of 
humankind due to his full divinity.  
 In accordance with her extrinsic understanding of grace, Tanner understands the 
Incarnation not in terms of some immediate redemption of creation, but as redeeming the 
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world through the course of Jesus’ life.477 All effects of sin, from which the world needs to be 
redeemed, are overcome precisely at the point at which Jesus is subjected to them, because 
Christ’s relationship to God reworks the situation.478 Christ receives the grace which God 
bestows onto the world and weaves it into the situation, so to speak. Jesus redeemed his own 
humanity and that of everyone else from the tendency to store up sinful inputs in one’s own 
constitution.
479
 This human tendency was redeemed precisely at the point when Jesus was 
exposed to the violent death of the crucifixion.
480
 Here, Jesus’ relationship to God, the 
transcendent source of all grace, helped him to endure the harm he had to suffer. Jesus, thus, 
remained open to God’s grace and did not integrate the harm done to him into his 
constitution.
481
 Concretely, this could mean that Jesus did not become harmful himself and 
did not close himself off to the full receptivity of God’s grace.  
 This focus on how Christ’s redemptive work was not demanded of him, in the sense of 
an ethical duty, but rather enabled by virtue of his relationship with God, is heightened when 
it comes to humankind’s participation in the world’s redemption. Tanner here strictly 
distinguishes between Christ and the rest of humankind, inasmuch as Christ is uniquely 
identified with the Word.
482
 Consequently, she argues that the whole point of Christ’s 
crucifixion was to redeem humankind in our stead, to the extent that no one has to suffer for 
redemption any longer.
483
 Christ’s divinity enabled him to redeem the whole world, insofar as 
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his divinity rendered the effects of his salvific deeds universal. Christ effected and revealed 
that humankind’s environment will always be filled with God’s grace.484 People’s sinful 
stocking up of themselves with sinful inputs can be undone by the grace of redemption, and 
will not stop God from offering grace. 
 This focus on Christ’s unique and eternally effective work of redemption sheds new 
light on the discussion concerning apologetic defences of Christian theological contributions 
to public politics, suggesting that Christians should imitate Christ’s redemptive work, but that 
this imitation cannot be turned into an ethical duty deriving its authority from appeals to the 
world’s need for redemption. This disassociates Tanner’s position from those who drew upon 
Christianity’s duty to complete the world’s redemption in order to promise positive 
contributions to the entire society’s political organisation. It might allow her to appreciate the 
theological significance of non-Christian positions to a higher degree, inasmuch as everyone 
is most fundamentally regarded as a beneficiary of the redemption uniquely won by Christ. In 
order to analyse the way in which Tanner strikes the balance between the church’s call to 
imitate Christ and its dependence and receptivity of a redemption that has been uniquely won 
by Christ in greater detail, I now turn to the way in which Tanner describes the church’s 
participation in Christ’s redemptive work. 
 
c) Ecclesiology: The church’s dependence on and active participation in redemption 
 
 On the basis of the previous discussion of Tanner’s understanding of humankind’s 
dependence on God’s continuous bestowal of grace, the sinful blocking of humankind’s 
receptivity of grace and Christ’s exemplary, as well as his unique, undoing of sin, we can now 
move on to Tanner’s understanding of the church’s active participation in Christ’s redemptive 
work. Here, Tanner’s thought exhibits two equally important features. On the one hand, the 
church truly participates in Christ’s divine nature to the effect that grace is no longer merely 
extrinsic, but becomes a part of the church’s own constitution. On the other hand, however, 
the church’s participation in Christ’s redemptive work proceeds precisely through 
acknowledging the way in which God’s bestowal of grace remains extrinsic to the church. 
How the two are interrelated, and what this means for theology’s apologetic promises of 
contributing positively to society, will be unpacked in what follows.  
 In accordance with Tanner’s understanding of the Incarnation, in terms of Christ’s 
identity with the Word, she also understands Christians as being attached to Christ and the 
Word in a way that means that they no longer one-sidedly depend upon the grace given to 
them from outside. Since the problem with sin is associated with humankind, rather than with 
the reality external to humankind, Tanner claims that Christ has effected ‘a new relationship 
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of God to creatures that renders the gift of divine power to human beings more efficacious 
and secure than before’.485 Christ not only reveals the dependency of created reality upon 
God, and of humans on their graced environment, but he also effected a change within human 
nature. The Incarnation not only enables people to receive the grace which God continues to 
bestow on creation once again,
486
 it also prevents the further loss of this reception, such that 
there could not be a second Fall from grace. Since Christ is the human being who, by nature, 
is in a right relation to God, he cannot lose this relationship. A person’s attachment to Christ 
affects the same insoluble union with God, which means that grace can now also become a 
part of a human being’s own constitution.487 Following the Incarnation, people are no longer 
either empty or filled up with sin; they can also be filled with grace. 
 Through their attachment to the Word, once grace is received, Christians now possess 
this grace as their own in Christ. Similar to Milbank’s understanding of Christians as 
positively exceeding Christ, Tanner also argues that ‘Christ’s life is extended in new 
directions as it incorporates our lives within it’.488 Christ’s relationship to God is imitated by 
the rest of humankind whenever a human being is assumed by Christ, the incarnated Word, in 
order to live in closest union with God.
489
 However, this being filled with grace should not be 
imagined primarily as some storing up of grace, perfecting the human individual in terms of 
some personal growth. Instead, being filled with grace translates into becoming an active 
distributor of grace.
490
 The filling up with sinful inputs is, thus, prevented through one’s 
primary occupation of sharing with others that which one has received. All remaining sin will 
be overcome once everyone bestows their received goods onto others.
491
  
 This argument explains why Tanner, despite her affirmation of the church’s 
participation in Christ’s divinity, can maintain that the church is different from non-Christian 
groups not due to any intrinsic quality, but only due to the free grace of God in Christ, which 
remains extrinsic to the church.
492
 The church is different from the world insofar as it is 
witness to something outside itself. Any ecclesial self-concern and defensiveness is 
idolatrous. Everyone, Christians and non-Christians, must be viewed as someone in need of 
Christ’s grace most fundamentally. Active participation in Christ’s ongoing redemptive work 
primarily means sharing the grace one continues to receive with others. This position would 
suggest that, in the face of opposition to ecclesial engagement in secular politics, Christian 
theologians should not be concerned with defending the benefits of this engagement 
apologetically, but they should motivate the church to continue distributing the grace God 
bestows onto the world with the wider society. The church must be convincing through its 
outward oriented works, rather than through its self-appraising words. 
 Tanner, thus, still advocates a form of apologetically defending Christian theological 
contributions to the politics of post-Christendom societies when she seeks to attend to ‘the 
most pressing problems and issues of contemporary life’.493 She wants to interpret the whole 
                                                 
485
 Kathryn Tanner, “Book Forum,” Theology Today 68 (2011): 346. 
486
 Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 22. 
487
 Tanner, Christ the Key, 14. 
488
 Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 74. 
489
 Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 9. 
490
 Tanner, Christ the Key, 37. 
491
 Tanner, Christ the Key, 90. 
492
 Tanner, Theories of Culture, 101-102; 113. 
493
 Tanner, “How my mind has changed,” The Christian Century 127 (2010): 40. Her Economy of 
Grace is precisely such an attempt to construct a comprehensive Christian theological understanding 
of economics (Kathryn Tanner, Economy of Grace (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 2-6). 
97 
 
 
contemporary situation ‘in a Christian light’494 through solving contemporary political 
problems by way of drawing upon the Christian tradition. Regarding the question of the 
grounds upon which this theological contributions to problems of a not exclusively Christian 
society can be advanced, Tanner justifies this approach by situating her theology within a 
postmodern context in which tradition-based arguments are not rejected a priori.
495
 Exhibiting 
belief in some universal intelligibility, Tanner claims that Christian arguments can be 
accepted or rejected regarding their plausibility, even by non-Christians.
496
 In a pluralist 
postmodern context, the universal legitimatisation is no longer gained by way of adhering to 
secular procedural norms of dialogue, but by way of offering solutions to wider societal 
problems, the quality of which is appreciated by all.
497
 In striking agreement with Radical 
Orthodoxy, Tanner then draws upon the Christian tradition in order to ‘shock and startle’ in 
the sense of offering ‘an escape from the taken-for-granted certainties of life by referring 
them to something that remained ever beyond them’.498 Like Milbank and Ward, Tanner looks 
at the past, not for any nostalgic reasons, but ‘to break out of the narrowness of a 
contemporary sense of the realistic’.499 Whereas some have criticised her, saying that her 
approach presupposes the impeccability of the Christian tradition
500
, Tanner conceives of this 
correlation of Christian theology with contemporary problems as both at once a solution to 
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these problems and a (correcting) renewal of the Christian tradition.
501
 Changing contexts and 
practices must continuously renew one’s understanding of the whole Christian theological 
system as well as of particular doctrines.
502
 Importantly, and in contradistinction to Radical 
Orthodoxy, Tanner advances her theological solutions to contemporary political problems 
without argumentatively relying on an inferior alternative worldview, such as secularism. 
 My question at this point, however, is why Tanner focuses on contemporary problems 
in the first place if her argument is that Christians should primarily recognise the grace that 
surrounds them. At this point, she leans towards a model of recognising a sinful situation and 
of distributing the graces that Christian theology has already stored up in its tradition. 
Importantly, despite her otherwise convincing focus on the church’s dependence and 
reception of redemption, at this point, Tanner turns this reception into an ethical task. Tanner 
draws upon Edward Schillebeeckx in order to argue that Christians must follow Jesus in living 
in union with God through their own situations.
503
 If Christians are not responsible for the 
world’s redemption, but are primarily joyous beneficiaries of this redemption, we might 
wonder where this ‘must’ comes from. As I will argue in Chapter 4, Schillebeeckx does not 
understand the Christian calling to imitate Christ primarily in terms of an ethical duty. The 
issue of whether this imitation is interpreted in the sense of imposing an ethical duty onto the 
church or not will prove to be decisive for the question concerning the political role of 
Christian theology in post-Christendom societies. 
   
3.4 Extrinsic grace against Christendom: Non-competitive self-positioning in the social 
order 
 
 We can now turn to analyse Tanner’s understanding of the political role of Christian 
theology in post-Christendom societies in greater detail, given that we have presented 
Tanner’s understanding of the church’s participation in Christ’s redemptive work. As in the 
previous discussions of Milbank’s, Ward’s, and Yoder’s theologies, particular attention will 
be paid to the question of the degree to which Tanner conceives of non-Christian positions as 
mediating grace. The more non-Christian positions are acknowledged to mediate God’s grace, 
the more marginal a political role could be ascribed to Christian theology. The more the 
emphasis is on theology’s unique insight into how the world is being redeemed by Christ, the 
more responsible Christian theology would see itself for the entire society’s redemption. 
Having already argued how Tanner understands the church as called to participate in Christ’s 
redemptive work, and as such bearing the promise of contributing positively to the social 
order, I will now explain that most fundamentally, however, she positions Christians on the 
same level as any other human being, namely at the level of being a sinner in need of God’s 
bestowal of grace, which remains extrinsic to everyone.  
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a) Extra-ecclesial grace: Non-competitive completion of the theological vision  
 
 The discussion above suggests that Tanner’s theology presents reality as being 
primordially graced, because the God on whom it depends is thought of in terms of 
plenitudinous positivity. She stresses that God bestows grace freely upon all creatures, 
Christians and non-Christians alike, and she is in agreement with Elaine Graham that this 
grace might find non-Christians in ways unknown to Christians.
504
 Because God’s creative 
grace is also active outside of the church, Tanner understands a pluralist society as being good 
in its own right, and not only as an aspiration for a grace that needs to be perfected in the 
church.
505
 Her understanding of Christ’s unique and definite realisation of redemption, thus, 
allows Tanner to acknowledge that God might bestow graces in ways entirely different from 
any pre-established theological vision of reality. Her overarching theological vision of how 
the world is graced would have to be modified through attendance to the concrete graces 
mediated by non-Christian positions.  
 Tanner’s understanding of non-Christian cultures as graced in their own right is 
consistent with the aforementioned explanation that Christian theology actively participates in 
Christ’s redemption of the world precisely insofar as it focuses not on itself, but on the grace 
which is given to it from outside. This focus on extrinsic grace is evident in Tanner’s 
explanation that Christian theologians and non-Christians share the same material, which they 
then use differently.
506
 Christianity only becomes a comprehensive way of life where 
theologians receive and modify the practices and beliefs of others. In this sense, Tanner calls 
Christianity ‘essentially parasitic’.507  
 Regarding the modification of this extrinsic grace, Tanner, like Radical Orthodox 
theologians, contends that Christian theology participates in Christ’s redemption of the world 
through relating non-Christian material to God. Contrary to Milbank and Ward, however, who 
laud themselves for being able to make more sense of reality than positivism through relating 
reality to God, Tanner in her acknowledgement of Christ’s unique realisation of redemption, 
argues that in relating insights from non-Christian cultures to God, ‘Christianity does not need 
to keep the upper hand [...]; the Word does’.508 This orientation to God is manifest, then, not 
primarily in the perfection of non-Christian material by Christian theology, but in the 
modification of extra-ecclesial material which should be critical of both the extra-ecclesial 
public as well as of the church.
509
 It is noteworthy, however, that in associating this relation of 
non-Christian material to God with theology’s imitation of the way in which Christ redeemed 
the world, Tanner again implicitly promises to contribute positively to society as a Christian 
theologian. As in the case of Yoder, the concrete positive outcome of this redemptive activity 
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might not be foreseeable, since it is left to the unpredictable God, but theologians should be 
convinced that they do something good. 
 Tanner’s non-competitive theology, although harmonising in a similar way to that of 
Milbank, then promises to achieve a more peaceful pluralist society in a slightly different 
way. Tanner uses her ontological framework of non-competition not in order to defend the 
superiority of Christian theology over alternative worldviews apologetically, but in order to 
approach others in such a way that any apparent conflict between the two worldviews is 
overcome.
510
 At this point, Tanner’s non-contrastive conception of God translates into a ‘non-
competitive’ conception of Christianity’s relation to non-Christians.511 The goal of any 
conversation between Christians and non-Christians is not agreement, but mutual 
understanding.
512
 For such a peaceful encounter, God’s grace must be imagined to be 
bestowed equally upon everyone, even if this materialises in different shapes. However, this 
way of approaching each other should not be defended triumphantly as the best solution to all 
conflicts in society. The point is rather that, where we are interpreting reality through the lens 
of Tanner’s theology, Christians would not strive to attain this privilege of imposing their own 
understanding of a peaceful conversation onto everyone, but they would only assume this 
hermeneutics because they see themselves as already equally privileged with all other 
recipients of grace.
513
 Tanner thus promises to achieve a more peaceful society not by way of 
installing a new social order or new ethical guidelines for everyone, but by way of ensuring 
that Christians contribute their best share to a peaceful co-existence.  
 Whatever Christian theologians understand about the non-Christian position, through 
and after this conversation, can then be integrated into the Christian tradition.
514
 The 
systematic whole of Christian theology is not meant to exclude, per definition, all those 
particulars which do not fit into this whole.
515
 Tanner would rather prefer these particulars to 
modify the theological vision. On this basis, we can then understand Tanner’s integration of 
secular non-anthropocentric philosophies or liberal positions into her theology. Whereas some 
have criticised this as simplistic accommodation of Christian theology to some secular trends, 
this criticism in turn fails to recognise the grace that is mediated by non-anthropocentric or 
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liberal philosophies. Due to Tanner’s positive understanding of grace, the integration of new 
contextual insights into Christian theology should be internally diversifying.
516
 Tanner’s 
nuanced integration of non-anthropocentric thought into Christian theology is not based on 
the assumption that this secular philosophy was neutral; its culturally specific status is fully 
acknowledged. Refraining from universalising non-anthropocentrism as the only adequate 
interpretation of reality, Western Christian theologians can receive non-anthropocentric 
philosophies as a welcome incentive to confessing Christianity’s centuries-long history of 
sinfully measuring everything according to the standard set by oneself.
517
  
 Overall, the argument, thus far, suggests that Christ first reveals the world’s 
continuous dependence upon the reception of goods from beyond its own stores, and second, 
that humankind is healed from sin through distributing the goods one receives with others 
equally. In this sense, faith in Christ can be associated with the promise that every human 
being will be healed from sin if all occurrences are, once again, read in their relation to God 
as their transcendent source.
518
 This understanding of grace is reflected in the Christian 
approach to conversation with non-Christians on the one hand. The different gifts of grace 
mediated by the conversation partners should be appreciated in their unique positivity, rather 
than being merged into something else. For the same reason, Christian theology should 
receive non-Christian contributions through understanding the other position as much as 
possible, without demanding the conversion to Christianity of those who made these 
contributions. In this way, Tanner upholds Christian theology’s all-encompassing vision of 
how the world is being redeemed in Christ and, nevertheless, couples this with a rejection of 
placing Christian theology at the centre of the social order. The centre must remain Christ, 
whose superabundant offer of grace surpasses that which Christian theology could adequately 
mediate. 
 
b) Appreciating gratuity: Acknowledging the church’s sinfulness  
 
 It has become apparent that Tanner can argue for a Christian harmonising vision of the 
whole of reality without advocating Christian theology as the best governing centre for the 
whole of society. On the one hand, others might have an equally harmonising all-
encompassing vision, and on the other, the emphasis should not erroneously be laid on 
Christianity itself, but on God’s grace which enables Christian theologians to attain this 
harmonising vision. However, how exactly Tanner acknowledges the impact of sin on non-
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Christian positions, as well as on the Christian theological vision, has not yet been fully 
explained. I will first explain how the sinful church is related to Christ, according to Tanner, 
and then I will draw out the implications of such a view for the way in which the church is 
related to the non-Christian public in terms of both what the church can receive from outside 
as well as what it can offer. In the final section of this chapter, I assess the degree to which 
Tanner also acknowledges that her own theological vision has become impaired by sin, and 
how this affects theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies. 
 Despite Tanner’s paralleling of Milbank’s understanding of Christians as positive 
excess to Christ, they part ways at the point when this becomes central to Milbank, and it 
becomes much less central for Tanner. Whereas Milbank focuses on the church’s excess to 
God’s goodness, Tanner focuses primarily on the restoration of created goodness, and regards 
the question of what God might ‘gain’ to be only of a secondary importance.519 She stresses 
more that received grace is not primarily returned to God, but is passed on to other 
creatures.
520
 This is not to say that a human return of grace to God, and thus an excess of 
divine goodness, is impossible.
521
 However, Tanner stresses that such a return is not the norm, 
but that it is the surprising and exceptional excess of the already good healing of sinful human 
nature. At this point, Tanner distinguishes between Christ’s perfect humanity and the sinful 
humanity of Christians. ‘Ever struggling against our own sinful impulses, we never exhibit 
Christ’s own perfect humanity’.522 Consequently, the Christian bestowal of goods onto others 
is, in most cases, defective. The church’s participation in Christ’s redemptive work does not 
always constitute an excess to the goodness of the gift received, but the gift is usually 
distorted.
523
 ‘We are always giving back in a lesser form what God gave to us: the goods are 
always damaged to some degree or other by fallible and sinful creatures’.524 In this vein, 
Tanner confesses that ‘[t]he history of Christian thought comprises indeed one of the most 
comprehensive and detailed accounts of human failing ever assembled’.525  
 Most fundamentally, Tanner views all people, Christians and non-Christians alike, as 
sinners in need of God’s grace. ‘Christians remain threatened by sin despite their acceptance 
of salvation in Christ; they have reason to continue to pray for God’s forgiveness’.526 In 
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contrast to all the other theologians introduced thus far in this dissertation, she argues that due 
to sin, Christians are ‘as much outsiders as insiders to a life in Christ’.527 This means that 
Christians cannot promise to perfect the extra-ecclesial public in any direct way by their own 
good works, but that they can only participate in the redemption of the world as ‘graced 
sinners’.528 God’s action must always purify and surpass Christian action. In what follows, I 
will first investigate the extent to which Tanner’s association of the church’s sinfulness with 
shortcomings in its activity in comparison to Christ’s perfect activity impacts upon her 
understanding of the church’s relation to the extra-ecclesial public. Then, in the last part of 
this chapter, the extent to which Tanner also conceives of sin’s impact on theology’s vision, 
concerning what activity is best in a given situation, will be examined.  
 First, the church’s relation to the extra-ecclesial public is meant to accord with God’s 
merciful justice. According to Tanner’s theology of grace, gifts are not to be distributed 
according to some supposedly just measure of what the recipients deserve on the basis of their 
active contribution to the common good, but gifts should be bestowed in accordance with 
someone’s need, irrespective of what they may return.529 Tanner stresses that no human 
failure can ever alter one’s standing in the covenant with God in Christ, who intercedes for 
them and continues to justify them despite themselves. God bestows ‘merciful gift[s] of what 
is undeserved’ and expects nothing in return.530 The proper human response to this offer is to 
participate in this merciful gift-giving onto the world.
531
 This means that Tanner’s 
understanding of the extra-ecclesial public, as good in its own right, does not disacknowledge 
the extra-ecclesial public’s sinfulness. It is, rather, in accordance with Tanner’s understanding 
of God’s mercy that she can mercifully focus on the extra-ecclesial public’s goodness, rather 
than on its shortcomings. No sinfulness would ever undo the fact that the extra-ecclesial 
public is primarily an expression of God’s faithful bestowal of grace. 
 Second, Tanner’s anthropocentric understanding of human sinfulness, and her 
understanding of grace as external to humankind, translate into a high degree of appreciation 
of the beneficial purpose of social structures. Economic and social structures that channel 
human self-interest into a mutually beneficiary way are necessary presuppositions to realising 
Christianity’s hope for a universal community of love.532 Tanner, thus, favours an economic 
system which is structured in such a way that individual benevolence becomes virtually 
unnecessary.
533
 At this point, Tanner seems to associate sin more with shortcomings 
concerning human actions than with an impairment of people’s visions. It is, in some ways, 
easier to envision beneficial social structures than to move individuals to good actions. If the 
theological vision was equally admitted to be impaired by sin, humanly envisioned social 
structures could not be exempted from the effects of sin and could not be presented as the 
solution to sinful human inclinations so easily. To clarify the issue, I conclude by reflecting 
on the way in which Tanner conceives of sin as also impacting upon any theological vision 
and on what this means for Christian theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies.
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c) Reconsidering Tanner’s theological solutions for societal problems 
 
 Regarding the question of the degree to which Tanner admits the impact of sin on her 
own theological vision and the possibility of divine corrections as being mediated elsewhere, 
it is important that Tanner distinguishes between God and human ideas about God.
534
 She 
seeks to focus on God and not on Christian theology’s own ideas. She is wary not to elevate 
anything human onto God’s position and wants that Christians obey God alone. Similar to 
Ward and Yoder, Tanner conceives of God’s freedom from theological ideas about God in 
terms of unpredictability.
535
 The consistence of God’s free grace can only be determined in 
retrospect, not in advance.
536
 However, also in retrospect, God’s guidance of the Christian 
tradition is not identifiable with any concrete aspect of Christian history.
537
 Again, the 
argument seems to distinguish the theological tradition of ideas, symbols and practices from 
Christ who won the world’s redemption. The Christian tradition, just as the rest of the world, 
depends entirely upon Christ’s redemption.538  
 Yet, at the same time, Tanner maintains that in any historical period, Christian 
theologians must make judgments and openness to God’s correction means that Christians 
must acknowledge the possibility that God might nevertheless move in a different direction in 
the future.
539
 On this basis, Tanner parallels Milbank’s work in constructing an all-
encompassing systematic vision, against the background of which all particulars can be 
assessed.
540
 She views it as being every Christian’s responsibility to engage in such an 
endeavour to the effect that Christianity should be ‘a genuine community of argument’ 
characterised by its common openness to correction and edification by others, and its shared 
hope to be faithful disciples of Christ.
541
 The rule of this community must be humility. Tanner 
attempts to leave God entirely outside of her own theological system, as an external judge. 
Her acknowledgment of theology’s entanglement in sin implies that, for Tanner, ‘being 
genuinely open to the Word[,] always involves opening oneself to the risk of failure’.542  
 In this context, Tanner argues that, acknowledging their sinfulness, Christian 
theologians must be willing to submit to the judgments of others.
543
 It is precisely the 
seriousness of sin on all sides of a debate which renders the prospect of mutual correction a 
salutary gift.
544
 This understanding of the Christian position, as potentially wrong or at least 
incomplete, allows Christian theologians to receive insights from non-Christians as 
enrichments or corrections.
545
 This need for correction from non-Christians is then also why 
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Tanner opposes the idea of an entirely Christian culture.
546
 At the same time, Christian 
theologians are also called to criticise the wider society, and transform it primarily for 
society’s sake, not in order to convert people to Christianity. This returns us to the issue 
concerning whether God could ever offer a new grace that breaks with Tanner’s own 
theological vision. Acknowledging the human liability to sin, Tanner cannot present her 
extrinsic view of grace as being the definite and eternal truth about reality.  
 However, Tanner insufficiently engages with the problem that theology’s 
entanglement in sin might distort the theological vision to such an extent that theologians 
might not even know what exactly should be evaluated as being problematic in their own, as 
well as in non-Christian, positions. Tanner’s primary focus on societal and ecclesial problems 
in need of a solution, and not on the graces which are already being received, is indicative of 
her confidence that Christian theology is able to know and point out sin. This confidence 
contrasts my own hypothesis that the very opposition to any theological involvement in 
secular politics might mediate a grace and reveal a sin to Christian theology, which Christian 
theologians could not have seen from their own distorted perspective. Such a move would be 
inconceivable from the perspective of Tanner’s theology, because her theology would 
commend this opposition to theological contributions to secular politics as being more on the 
side of a societal problem that needs to be overcome than on the side of a solution. Since 
Tanner understands closing oneself off from the reception of grace to be sinful, and since 
grace is believed to be mediated equally in all positions, it is difficult to acknowledge how 
someone could ever legitimately reject any position, and thus also how anyone could 
legitimately reject theological contributions to post-Christendom politics. It would be difficult 
to acknowledge the positive theological significance of the secularist opposition to theological 
contributions to secular political debates, because this opposition would be prejudged to 
reveal the sinful refusal of accepting the grace inherent in the theological contribution from 
the outset.  
  
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter I have introduced two different Christocentric approaches to the 
question concerning the political role of Christian theology in post-Christendom societies; in 
so doing I have related to public theology’s conscious distinction of their own discipline from 
post-liberal responses to the question. Public theologians reject the post-liberal stance where it 
exhibits an illegitimate concern with Christian integrity to the detriment of engaging in the 
struggle of translating Christian theological insights into publicly accessible terms, and where 
it entails any sectarian withdrawal from political engagement in post-Christendom societies. 
My own discussion, found in the first two chapters, has pointed in the direction of ascribing a 
less central political role in contemporary post-Christendom societies to Christian theology 
than those apologetically defended by public theologians on the one hand, and by Radical 
Orthodoxy on the other. Moreover, I have argued that both public as well as Radical Orthodox 
theologians have tended to conflate Christ’s redemption with the theological task of 
completing this redemption, over and against which I have expressed my preference for a 
more Christocentric position.  
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 In this chapter, it has become clear that Christocentric responses to the post-
Christendom context, and the ascription of a humbler political role to Christian theology, do 
not necessarily imply a sectarian withdrawal from the political arena. Yet, I have distanced 
myself from Yoder’s post-liberal position by way of rejecting his principled opposition to 
both apologetics as well as to Christendom. I prefer a Christocentric approach to the question 
of theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies not in order to safeguard 
Christianity’s integrity, but in order to acknowledge the way in which the Christian 
theological vision of redemption is impaired by sin. Yoder’s doubts that Christian theologians 
might not possess a positive vision of a political goal, on the basis of which they could 
promise to contribute positively to the society’s common good, is helpful for my own 
approach, but according to different reasons than those advanced by Yoder. According to 
Yoder, Christian theologians positively know that the principle of nonviolent love will guide 
them towards their true, but unknown, eschatological goal. Against this, I maintain that, 
impaired by sin, Christian theologians also lack the positive vision of how to reach their goal. 
This renders any theological promise of contributing positively to the completion of the 
world’s redemption to be even more questionable than it is in Yoder’s theology. 
 Against this background of three currently prominent approaches to the question of 
theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies (that of public theologians, that of 
Radical Orthodoxy, and that of post-liberal theologians), I then turned to Kathryn Tanner as 
someone whose theology points in the direction which I seek to pursue. She acknowledges the 
difference between Christ’s unique realisation of redemption and the sinful furthering of 
Christ’s redemptive work by the church and Christian theology to a greater extent than the 
others. We part ways, however, at the point at which Tanner still offers Christian solutions to 
greater societal problems. By taking the acknowledgement of the impacts of sin onto the 
theological vision one step further, I would like to suggest that at this particular moment in 
time, in a post-Christendom context, Christian theologians might be better advised to refrain 
from offering their solutions to problems of the greater societal whole.  
 It might furthermore be summarised that none of the theologians introduced thus far 
has been able to appreciate the theological significance of the vehement opposition to 
Christian theological involvement in secular politics. Public theological and Radical Orthodox 
apologetic defences of Christian theology against this opposition have tended to re-ascribe a 
central political role to Christian theology in post-Christendom societies. Tanner has 
apologetically defended Christian theological engagement in secular politics by way of 
demonstrating its ability to solve societal problems, and Yoder principally agrees with those 
who oppose theological contributions to secular politics, independent of their specific 
arguments. I will argue, in the remainder of this dissertation, that the theological significance 
of the opposition to Christian involvement in politics should not be discarded too quickly. 
Instead, Christian theologians should discern the grace mediated by this opposition, given that 
it partly confronts Christian theology with being itself a societal problem that demands a 
solution. In the following chapter, I present Edward Schillebeeckx as a theologian who is not 
so much concerned with apologetically defending theology’s positive impact on society as he 
is concerned with continuously receiving the grace discernible in non-Christian positions; I 
will then examine where this leads us regarding the question concerning Christian theology’s 
political role in post-Christendom societies. 
  
CHAPTER 4 
EDWARD SCHILLEBEECKX: 
REJECTING APOLOGETICS IN FAVOUR OF  
CONTEXTUAL MEDIATIONS OF GRACE 
 
 Throughout the course of the previous chapters, I have begun to question public 
theology’s aspiration to apologetically defend Christian theological contributions to political 
discussions in post-Christendom societies. These defences are also directed against those 
secularists who vehemently oppose any explicitly faith-based involvement in secular politics. 
The problem with public theology’s apologetic reaction to this opposition is that it implicitly 
re-inscribes a central role for Christian theology in post-Christendom societies. Christendom 
imperialism is not overcome, but is perpetuated in a new guise. Both John Milbank and 
Graham Ward challenge the opposition to Christian theological contributions to secular 
politics even more fundamentally, revealing certain problems with the secularist social order 
which is why they offer two different theologically informed social orders as better 
alternatives. Again, their apologetic defences of Christian theological involvement in secular 
politics is coupled with the re-ascription of a central political role being played by Christian 
theology in post-Christendom societies. I have related this upholding of a remnant of 
Christendom, by both public theology and Radical Orthodoxy, to problems in their respective 
Christologies, specifically the insufficient differentiation between Christ’s offer of redemption 
and the Christian theological ability to mediate this offer. 
 John Howard Yoder was presented as a post-liberal theologian who, for Christological 
reasons, rejects both apologetics as well as Christendom as a matter of principle. I have 
argued that this rejection is too fixed, assuming an integrity on the part of Christian theology, 
which predisposes him not to recognise the specific theological significance of the secularist 
opposition to theological contributions to post-Christendom politics. Kathryn Tanner also 
rejects Christendom principally, but not in order to safeguard some presupposed theological 
integrity, but because she acknowledges the sinfulness of the church. Due to this sinfulness, 
non-Christian criticisms must be received as a welcome gift for Christianity. At the same 
time, Tanner still apologetically defends Christian theological contributions to secular politics 
by promising to solve contemporary societal problems.  
 I have argued throughout this work that, regarding the question of appreciating the 
theological significance of non-Christian positions, all theologians introduced thus far fail to 
understand the way in which the secularist opposition to Christian theological contributions to 
politics could mediate God’s grace. In the cases of public theology, Radical Orthodoxy and 
Tanner’s theology this is connected to their apologetic defences against this opposition. The 
secularist opposition is predefined as theology’s antagonist who must be shown to be wrong. 
Whatever is good and theologically significant in this opposition is, thereby, undermined. The 
problem with John Howard Yoder’s position is that he separates, in too sharp a manner, 
between Christian theology’s integrity and the sinfulness of non-Christian positions. Non-
Christian positions can only mediate grace insofar as they overlap with his predefined 
understanding of grace.  
 I have argued that this failure to recognise the theological significance of the vehement 
secularist opposition to theological contributions to secular politics is connected to the 
insufficient acknowledgement by all of the theologians introduced thus far that sin entails not 
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only the church’s continual failure to practice that which theologians recommend, but that sin 
also entails an impairment of the theological vision of how the world’s redemption is further 
exceeded or completed, and of how political problems are best solved.  
 
§ 1 Instead of Apologetics: Schillebeeckx’s Realistic Grace Optimism 
 
 Against this background, I will now introduce Edward Schillebeeckx’s Christology as 
a contribution to this discussion about theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies. 
First, I present Schillebeeckx’s extra-ordinarily positive reception of atheism throughout his 
career. This sets Schillebeeckx apart from all of the abovementioned theologians, as he does 
not engage with atheism by way of apologetically defending Christianity against those who 
have turned their back to it. Instead, he is concerned from the outset with understanding the 
grace that is mediated by the arguments of those who have left the church. Then, I turn to the 
objections that have been voiced against Schillebeeckx’s positive stance towards atheism; 
namely, the charges of being naively optimistic and of naturalising grace. Schillebeeckx’s 
‘grace optimism’ is said to assume too easily that atheists still follow the guidance of God’s 
grace, thereby neglecting the way in which they also sinfully reject God’s grace. In other 
words, Schillebeeckx is reproached for insufficiently criticising atheism’s shortcomings.  
 On this basis, I argue that far from being naively optimistic, Schillebeeckx interpreted 
atheism through a hermeneutic that combined a grace optimism with a pessimistic 
anthropology. The rest of this chapter proceeds by explaining how this hermeneutic is related 
to Schillebeeckx’s Christology, centring on Christ’s Resurrection. In the same vein, I contest 
the most widespread interpretations of Schillebeeckx’s work, which associate his 
understanding of grace with creation. I contend that Schillebeeckx’s primary focus on the 
grace of redemption means that he does not neglect the world’s fallenness, but that he has a 
certain soteriological understanding of how grace overcomes sin, which is also manifest in his 
engagement with atheism and which distinguishes him from Milbank, Ward, Yoder and 
Tanner. In the second part (4.4) of my exposition of Schillebeeckx’s Christology, I explain 
Schillebeeckx’s high regard for the mediated character of grace. This distinguishes him from 
post-liberal theologies and elucidates further how Schillebeeckx can help us to recognise the 
specific theological significance of the secularist opposition to theological contributions to 
political discussions in post-Christendom societies. Finally (4.5), I argue why Schillebeeckx 
rejects apologetic defences of theology against this opposition, contrary to public theology 
and Radical Orthodoxy. In the subsequent and final chapter, I trace how Schillebeeckx 
continuously modified his own theology with regard to what he conceived of as non-Christian 
mediations of grace in order to propose a way in which Schillebeeckx’s theology could be 
retrieved for today’s political contexts.  
 
4.1 Schillebeeckx on the theological significance of atheism 
 
 Edward Schillebeeckx’s thought can further the present discussion insofar as his 
theologically nuanced interpretation of atheism is revisited in relation to the research question 
posed here. I first examine Schillebeeckx’s interpretation of atheism as he developed it in the 
course of his theological career, highlighting that throughout, Schillebeeckx’s approach to 
atheism was marked by a merciful attitude. He always emphasised first what he appreciates 
109 
 
 
about atheism before he would criticise what he conceives of as being its shortcomings. 
Moreover, I will argue that, while Schillebeeckx understood atheism, from the outset, as a 
welcome critique that could correct the church’s practical failures, at the end of his career he 
also tended to interpret atheism as a critique of the shortcomings of the Christian theological 
vision itself. 
 
a) Early career: Atheism’s and Christianity’s entanglement in structural sin  
 
 By 1945, Schillebeeckx’s reflections on atheism were already very nuanced. By this 
point, he conceived of atheism and Christianity as two equally intelligible interpretations of 
the social context at the time. More precisely, Schillebeeckx associated atheism with a 
pessimistic outlook and Christianity with an optimistic outlook.
547
 His reconciliatory approach 
to atheism is especially evidenced in the late ‘50s when Schillebeeckx welcomes the new 
situation, in which Catholicism began to lose its cultural hegemony, as a possible opportunity 
for Catholicism to receive anew God’s grace.548 Relating this positive evaluation of 
Catholicism’s more marginal role in Dutch society to his understanding of grace, 
Schillebeeckx distinguishes between an atheist’s search for God’s absence, which might lead 
people to God, and a theological search for God’s presence which might distance people from 
God.
549
 The reverse side of this optimism, regarding the future to which atheism could lead, is 
Schillebeeckx’s rather bleak interpretation of the current state of the church. 
 Schillebeeckx argues that many contemporaries discard Christianity because 
Christians fail to visibly bear witness to the grace they proclaim with their words.
550
 He 
claims that for Christianity to be convincing, people must encounter someone whose life 
confronts them with the plausibility that life can be transformed into something more 
beautiful.
551
 In other words, rather than searching in atheism for the sin that led people to 
abandon Christianity, Schillebeeckx presents the church’s own imperfections as an occasion 
for people’s embracing of atheism.  
 A few years later, Schillebeeckx presents the relation between ecclesial and atheist 
sinfulness on a structural level. He then argues that while previously people were socially 
pressured to practice Christianity, this has now turned into the social pressure not to practice 
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Christianity.
552
 Schillebeeckx refuses to associate the de-Christianisation of a majority of his 
surrounding culture with personal sinful rejections of God.
553
 Arguing that God alone will 
judge the extent of sin of each individual atheist, he asks Christian theologians to trust in 
God’s mercy with regard to atheists’ entry into heaven.554 At the same time, Schillebeeckx 
calls on his fellow Christians not to cease striving to be holy as their heavenly Father is holy. 
He understands the church not as a community of the perfect, but as the institution in which 
people can strive towards perfection, a perfection which is achieved according to the measure 
that people accept the real church.
555
 This move is indicative of Schillebeeckx’s reception of 
atheism as a challenge to the church. The church’s sinfulness, which led to atheism, can be 
healed if the church can understand the atheist criticism aright and directs itself accordingly. 
 Two particular aspects of Schillebeeckx’s early thoughts about atheism are remarkable 
in relation to this dissertation’s discussion. Firstly, he understands atheism and the church to 
be involved in the same structural sin of coercion, and secondly, he acknowledges that God’s 
grace moves both Christians and atheists despite this structural sin. Consequently, the 
theological significance of the path pursued by atheists in their rejection of Christianity cannot 
simply be discarded on the grounds that their overall outlook is damaged by sin. 
Schillebeeckx does not yet reflect, however, on the implications of his interpretation of 
atheism for theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies.  
 
b) The ‘60s: Interpreting atheism through a hermeneutic of a realistic grace optimism  
 
 Throughout the ‘60s, Schillebeeckx further developed his reflections on the 
theological significance of atheism.
556
 In what follows, I will explain his engagement with 
                                                 
552
 Edward Schillebeeckx, “Theologische reflexie op godsdienstsociologische duidingen in verband 
met het hedendaagse ongeloof,” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 2 (1962): 69-70. This association of 
atheism with social coercion had already been present in Schillebeeckx, “Op zoek naar Gods 
afwezigheid,” Kultuurleven 24 (1957): 283. 
553
 Schillebeeckx, “Op zoek naar Gods afwezigheid,” Kultuurleven 24 (1957): 283. In the early ‘60s, 
Schillebeeckx further elaborates that sociology can help theology understand the conditions of human 
freedom in a society, which is theologically important in relation to the necessarily free acceptance of 
the gospel (Schillebeeckx, “Theologische reflexie op godsdienstsociologische duidingen in verband 
met het hedendaagse ongeloof,” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 2 (1962): 70; 75).  
554
 Schillebeeckx, “Op zoek naar Gods afwezigheid,” Kultuurleven 24 (1957): 283. 
555
 Schillebeeckx, “Op zoek naar Gods afwezigheid,” Kultuurleven 24 (1957): 283. 
556
 Schillebeeckx, “Op zoek naar Gods afwezigheid,” Kultuurleven 24 (1957): 276-291; Edward 
Schillebeeckx, “De betekenis van het niet-godsdienstige humanisme voor het hedendaagse 
katholicisme,” in Modern nietgodsdienstig humanisme, ed. W. Engelen (Nijmegen, Utrecht 1961), 74-
112; Edward Schillebeeckx, “Herinterpretatie van het geloof in het licht van de seculariteit. Honest to 
Robinson,” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 4 (1964): 109-150; Edward Schillebeeckx, “De ascese van het 
zoeken naar God,” Tijdschrift voor Geestelijk Leven 20 (1964): 149-158; Edward Schillebeeckx, “Het 
leed der ervaring van Gods verborgenheid,” Vox Theologica 36 (1966): 92-104; Edward 
Schillebeeckx, “Christelijk geloof en aardse toekomstverwachtingen,” in De kerk in de wereld van 
deze tijd. Schema dertien. Tekst en commentaar [Vaticanum II, 2] (Hilversum, Antwerpen 1967), 78-
109; Edward Schillebeeckx, “Het nieuwe Godsbeeld, secularisatie en politiek,” Tijdschrift voor 
Theologie 8 (1968): 44-65; Edward Schillebeeckx, “Het Evangelie als appél in onze geseculariseerde 
wereld (1),” in Het Evangelie als appél [Groepsgesprek van de religieuzen; 28] (Mechelen [1969]), 5-
17. His volume God and Man was praised at the time for providing an ‘enlightening view [...] to the 
problems of secularity’ (R. R. Masterson, review of God and Man, by Edward Schillebeeckx, The 
Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 34.1 (1970): 133). 
111 
 
 
atheism in this period in reference to Schillebeeckx’s statement that in the ‘60s, Christianity 
underwent a greater crisis than ever before.
557
 Acknowledging this crisis, Schillebeeckx 
rejects any alarmism and argues that, although society will not automatically move in the right 
direction, theologians should trust that throughout the ages, some theologians have fallen prey 
to a crisis of faith, whereas others guided the Christian faith safely through it. Schillebeeckx 
then calls on Christian theologians to embrace a ‘realistic grace optimism’.558 Reiterating his 
previous argument, Schillebeeckx still contends that Christians should trust that those who 
have left the church in order to follow an integral humanism may not find God, but that God 
will always find them. He argues that atheist reactions against Christianity can be remedies 
for the Christian faith if Christians continue to listen to God’s revelation in the Bible and in 
contemporary reality. In what follows, I will explain Schillebeeckx’s approach to atheism in 
the ‘60s in relation to his attempt to guide the church through its crisis. This will show how 
Schillebeeckx’s grace optimism enabled him to criticise what he perceived of as being 
problematic about atheism and to still receive atheism as a welcome incentive for the church’s 
redirection towards grace.  
 In 1962, discussing the theological significance of sociology, Schillebeeckx argues 
that what sociologists term ‘church decline’ can be theologically understood as a cleansing of 
the church.
559
 The church is now presented with the opportunity to appear less as an 
institution of dominating power and more as an attractive place in the midst of this world.
560
 
At the same time, Schillebeeckx interprets church decline as being indicative of his culture’s 
maturing to a greater trust in the universal immanence of God’s grace.561 Combining both 
aspects, Schillebeeckx interprets contemporary church decline as the negative preparation for 
a renewed sacramental appearance of the church. Again this is indicative of an optimism 
regarding the future, and a rather bleak assessment of the church’s present state.  
 Schillebeeckx then reiterates his earlier contention that those who leave the church 
should not be regarded as sinful. Now he even argues that, to the contrary, Christians are 
sinful if they fail to change their apostleship and pastoral care in faithfulness to God and in 
accordance to the new economic and social situation.
562
 He interprets the contemporary 
situation as one in which people have discovered their full humanity. And yet, Schillebeeckx 
refrains from affirming atheism on the whole, but instead retains a critical distance therefrom. 
He argues that contemporary atheists, for a certain time, erroneously think that God is not 
greater than humanity and, therefore, assume that human beings can be satisfied within the 
immanent sphere. He understands this attitude as being marked by a sinful weakness. 
Nevertheless, he is quick to highlight that this sinful weakness is not able to undo the grace 
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which is operative in the world as an unconscious desire prior to the reception of the 
sacraments.
563
  
 Arguing that Christians should acknowledge the mundane world from within their 
relationship with God, Schillebeeckx calls on them to respect nature as developing according 
to its own rules, and to take up nature into their dialogue with God.
564
 He stresses that, in 
being lifted up towards God, nature remains integral. Immanent values, such as humanisation 
are evaluated as good, and Christians are called to collaborate with non-Christians for the 
further realisation of these values.
565
 Overall, this suggests that Schillebeeckx is convinced 
that allowing atheism to develop its full potential would help to overcome both the 
shortcomings of atheism and the sinfulness of the present church. 
 In 1965, in this vein, Schillebeeckx understands the Anglican bishop John A. 
Robinson’s (a)theology as an incentive to renew Christian theology.566 He regards atheism as 
revelatory of a partial truth, which had remained hidden in Christendom.
567
 Schillebeeckx 
then reconnects this partial truth to the affirmation of God in order to render it more 
dynamic.
568
 At this time, Schillebeeckx conceives of the relation between atheism and 
Christianity in terms of the former as providing positive images of God, and the latter as 
correctly directing these images towards God.
569
 The structure is still that of Christian 
theology perfecting atheism’s already good aspiration for grace. Schillebeeckx could be 
interpreted, at this point, as seeking how atheism is able to restore the sinful theological 
vision. 
 Around the same time, Schillebeeckx more negatively judges some variants of atheism 
as ideological interpretations of secularisation.
570
 To counter this ideology, Schillebeeckx 
seeks to show that secularisation could also be understood from within Christianity. Taking 
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the atheist interpretation of the world seriously, Schillebeeckx claims that Christian 
theologians must show that the secular existence itself contains elements that point to an 
absolute mystery. Developing this thought a bit further, in 1969, Schillebeeckx wants to 
present Christian theology as a humanly meaningful interpretation of reality.
571
 The way in 
which Schillebeeckx seeks to counter ideological variants of atheism, then, still reflects his 
early distinction between atheism and Christianity along the lines of pessimism and optimism. 
He argues that, as much as Christians can be with atheists in this world, Christians cannot 
accept the latter’s interpretation of the world as unredeemed and their understanding of life as 
directed towards death.
572
 In contrast to this interpretation, Christian life must always be a 
saving presence in and with the living God. This does not undo the misery which gave rise to 
the atheistic pessimism, but it shows that pessimism is not the only self-evident conclusion to 
be drawn from this misery.
573
 
 Overall, and throughout the ‘60s, Schillebeeckx’s interpretation of atheism still 
followed the structure of detecting atheism’s aspiration for grace and theology’s completion 
of this aspiration. It is striking, however, that for Schillebeeckx, interpreting atheism as 
aspiration does not lead him to focus primarily upon that which atheism is lacking, but on that 
which is already good. Even in treating atheism as one ideological whole, Schillebeeckx 
argues that each element within atheism can be redeemed from this ideology by taking it up 
into the church’s lived communion with God. This communion with God is not to replace that 
which it has taken up, but to appreciate it in its integrity. This reception of atheism, then, still 
accords with Schillebeeckx’s early distinction between atheists being entangled in sinful 
social structures that restrict their freedom, and God’s grace as being stronger than these 
sinful social structures in the sense that grace can still move individual atheists in a good 
direction. In accordance with this distinction, atheists could not be converted to Christianity 
by subverting the ideological social order at once, because this move would neglect the grace 
which is mediated in this social order despite its sinfulness. Instead, Schillebeeckx suggests 
that we ought to discern how the individual elements of existence in this sinful social order 
still mediate God’s grace. Moreover, theologians have to attend to atheism’s good aspiration 
for grace in order to restore the shortcomings of their own theological vision. Once repaired, 
this theological vision could then still be advocated, as being the best framework for the entire 
social order. 
 
c) Late career: The political relevance of theology’s realistic grace optimism 
 
 Reflections about the relation between Christianity, secularisation, and atheism remain 
of great concern for Schillebeeckx, even in the ‘70s.574 During this time, Schillebeeckx begins 
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to engage with atheist ideology critiques
575
, and thinks increasingly about Christianity’s 
political engagement in society.
576
 At the same time, Schillebeeckx devotes focused attention 
to Christology.
577
 It is in this period that Schillebeeckx commences to acknowledge the 
impairment of his own theological vision due to sin. 
 In the ‘70s, Schillebeeckx relates his earlier insight that atheism reveals to Christian 
theology a heightened trust in the immanence of God’s grace to the domain of politics.578 He 
interprets this atheist insight now as a stimulus for an increased ecclesial socio-political 
engagement for the wellbeing of all of humankind now and in the future. Important for our 
discussion here, concerning theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies, 
Schillebeeckx now argues that theology is no longer the queen of the sciences, but that, by 
acknowledging the autonomy of the natural sciences, theology has become a political 
science.
579
 Other sciences must inform the theological understanding of the Christian faith 
and, thus, be regarded as sources of theology. Conversely, theology must be critical regarding 
any scientific reductive understanding of reality. Since the immanent world is regarded as 
being the constitutive symbol of God’s real presence, the political engagement for the 
wholeness of the world is at once a mediation of grace and an advance of realised salvation.
580
 
In disagreement with the atheist denial of God, Schillebeeckx then argues for a combination 
of prayer and politics.
581
 The prayerful acknowledgment of God’s excessive gift of grace, 
which cannot be exhausted by the human response, should help Christians to begin always 
anew, despite any human failures.
582
 It seems that, at this later stage of his career, 
Schillebeeckx still relies on his early distinction between atheism as a pessimistic and 
                                                                                                                                                        
geloofsmogelijkheden,” Verbum 46 (1979): 14-29; Edward Schillebeeckx, “Wezen en grenzen van het 
christendom,” De Vrij-Katholiek 54 (1979): 8-9. 
575
 Edward Schillebeeckx, “Kritische theorie en theologische hermeneutiek: confrontatie,” Tijdschrift 
voor Theologie 11 (1971): 113-139; Edward Schillebeeckx, “Naar een verruiming van de 
hermeneutiek: de `nieuwe kritische theorie’,” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 11 (1971): 30-50; Edward 
Schillebeeckx, “Kritische theorieën en politiek engagement van de christelijke gemeente,” Concilium 
9 (1973): 47-61. 
576
 Edward Schillebeeckx, “The Christian and Political Engagement,” Doctrine and Life 22 (1972): 
118-127; Edward Schillebeeckx, “Stilte, gevuld met parables,” in Politiek of Mystiek? Peilingen naar 
de verhouding tussen religieuze ervaring en sociale inzet ([Utrecht, Brugge] 1972), 69-81; Edward 
Schillebeeckx, “Mysterie van ongerechtigheid en mysterie van erbarmen,” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 
15 (1975): 3-24. 
577
 Edward Schillebeeckx, “Ons heil: Jezus’ leven of Christus de verrezene,” Tijdschrift voor 
Theologie 13 (1973): 145-165; Edward Schillebeeckx, “De vrije mens Jezus en zijn conflict,” TGL 29 
(1973): 145-155; Edward Schillebeeckx, Jezus, Het verhaal van een levende (1974), Edward 
Schillebeeckx, “De `God van Jezus’ en de `Jezus van God’,” Concilium 10 (1974): 100-115; Edward 
Schillebeeckx, “De vraag naar de universaliteit van Jezus,” in De vraag naar de universaliteit van 
Jezus. Openingswoord en inleidingen gehouden voor het congres van de Werkgroep voor Moderne 
Theologie op 20 oktober 1975 te Utrecht (Utrecht 1975), 15-26; Edward Schillebeeckx, “Jezus en de 
menselijke levensmislukking,” Concilium 12 (1976): 86-96; Edward Schillebeeckx, Gerechtigheid en 
liefde : genade en bevrijding (1977); Edward Schillebeeckx, “Waarom Jezus de Christus?,” TGL 33 
(1977): 338-353; Edward Schillebeeckx, “Op weg naar een christologie,” Tijdschrift voor Theologie 
18 (1978): 131-156; Edward Schillebeeckx, “Jezus voor wie vandaag gelooft,” Kultuurleven 46 
(1979): 887-901. 
578
 Schillebeeckx, “Stilte, gevuld met parables,” in Politiek of Mystiek, 71-72. 
579
 Schillebeeckx, “The Critical Status of Theology,” World Congress ‘The Future of the Church’, 
Brussels Sept 12-17 1970. 
580
 Schillebeeckx, “Stilte, gevuld met parables,” in Politiek of Mystiek, 72; 75. 
581
 Schillebeeckx, “Stilte, gevuld met parables,” in Politiek of Mystiek, 72. 
582
 Schillebeeckx, “Stilte, gevuld met parables,” in Politiek of Mystiek, 74; 78. 
115 
 
 
Christianity as an optimistic understanding of reality; he is still presenting Christianity’s 
political role in terms of a continuous motivator for further political engagement, also in the 
face of failure.  
 Schillebeeckx’s move, to position theology as one science amongst others, is further 
clarified in 1973 when he distinguishes between a crisis of the language of faith and a crisis of 
faith. He asserts that there is a crisis of the contemporary language of faith, which he 
evaluates positively.
583
 This crisis has been initiated through theology’s forgetfulness that 
scientific and religious language both refer to the same reality of the coming of God’s 
Kingdom.
584
 According to Schillebeeckx, this crisis of the language of faith should vitalise the 
Christian faith through remembering again that the difficulty in finding the right language to 
express the reality of Christ is constitutive of the Christian faith. Schillebeeckx stresses that 
there is no guarantee that Christian theology will succeed in experimenting with this 
difficulty.
585
 And yet, the risk can be taken in faithful trust in the Holy Spirit’s guidance of 
Christian congregations, which allows theologians to be mistaken at times.
586
  
 Schillebeeckx assumes that there is an evocative surplus in the language of the 
surrounding culture, and the language of faith is meant to express that which remains implicit 
in all other languages.
587
 In this way, Christian theology is but one science amongst others, 
but it is also holistic, given that it assembles what all the other sciences express about the 
arrival of God’s Kingdom. It is noteworthy that, at this point, Schillebeeckx introduces a 
distinction between theology’s confession of Christ, as fulfilment of all cultural expectations, 
and theology’s inability to mediate this fulfilment. Theology names the surrounding society’s 
aspiration for grace in such a way that the fulfilment by Christ remains extrinsic to theology’s 
own utterance.
588
  
 Also throughout the ‘80s, Schillebeeckx devoted a great deal of thought to the relation 
between Christianity and the surrounding society.
589
 Elaborating further on his earlier 
understanding of history as the medium of God’s dialogue with humankind, Schillebeeckx 
now develops his earlier apophatic emphasis on God’s hiddenness.590 Schillebeeckx now 
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argues that, in order to fulfil theology’s prophetic task, Christian theologians must listen to the 
foreign prophecy with which the world confronts it.
591
 Combining this with an apophatic 
stress of God’s hiddenness, Schillebeeckx claims that this foreign prophecy must partly be 
discerned not in positive images, but in negative contrast experiences. In these, people 
experience the absence of what should be, followed by a multitude of different, equally 
legitimate positive projects that are all aimed at overcoming the negative contrast.
592
 The 
theological task is, then, to discern with society the best project in each particular situation.
593
 
 This already sets the path for Schillebeeckx’s most explicit discussion of the question 
about theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies in 1986, when he rejects any 
Christian exclusivism or imperialism as antithetical to the gospel.
594
 Although he maintains 
that theology’s support of people’s lived experience with God belongs to the most ultimate 
inspirations of humanism, Schillebeeckx refrains from advocating a central role for Christian 
theology in the determination of the social order.
595
 At this point in his career, Schillebeeckx 
interprets the true humanity of Jesus Christ to be both revealing and concealing God, which is 
why Christians cannot claim that Christ is the only path to God.
596
 Schillebeeckx fears that 
interpreting Christ as the sole path to God would conflict with his observation of atheists who 
are engaged in the struggle for a more humane future.
597
 Consequently, Christians can no 
longer claim that solely their faith in God’s self-revelation in Christ indicates the way to a 
better future.  
 Altogether, this brief outline of the development of Schillebeeckx’s interpretation of 
atheism throughout his career shows that he has continued to focus on the grace that is 
mediated by atheist positions, despite the latter’s overall reductive understanding of reality. 
This is connected to the ‘realistic grace optimism’ that is characteristic of his entire oeuvre, 
and his understanding of atheism as an equally legitimate pessimistic interpretation of reality. 
Until the 70’s, Schillebeeckx still presented Christian theology as the fulfilment of atheism’s 
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aspiration for grace, with a focus on that which is good about this aspiration, not on the lack it 
expresses. Nevertheless, Schillebeeckx stated explicitly that atheist solutions to societal 
problems are to be seen as on the same level as theological ones only at the end of his 
career.
598
 He explicitly refrained from presenting Christian theology as a solution to societal 
problems, and advocated Christian theology as one conversation partner amongst others in 
common political projects of positively overcoming evil and suffering. He now wanted 
theology to express society’s aspiration for grace, while distancing himself from promising 
that theology itself could fulfil these aspirations. From one side, this can still be interpreted as 
being in line with Schillebeeckx’s grace optimism: God’s offer of grace is too abundant to be 
expressed by Christian theology alone. From the other side, however, I argue in both this 
chapter and the next that the particular grace mediated in Schillebeeckx’s increasingly atheist 
context revealed to him the impairment of the theological vision through sin; an impairment 
which should be acknowledged by Christian theologians in order to guide Christian theology 
safely through its crisis and to restore the theological vision eventually. This is why, towards 
the end of his career, Schillebeeckx wrote that Christian theology must express the divine 
reality, but in a ‘stammering’ way.599  
 
4.2 A naively optimistic interpretation of atheism?  
 
 In order to advance my argument that Schillebeeckx’s theology of grace is valuable for 
contemporary public theology, it should first be mentioned that Schillebeeckx’s reconciliatory 
stance towards atheism has been criticised for not only being naively optimistic, and 
insufficiently critical, but also for exhibiting an erroneous understanding of grace. Contrary to 
this criticism, this chapter’s purpose is to argue that Schillebeeckx’s attitude towards atheism 
was undergirded by one consistent understanding of grace, in terms of God’s merciful 
forgiveness, an understanding of grace which I claim should be revitalised for answering the 
question concerning contemporary theology’s contributions to political discussions in post-
Christendom societies. 
 After explaining the criticism voiced against Schillebeeckx in greater detail, I will 
relate this criticism to the nearly unanimous scholarly agreement that Schillebeeckx’s positive 
attitude to non-Christian positions is related to his theology of creation, in the sense that 
God’s creative grace can be trusted to be present throughout the entire society. I will argue 
that, if this was true, then Schillebeeckx’s critics would be justified in their opinion that he is 
naively optimistic with regards to atheism.
600
 Contrary to both, Schillebeeckx’s critics as well 
as those who appreciate his theology of creation, I will argue that Schillebeeckx’s theology of 
redemption undergirds both his understanding of grace as well as his positive attitude towards 
atheism. The difference being that, grounded in a theology of redemption, Schillebeeckx does 
not neglect the sinfulness of humankind, including atheists. Instead, he operates with a 
particular understanding of how the world’s sinfulness is overcome in Christ. The Christian 
Resurrection faith, in the superior power of God’s forgiveness over human sin, also 
determines Schillebeeckx’s understanding of how societal problems are being solved.  
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a) Objection to Schillebeeckx’s naive optimism: Naturalising grace 
 
 Schillebeeckx’s interpretation of atheism must be understood as being broadly situated 
within the context of discussions about the risks of naturalising grace that surrounded the 
Second Vatican Council. This is of particular interest for this dissertation insofar as John 
Milbank, building upon Henri de Lubac’s theology, accuses more liberal601 theologians of 
naturalising the supernatural.
602
 Naturalising the supernatural means that the secular world is 
regarded as a self-sufficient realm that can be immanently explained, and faith in God is 
understood as a super-addition, acceptable only by way of a fideistic leap. This idea of a 
natural order with its own natural end, independent of grace, is regarded not only as being 
unorthodox, but also as objectionable for political reasons.
603
 If such an integral natural order 
is affirmed, then atheism is legitimised as the most coherent understanding of immanent 
reality to which Christianity is merely a superfluous addition.
604
 This would mean accepting 
the secularist worldview as a neutral fundament upon which Christian theology can build, and 
the Christian faith could no longer be legitimately appealed to as a critical corrective to 
secular politics. De Lubac consequently upholds that nature’s aspiration for grace cannot be 
fulfilled without the help of Christian theology.
605
 The non-Christian world is understood only 
as ‘receptive readiness’ to be fulfilled in Christ.606 This means that Christian theology must 
attend to extra-ecclesial developments, but the focus of this attention is never on the world in 
its own right. Instead, it must be detected how precisely the world prepares itself for the 
reception of its fulfilment in Christ.
607
 It is noteworthy that, in the Radical Orthodox 
elaborations of this position at least, the perfection of nature by grace is equated with the 
perfection of non-Christian philosophies and politics by Christian theology.
608
 
 Also Schillebeeckx has been criticised for erroneously naturalising the Christian 
faith.
609
 Objections have been raised regarding Schillebeeckx’s assumption that the secular 
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realm is sanctified by divine grace without the help of the church, and that Christian 
theologians merely have to point to this extra-ecclesial grace.
610
 Schillebeeckx is accused of 
being too optimistic regarding developments in the extra-ecclesial public.
611
 However, this 
criticism is reductive insofar as Schillebeeckx’s optimism, concerning the all-pervading 
presence of grace in the extra-ecclesial realm, is not discussed theologically. Instead, 
Schillebeeckx’s acknowledgement of non-Christian mediations of grace is simply being 
discarded as ‘inclusive formula[s] [...,] simple cliché[s] or [...] a program of secularistic 
ideology’.612 
 In this chapter, I will defend Schillebeeckx’s position against his critics by way of 
explaining the relation between his theology of grace and his optimism regarding atheism. My 
argument follows more observant critics whose research suggests that Schillebeeckx is as 
adamant in interpreting nature only in its relation to grace as de Lubac is.
613
 On this basis, it 
appears that Schillebeeckx’s critics misidentify the point of disagreement between their own 
and Schillebeeckx’s understandings of the relation between Christian theology and non-
Christian understandings of the world. The disagreement does not concern the relation 
between nature and grace so much as it does concern the role of Christian theology in 
fulfilling nature’s aspiration for grace. Not unlike de Lubac, Schillebeeckx also characterises 
nature most fundamentally as an aspiration for grace, as has already become apparent in my 
above exposition of Schillebeeckx’s interpretation of atheism.614 However, Schillebeeckx is 
more hesitant to claim that the balance between the fulfilment and the postponement of this 
fundamental human aspiration for grace is best struck by Christian theology. Most 
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fundamentally, Christian theology must also be regarded as an aspiration for grace, on the 
same level with non-Christian positions.
615
  
 Before I explain Schillebeeckx’s understanding of redemptive grace, I argue in what 
follows that the above criticism is related, and justified, with reference to interpretations 
which link Schillebeeckx’s understanding of grace to his theology of creation. This link 
would indeed render Schillebeeckx’s theology unjustifiably optimistic at the expense of duly 
acknowledging atheism’s sinful imperfections.  
 
b) Reconsidering common interpretations of Schillebeeckx’s theology: Contesting the 
centrality of creation 
 
 At first glance, my claim that Schillebeeckx’s assessment of atheism is based on his 
theology of grace accords with the observation that ‘[t]he strong accent on grace -- the 
presence and power among us -- has characterized Schillebeeckx’s theological project from 
its beginning. The creator God “bent towards humanity” has promised to be with us always -- 
even to the end of the world’.616 In this vein, it has been suggested that Schillebeeckx’s 
treatment of creation and grace could be taken up by future scholars in order to further 
contemporary discussions about a faithful collaboration between Christianity and secular 
culture.
617
  
 Contrary to this suggestion, however, instead of stressing the influence of 
Schillebeeckx’s theology of creation on his engagement with non-Christian positions, I argue 
that his theology of redemption is more decisive for his optimism concerning atheist 
mediations of grace.
618
 Highlighting the import of redemption, rather than creation, on his 
theology of grace is crucial because it means that Schillebeeckx’s optimism concerning non-
Christian positions is not based on an overestimation of human nature. Instead, I will show in 
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the course of this chapter that, considering the Fall and human sinfulness, Schillebeeckx 
works with a particularly pessimistic anthropology.
619
 By pessimistic anthropology I mean 
that Schillebeeckx has little trust in the success of human efforts, and continues to 
acknowledge the probable failure of all human projects. Yet, at the same time, he maintains 
the ‘realistic grace optimism’ alluded to in the above historical outline of Schillebeeckx’s 
interpretation of atheism. Combining his grace optimism and his pessimistic anthropology, 
Schillebeeckx’s theological reception of non-Christian insights reflects his conviction that ‘it 
is precisely this sinful world which is an object of God’s mercy’,620 and in order to overcome 
contemporary societal, as well as ecclesial problems, Schillebeeckx searches for mediations of 
this mercy in his context. 
 That Schillebeeckx calls his grace optimism realistic can be explained with reference 
to his emphasis on the mediated character of grace. He stresses throughout that grace can be 
known from human experience in the world, in this way countering idealistic understandings 
of grace. Schillebeeckx calls grace an experience of the totality of reality that cannot be 
entirely conceptualised.
621
 ‘In our human experiences we can experience something that 
transcends our experience and proclaims itself in that experience as unexpected grace’.622 
Schillebeeckx defines grace as the surplus of reality, the abundant positivity of reality.
623
 
Grace is the all-encompassing reality in which all natural positivity participates. However, 
grace cannot be reduced to the sum-total of all natural positivity. Instead, grace can be 
identified at the point at which all natural positivity merges into mystery.
624
 In other words, 
the positivity of nature itself suggests that there is more than this natural positivity. This 
affirmation of more than natural positivity is what Christians call grace. In this sense, it can be 
known from human experiences of nature that grace transcends nature. In my subsequent 
presentation of Schillebeeckx’s Christology, I will clarify that this experience of reality, 
which Christians call grace, is a post-Resurrection experience of the world as redeemed.
625
 It 
is not the only self-evident experience of nature, but once nature is interpreted through a 
hermeneutic of redemption, Christian theologians can explain how nature is experienced as 
being graced. Before I demonstrate in greater detail that Schillebeeckx’s focus on Christ’s 
Resurrection builds the basis for his association of grace with redemption, more than with 
creation, I will first explain what I mean by Schillebeeckx’s combination of a grace optimism 
with a pessimistic anthropology. 
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c) Grace optimism and pessimistic anthropology: The centrality of redemption 
 
 Towards the end of his study of the biblical understandings of grace, Schillebeeckx 
summarises that all gospels ‘testify at the same time both to the depth of human failure in a 
world of finite and sinful men [sic], and to the depth of the triumphant mercy of God in a 
human world which in the last resort is experienced as “God’s world”‘.626 Schillebeeckx even 
interprets the only unforgiveable sin against the Holy Spirit as the deliberate rejection of ‘the 
principle of God’s mercy in Jesus’.627 In a similar vein, Schillebeeckx repeatedly stresses the 
fundamentally undeserved character of grace.
628
 A Christian understanding of grace always 
already includes God’s forgiveness of human sin.629 This indicates that, similar to Kathryn 
Tanner, Schillebeeckx understands grace not primarily as a reality within human nature but as 
the natural environment in which humankind always already exists.
630
 Schillebeeckx affirms a 
grace optimism inasmuch as God’s faithful bestowal of grace can be trusted, as well as a 
pessimistic anthropology insofar as this grace is unmerited by humans. This grace optimism is 
ontological, given that the superior power of all goodness and justice over all evil and 
injustice is acknowledged.
631
 Schillebeeckx calls this grace optimism ‘the mother of all 
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 Schillebeeckx, Christ, 626 [637]. In another place, Schillebeeckx explains that reality is always 
already graced and redeemed, and sin is the human rejection of their dependence on that reality 
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629
 Schillebeeckx, Christ, 76-77; 84; 627 [87-88; 96; 637]. 
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attachment to earthly possessions might inhibit a person’s appreciation of God’s trustworthiness 
(Edward Schillebeeckx, Jesus: An Experiment in Christology, trans. John Bowden, CW vol. 6 (London 
et al.: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 122-123 [142-144]).  
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 Schillebeeckx argues that ‘[i]n Christ, God assures that everything will ultimately be good for those 
who love him’ (Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament, 156 [266-268]); he speaks of ‘the superiority of 
all justice and goodness to injustice’ as ‘the experience of the absolute presence of God’s pure 
positivity in the historical mixture of meaning and meaninglessness’ (Schillebeeckx, Church, 94-95 
[96-98]), of an ‘eternal difference between good and evil’ (136 [138]), of ascribing ‘pure positiveness 
[sic] to God’, and refers to God’s essence in terms of ‘a promoter of the good and an opponent of all 
evil, injustice and suffering’ (Schillebeeckx, Interim Report, 105 [119-120]); he speaks of God’s 
refusal ‘to acknowledge the superior strength of evil and so with his own divine being stand[ing] 
surety for the defeat of evil in all its forms’ (Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 155 [178]); explaining the Old 
Testament term hesed, Schillebeeckx explains God’s relation to humankind as one not only of good 
will but of ‘generosity, overwhelming, unexpected kindness which is forgetful of itself, completely 
open and ready for “the other”‘ (Schillebeeckx, Christ, 83 [94]); with regard to belief in the anti-
Christ, Schillebeeckx explains that Christians must acknowledge evil as a power whilst affirming that 
the power of grace in Christ has the last word (Schillebeeckx, Christ, 570-571 [579-580]); he explains 
the Christian understanding of election as based on the conviction that ‘[l]ife is directed by God in 
freedom and goodness’, and that God’s love ‘turns all things to good for those who love God’. 
Christians affirm the ‘fundamental goodness of God’s purposes with man [sic]’ and ‘the ultimate 
123 
 
 
Christianity’.632 By a pessimistic anthropology, I mean that, in accordance with an 
Augustinian understanding of evil as privation, Schillebeeckx distinguishes between all 
goodness as deriving from God and as, therefore, ultimately lasting, and all evil as deriving 
from human sin.
633
 Human sin is the reason why history is a mixture of good and evil. As a 
combination of both an optimistic theology and a pessimistic anthropology, the superior 
power of grace is identified as God’s mercy at the heart of reality.634  
 Explaining Schillebeeckx’s aforementioned trust that, despite their entanglement in 
sinful social structures, individuals can be moved by God’s grace, Schillebeeckx’s pessimistic 
anthropology does not prevent him from being optimistic regarding the human ability to 
continuously respond to God’s grace. He still regards every human being as being 
intrinsically inclined towards grace.
635
 However, this is not so much due to any optimism 
concerning human nature, but is rather to do with Schillebeeckx’s understanding of grace in 
terms of mercy. Due to God’s merciful grace, human beings participate in God irrespective of 
their sinfulness.
636
 That God’s grace is most fundamental means that it is always at people’s 
disposal, even despite any human rejection of this grace.
637
 The boundary between God and 
humankind is entirely on the human side.
638
 ‘The rejection of the merciful love of God is the 
only barrier which can be thrown up against mercy’.639 God’s merciful acceptance of people, 
despite their sinfulness, means that reality is not only good in terms of an unaffected stability. 
Schillebeeckx not only refers to the superior power of the good over evil, but he also claims 
that from a Christian perspective the whole of reality is concerned with human salvation.
640
 
‘Wherever we turn, God’s grace is always there ahead of us. His face confronts us in 
everything’.641 In other words, to attribute the origin of goodness to the merciful God means 
                                                                                                                                                        
meaning of human life’ (Schillebeeckx, Christ, 625 [635]); he furthermore explains that this promise 
‘enables, allows and obliges us to give wellbeing and goodness the final say in a way that is grounded 
in Jesus, because the Father is greater than all suffering and greater than our inability to experience 
ultimate reality as a trustworthy gift’ (Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 586 [625]); he explains that this hope for 
the future is based upon God’s faithfulness who provides ‘certainty about the goodness of the plan of 
creation which is both the beginning and the eschaton [...]. It is “very good” (Gen. 1:31)’ 
(Schillebeeckx, “The Interpretation of the Future,” The Understanding of Faith: Interpretation and 
Criticism, trans. N.D. Smith, CW vol. 5 (London et al.: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 7 [7-8]). 
632
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Christianity is that ‘[h]uman history - with its successes, fiascos, illusions and disillusions - is 
transcended by the living God’. 
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[727]). For a discussion of the Thomist roots of Schillebeeckx’s understanding of evil as privation see 
Kathleen McManus, “Suffering in the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx,” Theological Studies 60 
(1999): 481-482. 
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that there is an active relating of graced reality towards humanity. God as pure positivity
642
 
actively bends towards humankind and, in this way, draws humankind into the goodness of 
reality. It is this emphasis on God’s mercy which allows Schillebeeckx, despite his pessimistic 
anthropology, to conceive of a fundamental human readiness to respond to the graced reality 
which surrounds them.
643
  
 Before I explain the political implications of this theology of mercy, I will first 
examine the way in which Schillebeeckx’s grace optimism and his pessimistic anthropology 
are connected to his Christology. This will not only clarify the issue at hand, but will also 
show the importance of the mediated character of grace characteristic for Schillebeeckx’s 
theology. As such, my examination is not only aimed at defeating the criticism that 
Schillebeeckx’s interpretation of atheism is naively optimistic, but also at distancing his 
position from the principled rejection of Christendom advanced by Yoder. Moreover, the last 
part of my exposition of Schillebeeckx’s Christology is, then, a critique of both public 
theology’s and Radical Orthodoxy’s apologetic defences of Christian theological 
contributions to political debates in post-Christendom societies.  
 
§ 2 Schillebeeckx’s Resurrection Christology 
 
 Some of the most prominent interpreters of Schillebeeckx’s theology relate his 
optimism regarding atheism to his understanding of creation. Christians must attend to the 
secular world because the Creator God is salvifically present in all of history.
644
 However, my 
argument in this chapter suggests that Schillebeeckx’s optimism concerning atheism is based 
on his understanding of redemption, and includes a particular understanding of how human 
sinfulness is overcome by Christ. In the following, I substantiate this claim by showing that 
Schillebeeckx’s interpretation of the Cross is the basis for his pessimistic anthropology, and 
that his grace optimism is related to Christ’s Resurrection. In my exposition of 
Schillebeeckx’s Christology, I follow his claim that faith in the Resurrection entails three 
affirmations: First, that of a new creation in which evil is definitely overcome; second, the 
approval of Jesus as a concrete and unique person and third, that the church has been founded 
by Christ.
645
 My explanation of the first implication serves to elucidate further the 
Christological underpinnings of Schillebeeckx’s realistic grace optimism, the second 
implication is related to Schillebeeckx’s emphasis on the mediated character of grace and the 
third implication is important regarding the question of apologetic defences of Christian 
theological involvement in secular politics. 
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4.3 The definite overcoming of evil: Combining a grace optimism with a pessimistic 
anthropology  
 
 This part of the chapter serves to show how Schillebeeckx’s grace optimism and his 
pessimistic anthropology are not related to his theology of creation, but instead to his theology 
of redemption. First, I argue that Schillebeeckx’s pessimistic anthropology is related to 
Christ’s crucifixion by sinful humankind, in order to then explain Schillebeeckx’s grace 
optimism in relation to Christ’s Resurrection, and to conclude by showing how 
Schillebeeckx’s understanding of the Incarnation is related to the Resurrection, thus stressing 
not only the continuity but also the discontinuity of Christ’s redemptive grace with creation.  
 
a) Cross: Human sin against God’s grace 
 
 My explanation of Schillebeeckx’s interpretation of Christ’s crucifixion serves to 
elucidate the way in which his grace optimism is connected to what I have termed a 
pessimistic anthropology. Most fundamentally, understanding the Resurrection as ‘God’s 
overwhelming power over evil’,646 Schillebeeckx argues that the significance of the 
Resurrection can only be recognised in the light of the seriousness of Christ’s death.647  
 Schillebeeckx understands the crucifixion as definitive rupture between sinful 
humankind and God’s grace.648 Understanding God as pure positivity, Schillebeeckx ascribes 
full responsibility for Jesus’ violent death to humankind.649 Schillebeeckx does not exempt the 
church from humankind’s sinful rejection of Christ, but instead interprets Peter’s denial of 
Jesus as the future church’s abandonment of Christ at the Cross.650 Consequently, at Jesus’ 
crucifixion there is a real break between all of humankind and God. At the crucifixion, there 
is a real lack of grace in humanity, elucidating Schillebeeckx’s pessimistic anthropology. At 
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the moment of the crucifixion, the only human who sides with God’s grace is Jesus, who is at 
this point entirely isolated from the rest of humankind. In other words, Schillebeeckx relates 
Christ’s uniqueness not so much to the Incarnation as to the Cross. 
 As has been stressed repeatedly, it is central to Schillebeeckx’s thought that Jesus had 
not been abandoned by God on the Cross.
651
 The crucifixion reveals that ‘God is also present 
in human life where he is absent from human view’.652 Schillebeeckx interprets God’s silence 
at the Cross as indicative of the way in which love endures all evil.
653
 Obedience to the silent 
God means that Jesus continued to love his fellow humans, leaving it to the reality of love to 
decide upon the future.
654
 In this sense, Jesus’ ‘solidarity with God in an anti-divine situation 
brought us salvation’.655 Jesus was not primarily concerned with the consequences for his own 
life, because of his single-hearted trust in God. Quite the contrary, Jesus’ death revealed that 
his life and message were unconditional.
656
 At the same time, and in sharp contrast to Yoder, 
Schillebeeckx regards the Cross not as a victory, but as a failure, and claims that it is a 
mystery that this historical failure did not erase Jesus’ faith in God.657 ‘Ultimately Jesus’ 
death is a question to God - the God whom Jesus proclaimed’.658 This is why Schillebeeckx 
refrains from setting Jesus’ crucifixion as an ethical example to be followed by all Christians. 
 Consequently, the seriousness of Christ’s crucifixion means that the whole of creation 
could have evaporated into the nothingness from whence it came. The death of the only 
human who consistently aligned himself with God’s grace puts God’s continuous offer of 
grace more into question than anything else ever could.
659
 
 
b) Resurrection: God’s ontological forgiveness 
 
 In the aftermath of the crucifixion there is, then, an absolute separation between 
humankind and God, with the sole exception of Jesus who is reconciled to God.
660
 
Consequently, humankind’s real lack of grace following the crucifixion can only be healed by 
Christ. At this point, Schillebeeckx’s emphasis on divine forgiveness moves to the forefront. 
Schillebeeckx understands the Resurrection as God’s sole initiative of mercy over the entire 
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absurdity and meaninglessness of Christ’s death.661 In the Resurrection, humankind has been 
redeemed by Christ because Christ here forgives sinful humankind.
662
 At this moment, the 
whole of humankind has found mercy before God.
663
 Only in this sense of Christ’s 
forgiveness is it then appropriate to say that, in Christ, humanity has already risen through 
Christ’s suffering to glory with the Father.664 This does not lead Schillebeeckx to affirm some 
mysterious transformation of human nature in any abstract sense. It means that God continues 
to bestow grace onto the world despite human sin, which indicates that Schillebeeckx 
understands God’s mercy as a reality external to humankind.665  
 The Resurrection is, thus, not so much the revelation of God’s creative grace as it is 
the revelation of God’s mercy over the sinful world.666 Yet, at the same time, the Resurrection 
is not a reaction against evil, but it reveals the persistence of goodness despite all evil.
667
 
There is, thus, a continuity of grace in both creation and redemption, but the point is that this 
continuity is no automatism, but that the continuity has been effected by Christ’s gratuitous 
forgiveness of humankind in the Resurrection. 
 In accordance with his pessimistic anthropology, Schillebeeckx calls Christ’s 
forgiveness of humankind in the Resurrection a pure act of God’s grace.668 The Resurrection 
is a revelation that comes from God alone.
669
 It is the event of God being God.
670
 Not even 
Jesus Christ’s humanity is active at this point.671 The human passivity at the Resurrection, 
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stressed by Schillebeeckx, is precisely why the Resurrection has the greatest ontological 
impact.
672
 The Resurrection is not one event in history amongst many, but the most all-
encompassing reality.
673
 The Resurrection is the greatest turning point in history and, as such, 
inaugurates an entirely new situation of the world.
674
 The situation is entirely new, insofar as 
all suffering and evil has definitely been overcome.
675
 And yet, Jesus Christ is the only point 
in which history is already eschatologically completed.
676
 This means that all history can only 
be understood adequately in the light of Jesus Christ.
677
  
 The implications of such a Christocentric interpretation of history are twofold. On the 
one hand, because of God’s mercy, the whole world has already received the promise of its 
final appraisal in Jesus Christ.
678
 This is why Christians can trust in an ultimately good end of 
history, despite all remaining evil.
679
 In this sense, the whole of history is already completed 
in Christ.
680
 On the other hand, a Christocentric interpretation of history also means that 
history carries its own judgment within it: It has already been decided that all goodness will 
persist and that all evil will vanish.
681
 However, the concrete shape of this goodness has not 
yet been determined definitively and is open to historical developments.
682
 In other words, 
history ‘continues as usual’, but the overall reality in which it takes place has changed.683 That 
the concrete shape of the eschaton is still open to developments is related to Schillebeeckx’s 
emphasis of the mediated character of grace, which will be clarified in the subsequent section 
regarding Schillebeeckx’s interpretation of Jesus’ life as anticipation of the Resurrection, as 
well as in 2.4 regarding Schillebeeckx’s understanding of the Resurrection as God’s 
affirmation of the unique person Jesus. 
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c) Incarnation: The ontological significance of Christ’s life 
 
 My argument that Schillebeeckx’s understanding of grace is related to redemption, 
rather than creation, could be questioned by his often-cited presentation of Christ as 
‘concentrated creation’.684 Despite this focus on the Incarnation’s continuity with creation, I 
will expose how Schillebeeckx’s understanding of the Incarnation is connected to the 
Resurrection and, thus, focuses on Christ’s overcoming of the sin of fallen creation.685 At the 
same time, my argument makes evident that far from postulating any naturally self-evident 
interpretation of Christ as grace for the world, Schillebeeckx is concerned with showing how 
Christ can be understood as grace for the world if his life is understood through a hermeneutic 
of the Resurrection. 
Schillebeeckx’s affirmation of the transhistorical nature of the Resurrection explains 
why, in retrospect, Jesus’ whole life can be understood as an anticipation of the 
Resurrection.
686
 Interpreted through Schillebeeckx’s theology of redemption, Jesus’ actions 
are, at the same time, saving actions in this world and eschatological acts that overcome all 
evil definitely.
687
 They are, as such, already the initiation of a new world. In this sense, the 
Resurrection is no superaddition onto Jesus’ earthly life, but the Resurrection is this concrete 
earthly life itself insofar as its positivity persists despite and beyond Jesus’ death.688 Jesus’ 
whole life anticipates the Resurrection in which only grace persists, and his death is only part 
of this life because some still reject this grace.
689
  
 This means that Schillebeeckx’s grace optimism is realistic in the sense of being 
connected to the concrete shape of Jesus’ life. Schillebeeckx argues that traces in Jesus’ life 
must account for any Christian grace optimism.
690
 God must be recognised in the concrete 
humanity of Jesus.
691
 In this context, Schillebeeckx understands Jesus’ life as revelatory of 
God’s being, as pure positivity, insofar as Jesus was never against anything but most 
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fundamentally in support of positive causes.
692
 Schillebeeckx explains his grace optimism in 
relation to Jesus who did nothing but good.
693
 Jesus was positively oriented towards God’s 
saving love, and only secondarily did this imply that he opposed everything that inhibited this 
loving grace from flourishing.
694
 Whereas the eschatological scheme of his day sought to 
transform people’s ethical behaviour through proclaiming God’s final judgment, Jesus 
transformed people’s lives through the proclamation of God’s unconditional love.695 In this 
way, Jesus’ concrete life reveals God as giver of grace towards humanity.696 
 Interpreting Jesus’ life through the perspective of the Resurrection, Schillebeeckx 
holds that the salvific value of the crucifixion also only emerges when Jesus’ death is read in 
the context of his whole life and Resurrection. God, as pure positivity, has been revealed in 
Jesus’ stance towards his approaching crucifixion insofar as he overcame oppression and 
suffering by remaining good.
697
 Schillebeeckx, not unlike Yoder, claims that Jesus was killed 
due to his non-violent subordination to the ruling powers.
698
 Schillebeeckx also argues that 
Jesus freely accepted his death, due to his obedience to God.
699
 However, whereas Yoder 
presents Jesus as faithfully obeying the ethical principle of nonviolence, despite any fatal 
consequences, Schillebeeckx explains Jesus’ obedience to God at the Cross in terms of Jesus’ 
participation in the ontological reality of love. This is important because it explains why 
Schillebeeckx refrains from attributing any redemptive significance to suffering and from 
postulating any ethical duty of furthering Christ’s work of redemption.  
Moreover, due to the cruciformity of grace’s triumph over evil, the Christian faith in 
redemption is neither obvious nor self-evident.
700
 The Cross reveals that redemption cannot 
only be seen where good triumphs over evil, but also where an alignment with evil is 
voluntarily refused.
701
 ‘Christology is God’s presence in this world, but under the sign of 
weakness’.702 Consequently, the understanding of Jesus’ life as mediation of divine grace can 
only be accepted on the basis of ‘a vote of confidence’.703 In other words, the Christian faith 
that grace is mediated in creation does not mean that interpreting reality as graced would be 
the sole self-evident interpretation of reality. 
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 Overall, it has now become clearer why Schillebeeckx’s grace optimism is not naïve. 
He is realistic, regarding human sinfulness, and works with a particular understanding of how 
God’s forgiving grace overcomes this sin. Due to the Cross, Christians must acknowledge 
their own as well other people’s sinfulness, but due to the Resurrection, Christians can trust in 
God’s forgiveness. Schillebeeckx does not present this understanding of reality as a self-
evident implication of Jesus’ earthly life, but he shows how Jesus’ earthly life can be 
understood on the basis of this hermeneutical framework. 
 
4.4 The eternal approval of Jesus as unique person: The mediated character of grace 
 
 The above discussion indicates that, with respect to the Christian faith in the reality of 
redemption, the Resurrection can be understood as God’s eternal act of creative grace on the 
one hand, and as God’s new forgiveness of human sin on the other. Moreover, how Jesus’ 
earthly life can then be interpreted as already an eternally persistent anticipation of the 
Resurrection has been shown. Whereas it could seem as though Schillebeeckx draws on the 
biblical Jesus in order to confirm his already established hermeneutical framework, I will now 
turn to the way in which Schillebeeckx also reversely emphasises the way in which any 
predefined understanding of grace must be modified in accordance with the concrete life of 
Jesus of Nazareth.
704
 This first section of 4.4, thus, serves to elucidate Schillebeeckx’s 
contention that the Christian worldview is not laid out in ideals, but in the concrete person of 
Jesus.
705
 The way will then be paved to understand the crucial role of the mediated character 
of grace in Schillebeeckx’s theology. 
 
a) Understanding grace: The importance of mediation 
 
 His claim that any predefined understanding of grace must be modified in accordance 
with the concrete life of Jesus Christ is connected to Schillebeeckx’s second understanding of 
the Resurrection as an event that was entirely new, regarding the unique person Jesus.
706
 
Christian Resurrection faith implies that, instead of vanishing at his death, Jesus was taken up 
into the persistent reality of redemption.
707
 Again, Schillebeeckx stresses that Jesus did not 
include himself in God’s own life at the Resurrection, but that this inclusion was God’s sole 
initiative.
708
 Jesus’ outward orientation was ‘rewarded’ by God’s legitimatisation of Jesus at 
the Resurrection. 
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 That God was fully incarnate in the concrete man Jesus means that Christian 
knowledge of God must be Christ-shaped.
709
 Jesus’ concrete life determines the Christian 
understanding of God.
710
 Even in the inadequacy of Jesus’ humanity to reveal God’s 
transcendent being and in thus obscuring the immanent Trinity to some extent, Jesus reveals 
the precise measure between God’s transcendence and all immanent mediations of grace.711 
This measure will never be surpassed until the eschaton.
712
 God’s bestowal of grace continues 
to be Christ-shaped.
713
 In this way, the Incarnation can be interpreted as God becoming God 
for humankind in the concrete person Jesus of Nazareth.
714
 Jesus’ life revealed that God is 
gracious towards humankind by nature. Acknowledging God’s changelessness, Schillebeeckx 
then contends that creation is also primarily God’s sharing of God’s goodness with others.715 
In this way, the redemption, effected by Jesus, proceeds from God.
716
 However, this 
redemption then also returns to the glory of God, which means that Schillebeeckx conceives 
of a reciprocal exchange of grace between God and Jesus.
717
 In other words, although grace 
always proceeds from God, the way in which grace is mediated in this world shapes God’s 
own life. 
 This view’s implications can best be seen in reference to the crucifixion. Schillebeeckx 
contends that, at the Cross, it has been revealed that grace overcomes evil through 
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defencelessness.
718
 Jesus’ death reveals the superior power of defencelessness, which disarms 
evil.
719
 In a similar vein, Schillebeeckx also interprets the beatitudes as affirming the ultimate 
power of powerlessness.
720
 Far from rendering this as an ethical principle, however, 
Schillebeeckx’s pessimistic anthropology comes to the fore when he stresses that God alone 
can deliver the world from all remaining suffering and evil.
721
 The point of believing in the 
superior power of defencelessness is, then, not to seek to redeem the world through 
nonviolence, but to trust in the world’s redemption despite all the remaining evil.722 
Altogether, both beatitudes and crucifixion suggest that understanding the world through 
Schillebeeckx’s realistic grace optimism does not imply that one would have to ignore the 
realities of unjust suffering and death.
723
 Instead, the way in which unjust evil and suffering 
has been overcome by Christ is revelatory of what Christians should understand by the term 
grace. This also paves the way for Schillebeeckx’s theological appreciation of grace’s 
mediated character in the contemporary context.  
   
b) Understanding redemption: The importance of contemporary mediations of grace 
 
 In accordance with the transhistorical significance of the Resurrection, Schillebeeckx 
not only understands Jesus’ earthly life, but also all other human acts of genuine goodness, as 
eternally significant anticipations of the Resurrection.
724
 This is why the concrete shape of the 
eschaton has not been defined at the moment of Christ’s Resurrection, but remains open to 
further developments. Consequently, whereas all other theologians introduced thus far have 
explained how the Christian understanding of redemption can serve to solve contemporary 
political problems, Schillebeeckx stresses that any Christian understanding of redemption 
must be informed by contemporary mediations of grace. 
 Stressing the mediated character of grace, and opposing any idealistic understandings 
of redemption, Schillebeeckx claims that Christian theologians are called to express what it 
means that all of reality participates in Christ’s redemption in ever new situations.725 Any 
contemporary articulation of faith in Jesus Christ must be co-determined by people’s relation 
to the ever renewing reality of redemption.
726
 The history of salvation must enter into the 
Christian definition of God.
727
 This means that theologians should ‘collate, seriously and 
responsibly, elements in history which may lead to a new, authentic “disclosure” or source of 
experience’, thereby exposing the ‘unfathomable depths’ in historical events.728 Later 
interpretations of redemption, thus, widen theology’s understanding of the historical Jesus.729 
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In short, the way in which Christ redeems the world right now cannot be known merely 
through studying Christological texts from the past, because God’s new offer of grace, as it is 
mediated in the contemporary context, further shapes the Christian understanding of 
redemption.
730
 
 Whereas all other theologians introduced in this dissertation have laid the focus on 
how Christian theology can actively complete the world’s redemption, Schillebeeckx is the 
first one to say that without first recognising redemption in the contemporary context, 
Christian theologians cannot adequately know what they should be completing. Nevertheless 
highlighting the importance of naming this reality of redemption theologically, Schillebeeckx 
distinguishes between salvation as liberating grace, and revelation as the explicit naming of 
this grace in reference to God.
731
 Salvation is the whole of history, insofar as it derives from 
God, i.e. insofar as it is graced.
732
 God’s salvation is then primarily a reality in history, and 
only a conscious experience and recognition by the faithful secondarily.
733
 Yet, at the same 
time, Schillebeeckx argues that since salvation is the all-encompassing reality in which the 
whole world participates, salvation is never not interpreted.
734
 Schillebeeckx argues that 
Christ’s interpretation of God’s offer of salvation is uniquely original and adequate, which is 
expressive of his Christocentrism and indicates a somewhat humbler role for Christian 
theology.
735
  
 Metaphysically, Schillebeeckx is able to appreciate God’s offer of grace in reality as a 
reality that surpasses human interpretation, with the help of the notion of the implicit 
intuition.
736
 This notion helps Schillebeeckx to differentiate between a noetic and a conceptual 
knowledge of the immanent world.
737
 Noetic knowledge concerns the personal contact of the 
knower with the reality that is known.
738
 Conceptual knowledge merely participates in this 
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noetic knowledge. This means that Schillebeeckx seeks mediations of redemption within the 
exterior world.
739
 There is a mysterious depth in this world, a depth which can be discovered 
and celebrated by Christian theology.
740
 Theologians’ environment contains a surplus in 
which their interpretations can truly participate. In other words, the notion of the implicit 
intuition helps Schillebeeckx to posit the reality of grace in the exterior world and only by 
participation in theological interpretations. Human interpretations of the world can really 
participate in grace, but they are bound to fall short of capturing the entire positivity that 
resides in the reality of redemption that surrounds humankind.
741
 
 This means that Schillebeeckx rejects the view that all conceptual expressions equally 
deviate from some supposedly inexpressible reality to which they point.
742
 The inexpressible 
reality of redemption really does give a definite content to conceptual knowledge. There is, 
thus, a plurality, not a vague infinity, of truthful interpretations of the grace mediated in the 
world.
743
 However, for Schillebeeckx, it is important that reality itself, and not the human 
conceptual grasp thereof, determines the Christian understanding of redemption.
744
 The grace 
mediated in the contemporary context is known if theologians are aware that their 
interpretations fall short of the fullness of redemption experienced in their noetic contact with 
their environment.
745
 In other words, Schillebeeckx claims that theological interpretations 
should somehow reflect that they remain partial expressions of the way in which nature 
mediates grace.  
 This is not to present theological interpretations of the reality of redemption as merely 
decorative adornment, but Schillebeeckx understands the unity of the objective reality of 
salvation, and its interpretation in revelation, as redemptive. ‘God’s eschatological presence in 
Jesus and man’s [sic] ultimate understanding of reality are correlative’746 in such a way that 
‘[t]he objective being of the content of faith, and thus its intelligibility, is its saving value’.747 
In other words, God’s salvation in history is only completed if its significance is theologically 
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recognised. For it is only in the light of revelation that a human life can be led in personal 
communion with God. ‘The whole purpose of the history of salvation is to be an epiphaneia 
of God’.748 The function of revelation is to glorify God through the faithful acceptance of 
God’s way of salvation.749 In this way, Schillebeeckx defines revelation as that saving event 
in which the reality of God visibly ‘touches’ human reality.750  
Overall, Schillebeeckx appeals to Christian theologians to recognise contemporary 
mediations of redemption. Redemption is recognised through a noetic contact with the 
immanent world, a contact which surpasses that which can be conceptually expressed.
751
 This 
emphasis on the concrete reality of redemption is important for an understanding of how 
Schillebeeckx’s conceives of the relation between Christian theology and non-Christian 
positions. For Schillebeeckx, faith in the Christian God demands attentiveness to concrete 
mediations of God’s bestowal of grace.752 Christian theologians understand their own faith 
only through interpreting the way in which God’s grace is manifest in the contemporary lives 
of people.
753
 This is why he claims that ‘an intense presence-in-the-world is a necessary 
condition for theology’.754 At the same time, Schillebeeckx’s emphasis on the superabundant 
positivity that permeates the exterior world leads him to deny the human ability to have an 
exhaustive total vision of redemption.
755
 
 What it means that only Christ perfectly interprets God’s offer of salvation, whereas 
Christian theologians could fail to do so adequately has not yet been explained however. At 
this point, Schillebeeckx again highlights the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as the sole standard 
for what Christian theologians should assess as positive when they examine their context for 
mediations of grace. For Christians to be oriented towards God, as pure positivity, means 
assembling around Christ.
756
 The ways in which Jesus’ uniquely adequate interpretation of 
grace restrains the interpretative openness of theological interpretations of the reality of 
redemption, as it is mediated in the contemporary context, will be explained in the following 
section.  
 
c) Understanding mediation: The importance of continuity with Jesus Christ 
 
 The previous section has highlighted that the theological interpretation of the reality of 
redemption in each context is integral to Schillebeeckx’s understanding of grace. This also 
means that each generation’s expectations of salvation, its aspiration for grace, must be 
responded to with a contemporary interpretation of the world’s redemption in Christ.757 At the 
same time, Schillebeeckx is quick to highlight that a Christian understanding of Christ should 
never be predetermined by the contemporarily prevalent worldview or by contemporary 
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expectations, but that the prevalent worldview and its expectations must be corrected with 
reference to the concrete Jesus of Nazareth.
758
 This again highlights Schillebeeckx’s 
acknowledgment of the sinfulness of humankind. What people call redemption might not 
coincide with God’s concrete offer. What is important for this discussion is the role 
Schillebeeckx ascribes to Christian theology in naming the concrete offer of redemption in a 
certain context correctly, and what this implies with regards to theology’s ability to complete 
the world’s redemption.  
Schillebeeckx affirms that there is no access to the earthly Jesus apart from the 
Christological testimony of the early church.
759
 However, Schillebeeckx emphasises that this 
community of first Christians reflected what Jesus himself was and did. The new life they 
sensed in themselves was interpreted in remembrance of the earthly Jesus.
760
 The community 
of the church is not founded upon or bound together by an abstract value, but by the concrete 
person Jesus Christ.
761
 The decisive factor in interpreting new offers of redemption is that the 
interpretation remains truthful to the concrete reality of Jesus Christ.
762
 Consequently, God’s 
contemporary offer of salvation in Christ can only be understood through continuous 
engagement with the biblical reports about the primary response to this offer.
763
 It should be 
borne in mind that the early church stood under the sole norm of the concrete historical Jesus, 
who must be the abiding interpretative norm for Christianity.
764
 All new Christian 
interpretations must, consequently, allow Jesus Christ to have a determinate influence on 
them.
765
 Given that Schillebeeckx opposes a mere conceptual development of the ideas about 
Jesus, all interpretations must be constantly corrected with reference to the concrete reality of 
Jesus.
766
 Schillebeeckx contends that there is room for the human imagination, but that this 
imagination must always be subdued under the concrete reality of Jesus for correction.
767
 
 Schillebeeckx, thus, differentiates between the concrete reality of Jesus and 
theological interpretations of this reality. He argues that the historical reality of Jesus contains 
a gratuitousness which cannot be directly conceptualised.
768
 In other words, Schillebeeckx 
posits the abundance of redemption in the concrete life of Jesus Christ and not in the Christian 
interpretation thereof.
769
 In this way, the concrete Jesus of Nazareth is the only norm for 
Christian faith, even if this reality is always clothed in the conceptual pre-understandings of a 
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certain time.
770
 It is this concrete reality of Christ that motivates Christians to ponder about 
the implications.
771
 And, since the fullness of meaning resides in the historical Jesus, later 
explications of that meaning must have already been implicitly present in the concrete life of 
Jesus of Nazareth. In this way, Schillebeeckx stresses that Christ is the only proper index for 
any analogical knowledge of God gained through new experiences of redemption.
772
 
 Schillebeeckx then refrains from any triumphant presentation of theology’s naming of 
the reality of redemption, in its relation to Christ, and argues that Christian theologians must 
highlight that it is Christ himself and not the Christian interpretation which is redemptive, 
claiming that there is always some disharmony between people’s experience of redemption in 
Christ and the conceptualisation of that reality.
773
 Schillebeeckx highlights that the Christian 
conception of salvation and grace must continuously be measured against the concrete offer of 
redemption in Jesus Christ.
774
 This is why Christian theology must sometimes distance itself 
from its older interpretations, which are no longer necessary for a contemporary experience of 
Christ.
775
  
 Consequently, for Schillebeeckx, Christian orthodoxy is not primarily marked by its 
philosophical coherence, but by the adequate remembrance of the reality of Jesus Christ.
776
 
On the conceptual level, different Christologies cannot be unified, and it is impossible to 
specify some definite conceptual criteria for a truthful Christology.
777
 The only unifying 
factor is the experience of redemption in Jesus Christ that is bound to remain pluriform in its 
expressions.
778
 No single interpretation is identical with the essence of Christian faith, which 
is the reality of Jesus Christ itself.
779
 The pluriformity is then limited by the reality itself in 
which the interpretations all participate.
780
 All Christological confessions must always 
remember the unique life of Jesus Christ.
781
 In other words, the experience of redeemed 
reality in Christ must be primary, and the conceptualisation of that reality secondary.
782
 
 Overall, why and how contemporary mediations of grace are central to 
Schillebeeckx’s theology has been explained. This distinguishes him from all other 
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theologians introduced in this dissertation. Whereas public theologians, as well as John 
Howard Yoder, have been criticised for an understanding of grace that is insufficiently 
dynamic and modifiable in accordance with new mediations, Radical Orthodoxy tries to 
envision a more dynamic understanding of grace. However, both Milbank and Ward introduce 
this dynamic by way of focusing on the contribution made by the theological interpretation to 
the understanding of grace in every new historical context. With this move, they tend to 
undervalue the way in which Christ uniquely mediates and interprets grace in favour of 
elevating the theological interpretation of contemporary mediations of grace onto a level 
beyond criticism. Tanner claims that grace is equally mediated by all positions, which is 
problematic insofar this understanding of grace does not allow her to perceive of the grace 
mediated in a position that denies the equal worth of all contributions to a certain discussion. 
In other words, she must interpret those who reject Christian theological contributions to 
secular politics as denying the equally graced status of all positions, which makes it 
impossible to discern the particular grace mediated in this secularist opposition. 
Schillebeeckx’s understanding of the way in which grace is primarily mediated in the 
contemporary reality of the world’s redemption in Christ and only by participation in non-
Christian and Christian interpretations of that reality, promises to offer a way in which the 
theological significance even of the secularist opposition to theologically informed political 
involvement can be appreciated, the fruits of which will be shown in Chapter 5.  
 
4.5 The foundation of the church: Ecclesial sin against apologetics  
 
 Not only interpreting the Resurrection as revelation of the superior power of grace 
over evil and of Jesus’ constitutive part in the reality of redemption as unique person, 
Schillebeeckx also calls Christ’s Resurrection the abiding foundation of the church.783 
Schillebeeckx’s emphases of God’s sole act in the Resurrection, the superior power of grace 
over evil and the abiding inclusion of Jesus’ unique person in this grace are also discernible in 
his deliberations about the church. Whereas I have already explained how Schillebeeckx’s 
focus on the Resurrection relates to his simultaneous upholding of a grace optimism and a 
pessimistic anthropology, as well as to his appreciation of the mediated character of grace, 
this final part of my exposition of Schillebeeckx’s Christology returns to the issue of 
apologetic defences of Christian theological contributions to secular politics.  
 In short, I will argue that Schillebeeckx opposes apologetic defences of the church’s 
positive influence on society for two reasons. First, theologians cannot promise that the 
church contributes positively to society, because this would deny that the church is the 
community of those who accept God’s forgiveness on which they continue to depend. Against 
this, it could be objected that the church is called to imitate Christ and that this calling would 
oblige theologians to promise that the church will complete or exceed the whole society’s 
redemption. I counter this objection by way of highlighting that Schillebeeckx rejects these 
apologetic defences because he primarily understands the church’s imitation of Christ as a 
gratuitous gift, and only secondarily as an ethical duty. All that remains to be argued for, then, 
is why Schillebeeckx’s rejection of apologetic defences of the church’s positive influence on 
society does not depoliticise his theology, foregrounding at this point the political import of 
his understanding of redemption as God’s overcoming of sin through forgiveness, which is 
dealt with in the last section of this chapter. 
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a) Acknowledging the church’s sinfulness: Against promises of positive contributions to 
society 
 
According to Schillebeeckx, the church is founded on the Resurrection insofar as it is 
the gathering of those people who experienced the forgiveness of their sin of rejecting Jesus 
Christ.
784
 The church, thus, lives on the strength of the renewal of the lives of its members.
785
 
Primarily, this means that the church regards its own foundation as gratuitous: No human 
being, apart from the risen Jesus himself, causes people to assemble in one community.
786
 
Christians interpret their own lives as part of the Christian story, which begins with a personal 
experience of God that is interpreted as being initiated by Jesus Christ.
787
 The reception of 
divine forgiveness is, thus, the only condition for becoming a Christian, and initiates a 
conversion.
788
  
 According to Schillebeeckx, the conversion to the Christian faith is marked by the 
structure of an initial bewildering disintegration of one’s original worldview, and a 
completing reintegration of that bewildering experience into a new worldview.
789
 Jesus’ 
disciples already underwent such a conversion when they met the earthly Jesus. Their 
bewilderment concerned the unconditional faith in God, to which they had been invited 
through their contact with Jesus.
790
 In this contact, Jesus freed them from any anxious self-
concern, which allowed them to abandon everything and commit themselves freely to God.
791
 
Importantly, Schillebeeckx conceives of this free surrender to following Christ not primarily 
in terms of a duty, but as a gift. Jesus’ life enabled his disciples to trust in God’s absolutely 
faithful goodness towards humankind.
792
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This trust was shattered at the crucifixion, for here it seemed as if human sinfulness 
had gained the upper hand.
793
 In this way, the disciples experience Christ’s death again as the 
disintegration of their previous worldview. This disintegration, and the frailty of their faith in 
the abundance of God’s grace, is positive insofar as it enables the disciples to understand the 
full implication of Jesus’ life.794 Only at the Resurrection did it become apparent that God’s 
grace overcomes all human evil, that no human failure has the last word and that God’s grace 
is entirely undeserved by humankind.
795
 The importance of the mediated character of grace 
also became only apparent at the Resurrection.
796
  
Overall, Schillebeeckx argues that the church exists because God converts people to 
Christianity.
797
 It is impossible to demonstrate the reasonableness of Christianity from the 
perspective of any other worldview conclusively, because God’s forgiveness, breaking with 
the logic of human calculations, is not the conclusion of any existing premises.
798
 In this 
sense, the Resurrection as revealing the reality of God’s merciful forgiveness demands faith. 
Instead of apologetically defending their faith, Christians must recognise that they are only 
justified by God’s unconditional mercy.799 Concerning any promises of contributing to the 
wider society’s common good, the church must primarily confess to be a community of 
sinners who are all equally called into this assembly by God’s unconditional offer of grace 
despite human sin.
800
 Christians must confess that they are bound to fail to meet their own 
standards, namely those set by the concrete life of Jesus.
801
 This should relativise all promises 
in order to achieve a better future through ecclesial efforts.  
At the same time, however, by accepting God’s forgiveness, converted people are 
reconciled with their past in a way that gives them new confidence in the future.
802
 Converted 
people’s confidence concerns the approaching of God’s Kingdom despite human failures.803 
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Christians are reconciled with ‘God’s way of doing things’804, which means that their overall 
outlook is based upon the faith that all that which is truly good will persist and all that is evil 
will vanish. The church’s conversion enables it to dedicate itself to the further realisation of 
redemption on earth even if the effects are not immediately seen.
805
 On the basis of their faith 
in the crucified and risen Christ, Christians can learn to see grace, as it is mediated in this 
world beyond apparent evil and suffering. ‘[B]y persevering in grace, the believer personally 
accepts God’s grace in Christ as a reality which is consistently affirmed, which becomes the 
basis of hope for resurrection […] and eschatological consummation’.806 This 
‘[e]schatological hope makes the commitment to the temporal order radical and, by the same 
token, declares any existing temporal order to be only relative’.807  
 However, the church’s political relevance should not be apologetically defended on 
the basis of its incessant striving towards the further realisation of God’s Kingdom on earth, 
because this would reverse the proper directionality of the church’s witness. Coupled with 
Schillebeeckx’s acknowledgment of the church’s sinfulness, the church’s incessant alignment 
with the reality of redemption that surrounds it could only serve as a practical witness to 
God’s unceasing offer of forgiveness.808 Others have argued that, according to Schillebeeckx, 
the triumph of grace must be visible in the church in order to be believable.
809
 My argument 
further refines this claim by highlighting that Schillebeeckx’s theology is most distinctly 
important for contemporary theology insofar as he imagines the church to be a visible 
community of merciful grace. The church, for Schillebeeckx, must not be a perfect 
community of the sinless.
810
 God’s triumphant grace in the church’s weakness, not in the 
church’s glory, manifests the reality of God in this world.811 People must be enabled to see 
that grace is effective in everyone who sincerely tries to do their best, and the reality of 
redemption must be recognisable in the utter generosity and gratuity that underlies this effort, 
despite its failings.
812
 The church’s continuous penitence is then a crucial element of the 
church’s witness to God’s forgiveness of all human failures.813 The church’s most 
fundamental role in society is to show in its life and praxis that the world has been redeemed 
by Christ, enabling people to put their trust not in human, but in divine strength.
814
  
 Understanding the church as an assembly of forgiven sinners, grounded in God’s 
mercy, Schillebeeckx understands Christianity essentially not as a human cultural project, but 
as humans giving themselves over to divine deeds.
815
 The conversion to Christ ‘means to act 
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and think like Jesus [...], who, by emptying himself […] made others rich’.816 Since Christ’s 
redemption is mediated in the contemporary context, their readiness to receive forgiveness 
entails that Christians pursue their own thoughts less and become more open to learning from 
the grace that surrounds them. Regarding the question concerning theology’s political role in 
post-Christendom societies, this foregrounds the difference in reading Schillebeeckx’s 
understanding of grace in terms of redemption, rather than in terms of creation. Associating 
Schillebeeckx’s understanding of grace with creation, commentators claim that he would 
argue that Christianity is the guarantor of the humanisation and liberation of the whole 
world.
817
 My interpretation, in contrast, suggests that Christ alone is the guarantor and that 
Christians, as much as non-Christians, benefit from this undeserved divine gift. This explains 
also why, instead of apologetically defending how Christian theology can positively 
contribute to public political discussions, Schillebeeckx’s theology is more directed to 
correcting the sinful church. In contrast to post-liberal theologies, which turn to the church 
because of the sinful world’s inability to understand Christ, Schillebeeckx turns to the church 
as theology’s primary addressee, because he acknowledges the church’s sinfulness. He seeks 
to understand how non-Christian positions mediate the reality of redemption in order to 
strengthen, renew or to correct the church’s dedication to the further manifestation of this 
reality. 
 
b) Imitating Christ: Against promises of completing the world’s redemption 
 
It could be objected that this stress on the church’s sinfulness downplays the Christian 
calling to imitate Christ, and that this calling allows or even obliges theologians to promise 
that the church will complete or exceed the world’s redemption. However, contrary to the 
theologians introduced thus far who all, in their different ways, draw on this call to imitate 
Christ in order to apologetically defend the church as a positive influence on society, 
Schillebeeckx understands the church’s imitation of Christ primarily as a gift and only 
secondarily as a duty. According to Schillebeeckx, Christians are primarily invited to imitate 
Christ’s relationship to God.818 Instead of focussing on any duty to imitate Christ for the 
further redemption of the world, the focus should be on the fact that the church can imitate 
Christ. Jesus’ calling God ‘Abba’ is indicative of a uniquely familiar and simple relationship 
that demands no medium between God and humankind.
819
 The church follows Christ by 
responding to God in a similar way as Jesus did, addressing God as Father.
820
 Once more, 
Schillebeeckx interprets this address as primarily revelatory of the trustworthiness of God’s 
benevolence towards humankind, but also of the expectation that humankind is willing to 
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align itself with this benevolent reality.
821
 Schillebeeckx calls this address the heart of 
Christianity.
822
  
 At this point, Schillebeeckx affirms the true reciprocity between Christians and God, 
not only a one-sided dependence.
823
 Understanding the historical Jesus as truly divine means 
that God was really influenced by Jesus’ contemporaries. To encounter the earthly Jesus 
meant to encounter God.
824
 In this way, the Incarnation enabled people to enter into a personal 
relationship with God.
825
 This relationship with God is central to the Christian faith and can 
be repeated by every new generation.
826
 This means that Christian theologians should not 
present God’s absoluteness in terms of a fixed stability, but they should stress that God really 
reacts to humans and answers their prayers.
827
  
That this imitation of Christ’s relationship to God is not primarily to be translated into 
a duty imposed on Christians for the further redemption of the world is again related to 
Schillebeeckx’s Resurrection Christology, given that it is accompanied by an emphasis on joy 
as the primary focus of Christian life.
828
 ‘Jesus’ whole life was a celebration of God’s reign, 
as well as an orthopraxis in accord with that kingdom’.829 ‘Jesus is the man who delights in 
God himself’.830 Jesus was so enthralled by God that his whole life became a celebration of 
God and, as such, a model for Christian orthopraxis.
831
 Schillebeeckx argues that ‘joy is a 
fundamental ingredient in Christian ethical action. For Christian ethics is more something that 
is graciously allowed than something that is firmly compelled’.832 This joy consists in God 
and humankind being each other’s happiness.833 Christians experience that reality is gracious 
towards them and return this grace in joyful celebration to God.
834
  
The church is not a ‘holy remnant’, but the firstborn of a new creation who already 
celebrates eschatological redemption.
835
 Christians are distinguished from non-Christians 
primarily inasmuch as they experience the final consummation of reality’s redemption already 
now.
836
 Christians should not understand themselves to be more ethically apt than non-
Christians, but as particularly hopeful due to their experience of the reality of redemption.
837
 
The point of liturgical celebration is, thus, primarily to praise God, to recall the reason for this 
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praise through remembrance of Jesus Christ and to bid to God in prayer to be faithful to this 
promise of grace also in the future.
838
 
 Schillebeeckx claims that Jesus did not primarily leave behind certain sayings, but that 
the church as liberation movement should be understood in the context of the church’s 
thankful relationship to God.
839
 The church is a liberation movement insofar as the crucified 
but risen Christ remains effective on earth in his followers.
840
 Schillebeeckx claims that it is 
not the Christian interpretation of reality, but Christianity’s continuation of Christ’s praxis 
that is co-redemptive.
841
 Importantly, Schillebeeckx understands Christ’s praxis as not 
primarily directed at the restoration of creation, but at the initiation of people’s contact to 
God.
842
 The restoration of creation is only the necessary means for the latter. All of Christian 
praxis must be motivated by redemption in this way.
843
 The church’s orthopraxis serves to 
make apparent that the salvation and liberation experienced by people brings them into 
contact with the reality of God.
844
  
 In this way, the church is an integral part of Jesus’ identity, one which exceeds that 
which Jesus has concretely done.
845
 Schillebeeckx speaks of an ‘ecclesial brotherhood [sic]’ 
that represents redeemed humanity in Christ on earth.
846
 Schillebeeckx stresses that the source 
of this community is the relationship of each member with Christ.
847
 However, since all of 
reality has been redeemed in Christ, all worldly peace is now understood as eternally 
persistent, which means that the boundaries between church and world are blurred.
848
 
Christians can read any worldly peace as participating in Christ’s redemption of reality. They 
are then called to celebrate and align themselves with these concrete manifestations of 
peace.
849
  
 In brief, the second reason why Schillebeeckx’s understanding of the political 
relevance of Christian theology conflicts with public theology’s as well as with Radical 
Orthodoxy’s apologetic defences of theology’s political relevance concerns his understanding 
of theology’s specific engagement with reality as that of thankful celebration.850 Theology 
only enhances and perfects the secular world indirectly, insofar as human life is neither 
meaningful without this addition of thankful celebration, nor is it possible without complete 
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gratuity.
851
 Only in this indirect way is Christianity’s ‘service to God, also a service to men 
[sic]’.852 The gratuitous joy of the Christian relationship with God must be evident in 
Christian lives; to argue for it would be to mischaracterise this joy. Moreover, Christian 
theology is politically relevant insofar as a human life that ‘dwell[s] upon the personal 
mystery’ retains a degree of independence from the majority opinion by way of 
acknowledging God as final judge over reality.
853
  
Insofar as Schillebeeckx does conceive of Christianity as adequately mediating God’s 
grace to the world, Christianity must exceed this surplus of positivity to the world. To this 
end, Schillebeeckx claims, in agreement with Radical Orthodoxy, that Christian theology 
must express the mystery and reality in which everyone exists, and thus be the interpretation 
of the whole of reality.
854
 Its specific activity is that of prophetic naming; Milbank turns this 
Christian interpretation of the whole of reality into an apologetic defence of theology’s 
political relevance by arguing that his Christian ontology translates into a particular social 
order that is promised to be better than its secular alternatives.
855
 According to Schillebeeckx, 
to the contrary, Christian theology is not directly politically useful in the way that Radical 
Orthodox authors present it as being.
856
 Schillebeeckx’s stress on the superabundant positivity 
of grace implies that theology does not fulfil any particular function that could be fully 
explained in secular terms.
857
 A secular answer must be found to all political problems and 
Christian theology should, then, celebrate the grace which made this answer possible. 
Whereas the world unconsciously owes its existence to the life, death, and Resurrection of 
Christ, the church is the place where this reality is celebrated in thankfulness.
858
 In this way, 
Christianity would mediate grace as the reality that exceeds the sum-total of all natural 
positivity.
859
 
 Overall, this argumentation suggests that if the Christian imitation of Christ was 
rendered into a promise to contribute positively to society, then this would erroneously 
downplay the sinfulness of the church on the one hand, and the reality of redemption which 
allows the church to exist nonetheless, on the other. Primarily, Christians imitate Christ in 
joyfully thanking God for God’s faithful bestowal of grace. Christian theologians should 
remind the church of the graces by which it is surrounded and upon which it depends. The 
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church’s joyful celebration of these received graces then, develops into an orthopraxis for the 
preservation and further distribution of these graces. If the primary focus was on the church’s 
ethical duty to increase the world’s redemption, the church would risk overlooking the grace 
which already surrounds it. It is the call to imitate Christ that obliges theologians not to focus 
primarily on that which is still lacking perfection, but on the grace that is already mediated. 
Only in this way can theology build further upon the work of redemption that has already 
begun and can it avoid chasing its own utopian illusions.
860
 Any theological promise must 
acknowledge how eternity begins to take shape in the depths of the present.
861
 
  
c) Mediating God’s forgiveness: Mercifully criticising non-Christian politics 
 
 Regarding the criticism that such a theology of grace might render Christian theology 
politically superfluous and uncritical, I argue in this section that Schillebeeckx’s theology 
calls on the church to be critical in a merciful way. It should not be concluded from the above 
discussion that no consequences would be entailed by Schillebeeckx’s theology for a 
Christian politics. But, a theologically informed criticism of alternative political positions 
should accord with the way in which Christians believe that all remaining sin is overcome in 
Christ, and in this way Christian theology can contribute to the completion of the world’s 
redemption. This means that theologians should inspire the church to mediate divine mercy to 
others. The church must be the distinct community that shows mercy towards every human 
being, even in spite of their sinfulness, and bear witness to the God who loves even sinful 
humankind.
862
 The most important law for Christians is to be merciful and gracious in the 
imitation of God.
863
 Believing that God’s gracious love is stronger than any human rejection 
of that love, and that the whole world has already been redeemed in this sense
864
, Christians 
must follow Jesus in not focusing on other people’s sinful rejection of God’s love as much as 
on their potential for the future.
865
 Conversion is not initiated by confronting people with their 
sins, but with the redemption that already surrounds them and can be theirs if only they were 
to accept it.
866
  
 Following Schillebeeckx’s emphasis on mercy, it is precisely God’s unconditional 
acceptance of people into the reality of redemption which calls sinners to repentance and 
transforms them. In other words, grace heals sinful nature whenever people realise that they 
are fundamentally accepted by God, despite their shortcomings.
867
 The transformation from 
sinful to redeemed human nature does not commence with the human recognition of their own 
shortcomings, but with the recognition that they have a legitimate place in the reality of 
redemption despite these shortcomings. To follow their natural inclination towards grace, 
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humans have to put all their trust not in themselves or other humans but in the reality of 
God.
868
 Those who accept the Christian faith in God’s trustworthy mercifulness are then 
granted the further grace of a heightened affinity with graced reality.
869
 The Christian faith 
might help people to trust in grace more than in their own ability to further the good. A 
redeemed human life is then superhuman in the sense that grace lives within that life.
870
  
 Consequently, Christianity is most crucially distinct from purely secular outlooks 
through its faith in the possibility of the humanly impossible.
871
 Whereas Milbank, following 
de Lubac, associates modern atheism with Christianity’s failure to sufficiently demonstrate 
that the Christian faith is relevant for secular life and critical of the surrounding society, 
Schillebeeckx associates modern atheism with the churches’ failure to nurture people’s ability 
to trust in God’s mercy. This is why, for Schillebeeckx, Christian theology’s primary task is 
not to criticise non-Christian politics for their shortcomings, but theologians must highlight 
that God’s grace transcends all human failures. Christian theology should not be presented as 
the solution to the human failure of sin, and in this way as the answer to contemporary 
societal problems. Instead, Christian theology must be presented in such a way that people 
understand that God’s love and grace are not diminished by human sin.872 In other words, 
Christian theology must present the reality of God, not Christian theology, as that which is 
most important in and for human life.
873
 In the following chapter, I will argue that 
Schillebeeckx adopted this hermeneutic of mercy in his approach to atheism, and I will reflect 
on how this hermeneutic should be revived in contemporary theology. 
On the basis of his theology of merciful grace, Schillebeeckx’s response to oppressive 
regimes differs slightly from that of Yoder. Both are in agreement that such a response must 
be nonviolent.
874
 However, while Yoder claimed that Christ’s cruciform redemption imposes 
upon Christians the ethical duty to endure the oppression for the sake of the world’s further 
redemption non-violently, Schillebeeckx shifts the focus away from the Christian ethical duty 
to the graced environment.
875
 Christians should primarily bear witness to the reality of a 
redemption that is brought about gratuitously by God, and not by human strength.
876
 There is, 
thus, not primarily a Christian duty to redeem the world through the nonviolent resistance to 
oppression, but oppressors, just as all other people, must be brought to recognise that all of 
reality is graced and that everyone has an equal share in this grace.
877
 A Christian response to 
oppression is meant to manifest that ‘God’s mercy is greater than all evil in the world’.878 
Christians must not primarily follow an ethics that promises to counter the evil of oppression, 
but Christians must be merciful to the sinful and, thus, make manifest that ‘human and divine 
justice evidently go their separate ways’.879 This again is based on the trust that good and evil 
are not on the same ontological level but that only the good will persist, whereas evil will 
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annihilate itself.
880
 Christianity should manifest that God’s grace is revealed in the 
powerlessness of the servant Christ.
881
 ‘Although God always comes in power, divine 
authority knows no use of force, not even against people who are crucifying his Christ. But 
the kingdom of God still comes, despite human misuse of power and human rejection of the 
kingdom of God’.882  
If we ask now, once again, why Schillebeeckx does not advocate this theological 
vision of how sin is overcome through God’s forgiveness, as a positive contribution to the 
politics of post-Christendom societies, promising to attain the further reconciliation among 
conflicting parties, we should direct our attention to how Schillebeeckx himself received the 
grace that has been mediated in his contemporary context into his theology. In the following 
chapter, I will trace the way in which Schillebeeckx received insights from atheist positions of 
his time through a hermeneutic of mercy, as has been outlined above. I will argue that the 
theological significance of these atheist positions consisted partly in reminding Schillebeeckx 
of the impacts of sin upon his own theological vision, which rendered it ultimately impossible 
for him to promise that shaping the entire social order in accordance with his theology of 
grace would lead to a better future. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have first traced the development of Schillebeeckx’s interpretation of 
atheism over the course of his theological career. His reconciliatory approach towards atheism 
was remarkable throughout. Moreover, it was striking that Schillebeeckx understood 
Christianity and atheism to be entangled in the same structural sin. He believed this structural 
sin could be overcome through theology’s redirecting of Christianity towards God in 
acknowledgement of the atheist criticism of the church. In this way, until the ‘70s at least, 
Schillebeeckx conceived of Christian theology as the fulfilment of atheism’s already good 
aspiration for grace. This indicates that, until that time, Schillebeeckx shared, along with all 
the other theologians introduced in this dissertation, the conviction that the Christian 
theological understanding of redemption translates into a vision of how societal problems are 
best overcome. Until that point, he could still have advocated a central political role for 
Christian theology, even in post-Christendom societies. What restrained Schillebeeckx from 
doing so was his acknowledgement that atheists, despite their entanglement in structural sin, 
are moved by God’s abundant grace in ways unknown to Christian theologians, and that 
therefore they might be equally able to establish a harmonious social order. Yet, 
Schillebeeckx still claimed that he was able to see that this is the case, and consequently, 
could have promised that the adoption of his vision would lead society into a better future. 
This changed in the ‘70s when Schillebeeckx explicitly stressed that Christian theologians 
lack the vision of how society’s contemporary problems are best solved. 
Common interpretations of this development either criticise Schillebeeckx, for his 
having a naive optimism regarding atheism, and his increasing accommodation of Christian 
theology to atheist thought, or they praise Schillebeeckx’s understanding of creation as 
allowing him to adopt a particularly amicable stance towards atheism, which should inspire 
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similar engagements with non-Christians in contemporary contexts. I have countered both of 
these interpretations by way of arguing that Schillebeeckx’s reception of atheism is not 
connected to his understanding of creation, but to his understanding of redemption, evidenced 
in his simultaneous upholding of a grace optimism and a pessimistic anthropology. His 
optimism with regard to atheism does, thus, not come at the expense of a sufficiently adequate 
acknowledgment of human sin, but was motivated by Schillebeeckx’s conviction that the 
world’s sinfulness is overcome precisely by being confronted with God’s forgiveness, which 
is more powerful than any human shortcoming. Moreover, Schillebeeckx’s interpretation of 
the Resurrection highlights the mediated character of grace, which explains why he evaluated 
the theological significance of atheism to a much higher degree than any of the other 
theologians introduced in this dissertation. Schillebeeckx thus invites political theologians to 
discern the reality of redemption, in their contemporary context, instead of promising to solve 
contemporary political problems with some idealistic understanding of redemption. Finally, I 
have explained that Schillebeeckx rejects apologetic defences of Christianity’s political 
relevance by way of pointing to the church’s positive influence on society, because this would 
risk denying the church’s sinfulness and erroneously present the church as an ethical 
community, rather than as the community that joyfully celebrates God’s forgiveness. I then 
concluded by way of explaining that Schillebeeckx’s theologically informed social critique 
corresponds to his understanding of redemption, most prominently manifesting the conviction 
that sin is overcome through forgiveness.  
This chapter’s argument, as a whole, might suggest that Schillebeeckx did not 
advocate his Soteriology as promising a better social order than atheism, because, believing in 
the superabundance of grace, non-Christian positions could be equally good. In the following 
chapter, I will turn to an examination of the way in which Schillebeeckx’s theology was 
shaped by what he conceived of as mediations of grace in his context in order to explain his 
acknowledgment of the impairment of his own theological vision through sin towards the end 
of his career. In this way, I will discuss the significance of Schillebeeckx’s theology tor the 
question of theology’s political role in the contemporary post-Christendom context more 
directly.  
  
CHAPTER 5 
RESTORING THE THEOLOGICAL VISION: 
A NON-TRIUMPHANT CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY FOR POST-CHRISTENDOM 
SOCIETIES 
 
 In the previous chapter, the Christological rationale for Schillebeeckx’s remarkably 
unapologetic approach to those who opposed Christianity at his time was made apparent. I 
have argued that Schillebeeckx’s theology is characterised by an extraordinary appreciation of 
the mediated character of grace. His Christology suggests that theologians should be 
preoccupied with understanding how grace is mediated in their contexts, so that the church 
might celebrate the world’s redemption in Christ. Far from being naively optimistic and 
apolitical, I have also shown that Schillebeeckx’s grace optimism was paired with a 
particularly pessimistic anthropology, thus corresponding to a specific understanding of how 
sin is overcome by Christ. Having low expectations regarding humanity’s own capacities, 
Schillebeeckx focused on God’s ever-forgiving offer of grace. This highlighting of God’s 
prevailing grace is political insofar as utopian promises to society are prevented. The divine 
promise, not the human efforts to respond thereto, gives Christians the continuous courage to 
prevail in their political activities, as well as the flexibility to change the political course of 
action in the event that previous projects appear to be flawed.
883
 Contemporary mediations of 
redemption are understood as God’s merciful forgiveness of the continuous failures of 
ecclesial and atheist political projects, and as a promise for a better future. 
 The relevance and appropriateness of Schillebeeckx’s unapologetic approach to 
atheism, for answering the question concerning theology’s political role in the contemporary 
post-Christendom context, remains to be investigated. Having exhibited the Christological 
underpinnings of Schillebeeckx’s unapologetic approach to atheism, I will now turn to the 
other side of the argument, explaining how Schillebeeckx’s theology is already influenced by 
what he perceived of as contextual mediations of grace. This chapter helps us to understand 
how Schillebeeckx’s Christology does not constitute a timeless blueprint for Christian 
theological engagement with non-Christian positions. Instead, I argue that Schillebeeckx’s 
realistic grace optimism led him to respond to his surrounding context in a very particular 
way. Consequently, a contemporary employment of his hermeneutic of the primacy of God’s 
mercy would entail changing certain emphases in response to new specific contextual 
mediations of grace. Having argued that Schillebeeckx’s Christology predisposed him to 
transform his theology in accordance with contemporary mediations of grace, this chapter 
returns to the public theological focus on the contexts of post-Christendom and pluralism. I 
will examine what specific insights Schillebeeckx gained from the ways in which he believed 
grace to be mediated in these two characteristics of the contemporary context. 
 First, I will respond to two existing suggestions for how Schillebeeckx’s theology 
should be updated to suit the contemporary context. Both contend that Schillebeeckx’s 
tendency to conflate the distinctiveness, either of non-Christian positions or of Christian 
theology, should be repaired in order to respond more adequately to contemporary questions. 
Against them, I will hold that Schillebeeckx’s maintained a particularly subtle distinction 
between his theology and non-Christian positions, which can be seen if Schillebeeckx’s 
understanding of grace, in terms of God’s forgiveness, is read to provide the hermeneutical 
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lens through which Schillebeeckx critically approaches non-Christian positions.
884
 Having 
presented Schillebeeckx’s distinct engagement with non-Christian positions as one of 
merciful critique, I will then set out to explore how this approach could be employed in the 
contemporary context by way of distinguishing it from Radical Orthodoxy in particular. To 
this end, I examine how Schillebeeckx transformed his own theology in accordance with all 
that which he perceived as grace in the end of Christendom, and in pluralism. This then paves 
the way to explain further my initial criticism of all other theologians introduced in this 
dissertation for insufficiently acknowledging the impairment of the theological vision, 
particularly when they promise to solve societal problems by way of theological reflection. In 
the third part of this chapter, I explain how Schillebeeckx’s understanding of reality, as 
abounding with grace, leads him to eventually acknowledge the entanglement of his own 
theological vision in sin when he encountered the particular grace mediated by ideology 
critique.
885
 This will elucidate the notion that I do not argue that Christian theologians could 
never promise to contribute positively to political discussions in a not exclusively Christian 
society. Instead, I contend that, being considerate of the specific grace that is mediated by the 
atheist opposition to Christian theological involvement in political discussions in post-
Christendom societies, Christian theologians are invited to devote their attention primarily to 
the restoration of their impaired vision before promising to positively influence the entire 
society. In this way, the problems associated with Christendom imperialism might be 
overcome, eventually. 
 
5.1 Developing Schillebeeckx’s theological approach: Adopting a hermeneutics of mercy 
 
 If I want to advance the argument that Schillebeeckx’s theology developed through the 
reception of what he understood as non-Christian mediations of grace in his own context, it is 
important to reconsider two criticisms. From the one side, Schillebeeckx has been criticised 
for failing to respect the true distinctiveness of non-Christian positions, and from the other 
side, he has been criticised for failing to uphold the distinctiveness of Christian theology. In 
what follows, I will briefly introduce both criticisms in order to then argue that both fail 
equally to recognise the subtlety of Schillebeeckx’s distancing of his Christian theology from 
non-Christian positions, as it is marked by a merciful critique. This subtle distinction should 
be maintained in any updating of Schillebeeckx’s theology for new contexts.  
 
a) Objections: Overwriting atheism’s and theology’s distinctiveness 
 
 From a postmodern theological perspective, Schillebeeckx’s thought has recently been 
criticised for assuming too much continuity between Christianity and non-Christian 
worldviews.
886
 It has been claimed that, in order to suit the contemporary postmodern context, 
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Schillebeeckx’s theology would have to be updated in accordance with the postmodern 
assumption of irreducible particularities, instead of assuming with modernity that different 
positions share some underlying sameness. This objection concurs with de Lubac’s much 
earlier criticism that Schillebeeckx’s optimism, regarding atheism, insufficiently considers the 
historical connection between atheism’s positive aspects and the Christian heritage on which 
these might depend.
887
 Schillebeeckx is said to ignore the actual influences that Christianity 
has had upon the sentiments, morals and legislation of European societies, which might 
explain why Christian theologians detect Christ-like elements in atheism too. Both criticisms, 
thus, reproach that Schillebeeckx naively assumes an underlying harmonious continuity 
between Christianity and atheism.
888
 The correction proposed is either to re-establish the lost 
harmony between atheism and Christianity (de Lubac and later Milbank) or to abandon any 
assumptions about Christianity’s harmony with non-Christian positions, updating 
Schillebeeckx’s theology to postmodernity’s prioritisation of irreducible particularity over 
unity (Boeve).
889
 
 In contrast to these critics, my reading of Schillebeeckx’s theology suggests that 
Schillebeeckx has never been as naively modern as these critics claim. To the contrary, my 
stress on the difference between a grace optimism and a pessimistic anthropology in 
Schillebeeckx’s thought suggests that he argues for the harmonious continuity between 
Christianity and atheism not due to any presupposed general human nature in the way a 
modern theologian might uphold it.
890
 Instead, the underlying harmony between atheism and 
Christianity is assumed due to Schillebeeckx’s conviction that the whole of reality has been 
redeemed in Jesus Christ and that both Christians, as well as atheists, live in this reality. The 
claim that everyone continues to receive God’s merciful bestowal of grace does not 
presuppose any intrinsic commonality except that from being sinners who fall short in their 
responses to their graced environments.
891
 Like de Lubac and Boeve, Schillebeeckx also 
rejects the view of modern atheism as being implicitly Christian.
892
 However, unlike de 
Lubac’s suggestion that atheism resembles Christianity due to some historical influences, 
Schillebeeckx argues that Christians might detect Christ-like elements in atheists due to their 
own influence upon them. Since commonalities are most likely gained from a shared 
environment in which both Christians and atheists live, not from some inner principle, the 
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appearance of a good Christian in the atheist’s environment can effect that the best of the 
latter will come to the fore. The same would also hold for influences of atheists upon 
Christians. 
 The same criticism, concerning the assumption of too much commonality between 
Christianity and atheism, has also been voiced from the other side regarding Schillebeeckx’s 
reception of atheist philosophies. Here, Schillebeeckx has been criticised for undermining 
theology’s distinctiveness in favour of embracing atheist ideology critiques too 
wholeheartedly.
893
 It has been argued that, in his later work, Schillebeeckx abandoned the 
traditional theological interest in understanding God for a primary interest in finding a 
theological contribution to Critical Theory, and in analysing how ideology critiques challenge 
traditional theological thought.
894
 In his later theology, Schillebeeckx supposedly constructed 
an inductive metaphysics in the sense that he reasoned from human experience to God, and 
resisted providing definitive answers.
895
 In a similar vein, Schillebeeckx is being criticised for 
entirely conflating God’s saving activity with human liberation movements.896 This strand of 
criticisms resonates with the critiques mentioned in the previous chapter regarding 
Schillebeeckx’s supposed tendency to naturalise grace and to be overly optimistic with regard 
to atheism.  
 Against this criticism, I maintain that Schillebeeckx’s overarching interest in his 
engagement with ideology critiques remained theological. Schillebeeckx engaged with 
ideology critiques, like other atheist thought, through his hermeneutic of God’s abundant offer 
of mercy. Although the critics are right that, in his later theology, Schillebeeckx emphasised 
that the Christian faith in God’s merciful forgiveness of human failures cannot be deduced 
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from purely secular experiences, he maintained this faith nonetheless.
897
 Yet, as will become 
clear in this chapter, Schillebeeckx modified his theology continuously in accordance with the 
specific graces being mediated in his own context. Importantly, these modifications are, thus, 
not owed to any capitulation of theology to atheism, but they are concurrent with 
Schillebeeckx’s conviction that theologians must discern how the reality of redemption 
manifests itself in their contemporary contexts.
898
 
 
b) Appreciating subtle distinctions: Mercifully criticising atheism’s shortcomings 
  
 Both criticisms overlook the way in which Schillebeeckx maintains a subtle distinction 
between Christian theology and non-Christian positions. This subtlety derives from 
Schillebeeckx’s merciful critique of atheism. Thus, both critiques overlook that Schillebeeckx 
rejects modern secularity’s assumed neutrality.899 Schillebeeckx antecedes Radical Orthodoxy 
in calling modernity a mythology if it generalises that everyone lives in a secularist world, i.e. 
if it disguises the fact that it upholds a culturally conditioned all-encompassing ontology.
900
 
This is why Schillebeeckx seeks a way to accept modern secularisation without rendering it 
absolute.
901
 He claims that this is possible if secularisation is celebrated within the framework 
of a theocentric worldview, which is akin to later Radical Orthodox projects. The overall 
structure of Schillebeeckx’s merciful criticisms of atheist positions consists, however, of a 
primary interest in learning from atheism’s good aspirations, while elaborating only 
secondarily on atheism’s shortcomings.902  
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 This means that Schillebeeckx’s theology would not legitimately be updated by simply 
accepting postmodernity’s postulation of irreducible particularity, as though this claim was a 
neutral and self-evident truth about reality.
903
 Contrary to those who want to update 
Schillebeeckx’s thought to fit the postmodern current, Schillebeeckx is dubious of any purely 
formal acknowledgement of pluralism and the concomitant endeavour to position Christianity 
as one group within this pluralist landscape.
904
 Such a position assumes a total vision that 
dissolves true pluralism into merely an epiphenomenal plurality of instantiations of 
metaphysical univocity: Each societal sub-group is regarded as but one more instantiation of 
the secularist understanding of plurality. Correcting the shortcomings of this secularist 
understanding of pluralism mercifully, Schillebeeckx does not elaborate on this criticism but 
focuses instead on his contemporaries’ preference for plurality over unity without accepting 
their ontologisation of this preference.
905
  
 Consequently, Schillebeeckx seeks a way in which pluralism will be continuously 
overcome without being dissolved.
906
 It must be overcome in order to focus on God as the 
sole absolute reality, but not dissolved because this would ignore how Schillebeeckx’s 
contemporaries’ preference for plurality over unity manifests the reality of redemption in his 
context. If the particularity of each group celebrated by postmodern philosophy would be 
established as the sole point of departure for dialogue
907
, then the pluralist ontology would be 
consolidated rather than overcome. This is why Schillebeeckx presupposes the underlying 
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harmonious reality in which any plurality participates. On the basis of this assumption, 
Christian theology can be challenged and expanded through a plurality of insights from non-
Christians which are received as mediations of mercy. I will further elaborate upon the 
specific insights Schillebeeckx’s has gained from his contemporaries’ preference of plurality 
below, in 5.2. 
 In the case of ideology critique, Schillebeeckx also interprets the shortcomings of this 
atheist outlook mercifully. Overall, Schillebeeckx assesses his contemporary atheists’ 
fundamental faith that human beings are created for freedom positively.
908
 However, 
Schillebeeckx rejects the ‘fictitious concept of absolute freedom’ underlying the ideological 
critiques with which he engages.
909
 Again, Schillebeeckx denies the neutrality of ideology 
critique, and highlights its culturally specific foundations.
910
 Schillebeeckx warns against any 
abolutisation of the critical negativity of ideology critique, because this negativity itself 
becomes ideological if it is secretly used as an overarching vision of reality, and believed to 
be able to direct all human action.
911
 This is why Schillebeeckx completes ideology critique’s 
understanding of freedom with an acknowledgment of the origins on which freedom must 
build on the one hand, as well as of the end towards which freedom must be directed on the 
other.  
 Concerning freedom’s origins, Schillebeeckx combines the insights of ideology 
critique with a hermeneutic theology that seeks not only to deconstruct current structures, but 
also to preserve insights gained in the past.
912
 What has already been achieved must not be 
opposed as such, but just the tendency to perpetuate these achievements as the sole reality, as 
a result of which the realisation of further possibilities would be foreclosed.
913
 In the context 
of my interpretation, this would mean that theologians should admit that their insights might 
be incomplete and that a contemporary manifestation of the reality of redemption might lead 
them in a different direction. Used in this way, ideology critique is not nihilistic, but acts 
solely negatively against the human imaginative closure against further real possibilities.
914
 
Regarding freedom’s end, the Christian understanding of liberation and the negativity of 
ideology critique also converge without being identical.
915
 The Christian understanding of 
freedom is not merely negative, but oriented to the liberation of others into the same freedom 
from oppression for a faithful following of God.
916
  
 Instead of criticising Schillebeeckx for insufficiently distinguishing between Christian 
theology and non-Christian positions, and of then updating Schillebeeckx’s theology by way 
of repairing this alleged shortcoming, I maintain that Schillebeeckx kept a very fine 
distinction between Christian theology and non-Christian positions recognisable in the 
merciful way in which he theologically corrected whatever he regarded as erroneous in non-
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Christian positions, without thereby denigrating the latter. Schillebeeckx’s theology is 
precisely most distinct through its focus on how non-Christian positions always already 
participate in God’s grace, despite their sinful shortcomings. Contemporary public theology 
should follow Schillebeeckx in manifesting to non-Christians that ‘God loves us without 
conditions or limits: for our part undeservedly and boundlessly’ in its theological approach.917 
 
5.2 Receiving the end of Christendom as grace: Redirecting theology towards God 
 
 A third suggestion of how Schillebeeckx’s theological engagement with atheism 
should be updated, picks up on the critical distance he maintained to atheism, but 
overstretches it, thereby equally missing the subtlety of Schillebeeckx’s merciful critique. The 
similarity of Schillebeeckx’s criticism of atheism’s feigned neutrality to that of Radical 
Orthodoxy has led some to claim that Schillebeeckx showed great respect for secular 
humanism, but sought ‘to rescue it from its atheism’.918 These interpretations overlook that 
Schillebeeckx argues that Christian theologians themselves continuously fail to manifest 
adequately the reality they are meant to confess, and that his overall intention is not to 
overcome atheism’s shortcomings, but to learn from atheism in order to overcome theology’s 
entanglement in sin.
919
 Schillebeeckx is concerned about the problems with any imperialist 
advocacy of Christian theology, as playing the most central political role in post-Christendom 
societies, more than he is concerned about any theological rescuing of society from its 
atheism.
920
 Schillebeeckx is convinced that, in the current post-Christendom context, efforts 
to re-establish a society in which Christianity was the unanimously accepted, all-
encompassing worldview must be rejected.
921
 This is no naive accommodation of the 
Christian faith to secular trends and expectations. Schillebeeckx’s rejection of Christian 
imperialism is not motivated by any desire to defend Christianity’s relevance in a secular age, 
but it is based on Schillebeeckx’s evaluation of the anti-imperialist post-Christendom critique 
as a new mediation of mercy which should redirect Christianity towards God.
922
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a) Theological appreciation of post-Christendom: Encountering God in atheism 
 
 Concerning the theological significance of the post-Christendom context, 
Schillebeeckx thinks that Christian theology can no longer serve as the necessary basis for 
societal values and politics.
923
 God’s grace would be belittled if it was believed that separating 
values from their Christian roots would diminish the positivity mediated by these values. The 
abundance of God’s grace is revealed precisely in the fact that these values can develop in 
more than one positive direction. In this vein, Schillebeeckx reads his surrounding society’s 
capacity to self-organisation as constituting a further refinement and development of the 
Christian values that once underpinned a monolithic Christian culture.
924
 This reception of the 
theological significance of the post-Christendom context can, thus, be read as an objection to 
Max Stackhouse’s public theology925 as well as to Radical Orthodox’s triumphant 
presentations of Christian theology as rescuing society from all of the problems associated 
with atheism. 
 Far from downplaying the issue of human sinfulness, but also not primarily interested 
in correcting atheism’s sinfulness, Schillebeeckx seeks to understand how the atheist post-
Christendom critique reveals Christianity’s sinfulness. Schillebeeckx, thus, discerns the way 
in which God’s mercy over Christianity’s shortcomings is being mediated in this criticism 
from outside. Schillebeeckx argues that the churches are now liberated from erroneous 
political alliances, a contention resembling Yoder’s positive evaluation of the end of 
Christendom to some extent.
926
 Like Yoder, Schillebeeckx stresses that established alliances 
between church and state can limit the church’s focus on the gospel, but, in contrast to Yoder, 
Schillebeeckx also stresses that these alliances restrict the theological awareness of extra-
ecclesial mediations of God’s grace.927 In other words, post-Christendom critiques of 
Christian imperialism are received as a mercy that redirects Christian theology’s attention to 
the church’s dependence on the reality of redemption in which it always already exists. In this 
sense, Schillebeeckx regards the diaspora situation of a post-Christendom church as a 
purification of Christianity.
928
  
 Moreover, Schillebeeckx’s position is distinct from Yoder’s insofar as Schillebeeckx 
does not elaborate upon the critique in order to discard the concept of Christendom as a 
whole.
929
 Schillebeeckx does not diagnose a principle contradiction between Christendom and 
truthfully following Christ. Instead, he laments that in the particular history of Christendom in 
the West, Christian theologians have downplayed the importance of Christianity’s God-
centeredness.
930
 At this point, Schillebeeckx is in agreement with both Radical Orthodoxy and 
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John Howard Yoder, that a purely immanent worldview has been consolidated during the 
history of Christendom, which must be regarded as insufficient in comparison to the Christian 
theocentric worldview.
931
 In agreement with Yoder, Schillebeeckx contends that an 
immanentist outlook cannot account sufficiently for the sacrifices that might, at times, be 
demanded from Christians for the sake of God’s kingdom.932 However, whereas Yoder argued 
that this is the case because the logic of the Cross and Resurrection surpasses the secularist 
ontology, Schillebeeckx laments the unintelligibility of prayer within a purely immanent 
ontology.
933
 He stresses that these spiritual sacrifices are only properly conceived of in light 
of people’s prayerful communion with God.934 The preoccupation with worldly wealth in 
Christendom was limiting, because immanent beings were too narrowly assessed in reference 
to some present enjoyment. Christian theology, to the contrary, must conceive of all 
immanent affairs as intrinsically open to God, which makes prayer to God about these issues 
intelligible.
935
 
 Schillebeeckx then retrieves, from the post-Christendom critique primarily the 
incentive to remind the church of the significance of praying to God. According to 
Schillebeeckx, the most decisive difference between Christianity and atheism is that for 
Christianity the worldly reality is no longer simply the object of philosophical analysis, but 
also the subject of God’s personal dialogue with humankind.936 Christian theology must 
always be based on God’s address to humankind, and in this way surpasses atheist 
philosophies that do not consider this prayerful relationship.
937
 Against any philosophical 
disavowal of this interpersonal relationship as idolatrous conception of God as one being 
amongst beings, Schillebeeckx stresses that the interpersonal relationship between God and 
people in prayer does not fall short of, but transcends a human interpersonal relationship.
938
 
Despite all of the inequality between humans and God, despite God’s independence from 
creation, Christians believe that God in God’s mysterious absoluteness really offers 
reciprocity to humankind.
939
 It is not up to theologians to protect God’s absoluteness 
argumentatively, but to confess the mysterious reality of the reciprocity between God and 
humankind, and to thus motivate Christians to pray.
940
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 However, instead of triumphantly presenting theology’s appreciation of prayer over 
the atheist disavowal of prayer, Schillebeeckx’s reception of the post-Christendom critique as 
incentive for Christian theology to re-appreciate the gift of prayer is precisely why he is not 
concerned with any triumphant presentation of Christian theology as something that promises 
to rescue society from its atheism. Instead of countering atheism, Schillebeeckx is concerned 
with prayerfully relating to God through all of creation, including atheism.
941
 Prayer refers 
Christians back to the world which can now be interpreted as the context in which God 
reveals Godself. Schillebeeckx primarily re-appreciates that ‘the genuine life of faith [...] 
remains magnetized by a prayerful longing for encounter with God’.942 It is, consequently, 
Christian prayer which stimulates the church to an active commitment in the world without 
ever identifying this commitment as the goal at which it could find rest.
943
 Atheist political 
contributions do not have to be countered, despite all of their shortcomings, because knowing 
itself to be addressed by the reality of God in Christ, the church is freed from any natural fear 
in its political engagement.
944
 In prayer, Christians know that their own as well as non-
Christian political efforts are bound to remain imperfect on the one hand, and that these 
shortcomings do not endanger the ultimate victory of God’s grace on the other. In this sense, 
Schillebeeckx calls prayer Christianity’s most critical element that can really change the face 
of the world. ‘[P]rayer – and I think only prayer – gives Christian faith it’s [sic] most critical 
and productive force.’945  
 
b) Theological appreciation of pluralism: Expanding the theological vision non-triumphantly 
 
 This reception of the post-Christendom critique as theologically significant, thus 
further elucidates why, despite exhibiting certain similarities with Milbank’s criticism of 
atheist secularism as ideological, Schillebeeckx’s rejection of the postmodern atheist 
interpretation of pluralism also remains distinct from the Radical Orthodox critique. 
Schillebeeckx also evaluates pluralism from a particularly Christian perspective, still positing 
God as the all-encompassing framework within which he assesses pluralism, while equally 
denying the neutrality of atheist understandings of pluralism. However, for Schillebeeckx, this 
means that atheist interpretations of pluralism are not to be replaced triumphantly, but 
theology must discern the way in which the atheist appreciation of pluralism, despite its 
shortcomings, mediates a grace for theology. Schillebeeckx receives this appreciation of 
pluralism as a merciful reminder for Christian theology that God’s grace is mediated in plural 
ways.
946
 He receives the secular celebration of pluralism as new positive incentive to examine 
critically and enlarge Christian theology through dialogue with others.
947
 Dialogue with non-
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Christians must be entered into in order to understand the reality of redemption.
948
 This means 
that Christian theologians must assess the goodness of every non-Christian insight in 
reference to the revelation of God in Christ.
949
 In this way, Christian theology can show how 
the transcendent unity of all worldviews in God can be dimly seen in analogical relations 
within the world.
950
  
 Identifying God as pure positivity, Schillebeeckx understands the reality of God to be 
really mediated in all instances of goodness and as opposed by all instances of evil.
951
 All 
worldly goodness directly participates in God and is, as such, revelatory of God’s own 
Being.
952
 The theological endeavour of understanding the Christian God better, thus, demands 
that the theologian attends to the positivity of human history. At the same time, when relating 
all this worldly goodness into one coherent vision of reality, it must be respected that God’s 
transcendent positivity surpasses that which has already been mediated.
953
 Although theology 
can somehow already see the harmonious whole, this total vision slips ‘from our grasp into 
depths unfathomable’.954 At this point, Schillebeeckx refrains from elevating his theological 
interpretation of pluralism triumphantly over and above its atheistic counterparts in order to 
acknowledge God’s transcendence over his own theological vision. Schillebeeckx stresses 
that precisely because Christian theology relates all mediated goodness into one coherent 
vision of God, it must at the same time ‘slide into mysticism’.955 Christian theology cannot be 
presented as something superior to other interpretations of reality, because it must witness to 
the God who remains greater than the Christian integration of all worldly positivity into one 
coherent vision.   
 Although God cannot be known independently from any ontological framework, 
theology must somehow evidence in its conceptual ontology that the abundant reality of God 
can never be adequately captured by any vision of reality.
956
 As has already been observed by 
others, because the superior power of grace is affirmed as true, independently from human 
responses to this reality, Christianity would wrongly focus on itself instead of on God if it 
                                                                                                                                                        
what comes to her from the world as “foreign prophecy”, but in which she nonetheless recognizes the 
well-known voice of the Lord’ (Schillebeeckx, “The Church as the Sacrament of Dialogue,” God the 
Future of Man, 76 [125-127]). Also Roger Haight has recently argued that in his theocentrism, 
Schillebeeckx did not fall short of, but went further than, an inclusive Christianity with regard to 
religious pluralism (Haight, “Engagement met de wereld als zaak van God,” Tijdschrift voor 
Theologie 50 (2010): 84). However, Haight relates this to Schillebeeckx’s theology of creation instead 
of redemption. 
948
 Schillebeeckx, Theologisch geloofsverstaan anno 1983, 9. 
949
 At this point, Schillebeeckx admits to be involved in an inescapable hermeneutical circle, which 
cannot be resolved prior to the eschaton (Schillebeeckx, Church, 161 [162-163]).  
950
 Schillebeeckx, Church, 165 [166-167]. 
951
 Schillebeeckx, Church, 73 [75-76]. In Schillebeeckx’s context, human liberation was an instance of 
grace and human enslavement was an instance of evil. 
952
 Schillebeeckx, Interim Report, 110 [126-127]. This indicates that, in agreement with Radical 
Orthodoxy, Schillebeeckx affirms that God’s ontological otherness from creation must be thought of 
in analogical, not in equivocal terms (Schillebeeckx, Church, 55-56 [56-57]). Schillebeeckx also 
claims that an equivocal understanding of God’s otherness would render Christianity politically 
irrelevant. (Schillebeeckx, “Secularization and Christian Belief in God,” God the Future of Man, 43 
[70-71]). Doctrinally, Schillebeeckx relates the analogical understanding of God and world to the 
Incarnation (Schillebeeckx, Church, 125 [126-127]). 
953
 Schillebeeckx, Church, 73-74 [75-76]. 
954
 Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 16 [33-34].  
955
 Schillebeeckx, Interim Report, 51 [60-61]. 
956
 Schillebeeckx, “Theological Criteria,” The Understanding of Faith, 57-58 [63-65]. 
163 
 
 
claimed that Christian theology is necessary in order to construct a better society.
957
 To affirm 
the reality of redemption means precisely that Christian theologians must be able to discover 
true goodness, also in non-Christian interpretations of reality.
958
 Because of the real 
superabundance of grace, Christian theology can never be demonstrated conclusively to be the 
best interpretation of reality.
959
 Consequently, Christian theology is concerned with the 
totality of reality, but it is itself not totalising.
960
 Christian theologians must win their own 
vision of reality over and over again precisely as not totalising, for such totalisation would be 
a disacknowledgment of the superabundance of grace. In this sense, ‘the theologian is [...] a 
custodian of transcendence but he [sic] does not guard it like a treasure’.961 Theology should 
not be concerned with securing a respectable position in public dialogue, but it should be 
entirely outward-looking, precisely because Christian theology should be primarily 
preoccupied with discovering how other worldviews might redirect Christianity towards 
God.
962
 
 
5.3 Receiving ideology critique as grace: Confessing theology’s entanglement in sin 
 
 This rejection of any Christian triumphalism returns us to the abovementioned issue of 
Schillebeeckx’s relation to ideology critique. If my argument from the previous chapters has 
suggested that Christian theologians should be more modest in their promises of contributing 
positively to post-Christendom politics, and acknowledge the impairment of their own vision 
by sin, it must be mentioned that Schillebeeckx’s confession of this impairment is partly owed 
to his distinct engagement with atheist ideology critiques of his time. In what follows, I will 
explain how Schillebeeckx did not capitulate to these ideology critiques, but discerned how 
ideology critique manifests the reality of redemption in his contemporary context, and how it 
should thus be received as mediation of mercy for redirecting the church towards God. 
 
a) A Theological appreciation of ideology critique: Confessing the impairment of theology’s 
vision  
 
 According to my reading, Schillebeeckx discerned how the secular ideology critiques 
of his day mediated a mercy that reoriented Christian theology towards God, and 
consequently incorporated these insights into his theology. Still upholding theology’s 
aspiration to form an overarching vision of reality, Schillebeeckx receives from ideology 
critique the distinction between legitimate and distorted ontologies.
963
 An overarching 
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ontology is not objectionable as such, but ideology critique shows that an ontology becomes 
problematic where it is used in order to consolidate the interests of a dominating group in 
society.
964
 Consequently, Schillebeeckx calls on Christian theologians to use ideology critique 
in order to be faithful to God, not to ideological human interpretations of God.
965
 In receiving 
ideology critique as a mediation of mercy, Schillebeeckx distinguishes between the Christian 
gospel, which escapes the criticism of only being a defective referent to the absolute truth, and 
theology’s previous proclamation of the gospel, which must now be acknowledged as partial 
and sometimes erroneous.
966
 The universal truth of the Christian gospel must still be affirmed, 
but, reflecting Schillebeeckx’s pessimistic anthropology, the Christian interpretation of this 
universal truth must be relativised.
967
  
 It is significant for this discussion that Schillebeeckx’s engagement with ideology 
critiques led him to reject attempts, such as that of Radical Orthodoxy, which sought to devise 
a renewed theology in order to successfully overcome the problems of Christendom 
imperialism.
968
 Receiving ideology critique as a criticism of Christianity’s imperialist past 
also means acknowledging the impairment of the theological vision at present. Although 
Christian theology can legitimately draw upon resources from the past tradition, a purely 
speculative theology tends to forget that these past insights have not been accompanied by a 
concrete liberating practice. Schillebeeckx’s argument suggests that the sinful shortcomings 
of theologians from the past cannot be separated from their theologies in such a way that 
contemporary theologians could draw upon traditional texts as though these coincided with 
the truth about reality. This means that Schillebeeckx understands all of Christian theology to 
be entangled in sin to some extent. This sin is overcome not by way of constructing a better 
ideal than the concrete contemporary situation. 
 Theology’s entanglement in sin is solely overcome by the superior power of God’s 
grace as it forgives theology at present. Faith in the reality of God’s forgiving mercy should 
help theologians to admit their own, as well as their ancestors’ errors, and to trust in the 
superior power of God’s grace, despite these failures.969 Schillebeeckx’s reception of ideology 
critique does not result in an abandonment of his theology, but it refines his combination of a 
grace optimism with a pessimistic anthropology: God’s grace is sufficiently powerful to 
persist, despite theological distortions. ‘The power to realise this humanum and to bring about 
an individual and collective peace is reserved for God, the power of love’.970 Ideology critique 
helped Schillebeeckx to see more clearly that Christian theologians should not exempt 
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themselves from their own understanding of human sinfulness, erroneously siding with God’s 
unique power to overcome human sin. 
 
b) Merciful distancing from ideology critique: Theology’s distinct God-centredness  
 
 This, then, also shows how Schillebeeckx’s theology remains distinct from atheist 
ideology critique: Schillebeeckx grounds faith in a better future theologically, whereas 
ideology critique does so anthropologically. Schillebeeckx’s combination of an optimistic 
ontology with a pessimistic anthropology is evidenced when he stresses that a Christian 
conception of freedom is not based on trust in human capacities. Quite the contrary, the 
human liability to failure renders any hope placed in a purely human redemption of the world 
impossible.
971
 Christian hope rests on the faith that humans are accepted by God despite their 
sin.
972
 Humans are not so much free by their own strength, as they are free due to God’s 
forgiveness, which continuously draws them away from self-enclosure towards the realisation 
of new possibilities. Consequently, theology’s political contributions to post-Christendom 
societies should not be limited to humanly realisable projects.
973
 Instead, Christian theology 
must direct its attention to the impossible as it is mediated in surprising ways in the public 
sphere.
974
 From Schillebeeckx’s Christian theological perspective, grace is not always realised 
in planned political projects, but it arrives as the entirely new and previously inconceivable, 
sometimes in spite of that which was humanly planned.  
 Some interpret Schillebeeckx’s theologically motivated engagement with ideology 
critique as a critique of atheism, inasmuch as the human devotion to secular liberation is only 
meaningful and fully accounted for where the superior power of grace over evil is 
acknowledged.
975
 Schillebeeckx indeed argues that Christian theology is able to explain that 
humanity’s continuous trust in the superior power of goodness, also evidenced in non-
Christian political engagement, ultimately makes sense on the basis that grace has overcome 
all evil at Christ’s Resurrection.976 However, Schillebeeckx ends his engagement with 
ideology critique, not on the note of criticising the shortcomings of a purely atheistic outlook, 
but by way of reminding the church that everyone who chooses goodness over evil can be 
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regarded as thereby already implicitly affirming the reality of redemption.
977
 He appreciates 
that, in spite of all evidence to the contrary, these ‘people, [...], refuse to be shaken in their 
conviction that it is not evil but goodness which has the last word’.978 Significantly, 
Schillebeeckx appreciates that atheism’s seemingly unaccounted trust in the meaningfulness 
of good actions mediates the superior power of God’s grace over evil.979 Consequently, 
Schillebeeckx, unlike Radical Orthodox thinkers, does not argue that secular ontologies fail to 
make consistent sense of reality. Instead, he makes the positive claim that theology’s 
overarching view of the positivity of reality frees Christians from despair, for they know that 
all evil that is encountered will not ultimately last.
980
 
 
5.4 Receiving contextual mediations of grace: Transforming the theological vision 
 
 Thus far, I have defended Schillebeeckx’s hermeneutic of God’s merciful forgiveness 
against alternative proposals of an adequate update of Schillebeeckx’s engagement with 
atheism. Importantly, Schillebeeckx was the only theologian introduced in this dissertation 
who was able to confess the impairment of theology’s own vision, which, as I will argue in 
the following section, renders him more hesitant than all of them to advocate Christian 
theology as being best able to solve contemporary political problems. This exposition of how 
Schillebeeckx modified his response to the question of theology’s political role in post-
Christendom societies will then serve as the basis for my application of Schillebeeckx’s 
hermeneutics of mercy in response to contemporary political questions. 
 
a) Recognising grace in unexpected places: Re-appreciating the cruciformity of grace 
 
 If we ask how Schillebeeckx modified his response to the question concerning 
theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies, in accordance with the grace that he 
perceived to be mediated in the atheist ideology critiques of his day, this modification 
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concerns Schillebeeckx’s introduction of a second reason as to why Christian theologians 
cannot promise to solve political problems better than non-Christian philosophers. The first 
reason concerned the superabundant reality of redemption, which can never be captured 
exhaustively by theological concepts. The notion of the implicit intuition allowed 
Schillebeeckx to conceive of a noetic knowledge of the concrete reality of redemption, which 
always surpasses the human conceptual grasp of reality. The continuous reorientation towards 
one’s external environment serves to continuously expand upon and correct the theological 
understanding of the reality of redemption. On this basis, Christian theologians would have to 
admit that non-theological concepts and worldviews could equally, but differently, be able to 
give expression to the same abundant reality of redemption, which explains why their political 
projects could be equally good as Christian theological ones. 
 Receiving the theological significance of ideology critique, this argument is now being 
complicated, insofar as Schillebeeckx must admit, on the one hand, that theological 
statements, just as well as any other, could also deviate from the superabundant truth about 
reality.
981
 On the other hand, he also admits that empirical reality itself is shot through with 
sinful imperfections, which renders it impossible to prove on the basis of any noetic contact 
with one’s environment that the reality we live in has been definitely redeemed in Christ.982 
And yet, contrary to his critics who argue that Schillebeeckx consequently abandoned this 
theological claim, concerning the Christian understanding of reality as redeemed, 
Schillebeeckx continues to interpret the world from the perspective of this conviction.
983
 
 Schillebeeckx now nuances his theology inasmuch as he modifies his notion of the 
implicit intuition of reality’s abundant positivity in light of his atheist contemporaries’ 
heightened attention to all evil in the world. Using the notion of the negative contrast 
experience, he now argues that the superior power of grace over all evil is not only intuited 
through experiences of meaning and goodness, but that the final victory of grace can also be 
anticipated in the confrontation with suffering and evil.
984
 Christian theologians are now 
called upon to discern God’s offer of grace not in spite of, but in the fragmentary realisation 
of goodness amidst evil.
985
 His contemporary atheists’ pessimism has, thus, helped 
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Schillebeeckx to pay heightened attention to the theological truth of the cruciformity of the 
reality of redemption, which might have been downplayed in his earlier thought.
986
  
 Thus, for Schillebeeckx, Christian theologians bear witness to the reality of 
redemption, not by seeing how all evil can be overcome by Christian theology in a Radical 
Orthodox manner, or how societal problems are being solved by Christian theology pace 
public theology and Kathryn Tanner, but through sharpening their perception of the reality of 
redemption even when it appears in no obvious manner.
987
 Accordingly, whereas Radical 
Orthodox authors argue that the Christian ontology can further expand upon or complete the 
world’s redemption, and promise a better future than any atheist social order, Schillebeeckx 
abstains from these promises, because due to human sin the Christian vision of the whole of 
reality also remains fragmentary.
988
 On the one hand, the acknowledgment that history is 
interwoven with sinful elements means that Christian theologians can only see the reality of 
redemption beneath sin, but they cannot rationally formulate how everything is interconnected 
into one meaningful whole. This inability can be explained in relation to theology’s own 
entanglement in sin, which is why the theological resources from the past are not entirely 
reliable in paving the way into a better future. Redemption can, thus, only be promised insofar 
as grace is shown to be mediated in the remaining evil in the world and insofar as people 
believe that this grace will win in the end.
989
  
 At this point, Schillebeeckx then conceives of a plurality of positive political projects 
to overcome the remaining evil in the world.
990
 He suggests that a communal discussion about 
the best political path to overcome the evil should commence once a plurality of groups 
agrees that a certain situation is problematic. Christian theologians must not be too concerned 
about presenting their own solution as being superior to others.
991
 Instead, Christian 
theologians must strike the right balance between witnessing to God as sole ruler of reality 
and to the faith that humankind freely participates in this rule.
992
 Christian theologians must 
show that humans are the active subjects of history in their public engagement, but they 
should not be the dictators who think that they have grasped the truth about the world and 
humankind.
993
 The positive solution chosen should be acknowledged to be decisive for the 
course of a society’s future, but it must not be dictated by Christian theology.  
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b) The contemporary relevance of Schillebeeckx’s position: Receptive openness instead of 
promising solutions 
 
 If we ask how we might retrieve Schillebeeckx’s hermeneutics of mercy for 
contemporary theology, I would first summarise the distinctiveness of Schillebeeckx’s 
theology in comparison to all of the others. Most importantly, public theologians, as well as 
Kathryn Tanner and Radical Orthodoxy, all associate theology’s political relevance with 
theological attempts to solve the surrounding society’s problems. Yoder rejected this 
approach in order to respect society’s alleged freedom to reject Christ, i.e. to be sinful. All of 
the theologians introduced have, thus, shared a reliance on Christianity’s surrounding 
societies to be relatively unredeemed in order to distinguish theology from atheist positions, 
and to highlight theology’s distinct political relevance with reference to its ability to solve 
problems in the surrounding society or to further the world’s redemption, even while the 
surrounding society continues to reject these efforts. Schillebeeckx showed a different way of 
theologically informed political engagement, summarised in his warning not to follow the 
present tides of a ‘cultural pessimism’.994 If public theology, postliberal theologies, and 
Radical Orthodoxy associate theology’s political relevance with Christianity’s task to further 
realising the world’s redemption, they are likely to rely on the world’s problematic state in 
order for theology to be politically relevant.  
 To reiterate Graham Ward’s pessimism, mentioned previously in chapter 2: ‘[...], we 
can all see that the world is fucked up but we’re all still hoping for something that can stop it 
from being so fucked up’.995 By stressing theology’s superior role in overcoming the world’s 
problems even more, Milbank similarly expresses his pessimism in the reactive hope ‘that in 
the current century this [the Catholic] project will be able to recover and rethink the Western 
tradition in a way that could even (in the face of increasing global catastrophe) prove 
universally pervasive’.996 Discontent with the present functions, for Ward and Milbank alike, 
as something fundamental for the theologically informed promise of deliverance. With 
Schillebeeckx, we could ask whether it is really as self-evident that the world is primarily 
marked by problems. The particular Christian interpretation of reality could, instead, suggest 
learning anew to perceive the reality of redemption, amidst and underneath all political 
problems.
997
 The focus on this realised redemption prevents Christian hope from becoming 
utopian on the one hand, and it prevents theology from becoming circular in the sense of 
inventing problems in society that it then promises to solve on the other. This is not to suggest 
that there are not enough political problems in the world, but Schillebeeckx reminds us that 
theologians should trust that the future will be a better place only if we first notice ‘the log in 
our own eye before we see the speck in the eyes of our neighbours’ (Matt. 7:3). Christian 
theology’s real political problem might be even more profound than public or Radical 
Orthodox theologians dare to acknowledge; namely, that we cannot even see what precisely is 
problematic in the contemporary post-Christendom context. Christian theology’s specific 
contribution might not so much be to detect problems, which atheists do not see, but to rely on 
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atheists’ detection of problems as well as their proposed solutions, and to discern signs of 
redemption in their activity.
998
  
 It is important to consider that Schillebeeckx has once more been criticised for being 
too naively optimistic in this regard, and updating Schillebeeckx’s theology has been 
proposed for the contemporary context once more through a correction of this shortcoming. 
Schillebeeckx’s trust that the surrounding society will react against evil has been criticised for 
insufficiently considering that social sin can blur a whole culture’s vision of evil and render it 
apathetic.
999
 The adequate update of Schillebeeckx’s theology proposed would, then, once 
more point in the direction of Radical Orthodoxy, criticising the shortcomings of the 
surrounding culture and assigning to theology the task of opening up everyone’s eyes to the 
miserable state of the world. My interpretation of Schillebeeckx’s theology points in a 
different direction: If contemporary society’s vision is too blurred to recognise evil, Christian 
theologians should not exempt themselves from this impairment. 
 If there is, at present, a certain observable apathy regarding political engagement for a 
better future, who tells us that this is the result of indifference? Schillebeeckx’s interpretation 
of atheism would rather suggest that atheism’s cultural pessimism might have led to apathy 
because people have despaired over the evil which, at times, seems overpowering, not 
because they are indifferent to it. Christian theology’s role is not to overcome atheism’s 
political apathy, but to receive this apathy as an offer of God’s forgiveness for the church. 
Theologians could learn that, due to their overall optimistic Christian outlook, they might 
have continuously proposed solutions to evils when atheists might have seen more clearly, 
and acknowledged more honestly, that the negativity of evil cannot be resolved. The 
contemporary political apathy observed should then not be ‘healed’ by an overzealous 
Christian theology, but Christians should learn from this apathy to face evil in all its gravity 
and negativity. And yet, Christian theologians should maintain a critical distance to the atheist 
outlook precisely in not despairing, but in interpreting the atheist despair over evil itself as a 
mediation of God’s mercy towards Christianity and, as such, as a sign of hope. Christian 
theologians should trust that this present state of political apathy is not the last word about 
reality, and is not determinative for a perpetual degradation of West European societies’ 
political fate. 
 But what would such a public theological approach imply more concretely? Let us 
consider the current political disputes in Europe concerning the degree of hospitality with 
which refugees should be welcomed. Contemporary theologians might be inclined to side 
with all those who favour open borders and engage in rendering Europe more hospitable. This 
is laudable and Christian theologians should indeed not discard the grace that is clearly 
mediated by all those who welcome those in need. But, should Christian theologians be as 
quick to discard entirely the theological significance of any opposition to an open border 
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policy? My interpretation of Schillebeeckx’s hermeneutic of mercy would suggest spending 
time with these opponents and discerning in how far they, even in their overall mistaken view, 
mediate a grace that we would not have otherwise seen. Theologians should admit that they 
cannot understand those people’s political opinions on a purely conceptual level before they 
have accompanied them in their concrete lives. On the one hand, theologians should confess 
that, if parts of a society want to close their countries’ borders, it would be simplistic to 
understand these people as being entirely sinful, as problems that need to be overcome, and 
those in favour of an open border policy as entirely graced and as already possessing the 
solution that needs to be adopted by everyone. Instead, theologians should confess that the 
entire society is implicated in the problem that leads some to refuse any hospitality towards 
refugees. Most importantly, theologians should turn to the church and investigate the extent to 
which the church is itself part of the problem that has led some contemporaries to be so 
anxious about the supposed dangers of an open border policy.  
 In this sense, Christian theologians should not side with either position in the current 
societal disputes about immigration. Importantly, however, Christian theologians should not 
apologetically advocate their reconciliatory stance as one that should be adopted by every 
member of the European Union either. We should not defend our own theological position in 
the middle of the conflict by promising to solve the problem and to, thus, actively further the 
world’s redemption. Theologians would not take this position in the middle as an ethical duty 
in the first place. Instead, we would take this position, because the grace mediated by both 
positions overflows an easy dichotomisation into one completely right and one completely 
wrong position. Theologians would have to confess to be more dependent upon recognising 
the grace mediated in others than to be able to correct other people’s shortcomings with our 
own insights. Reversely, Christian theologians could not promise to redeem the world with 
the theological middle position, because the theologian would also be entangled in the 
sinfulness of both positions. Theologians would have to confess that due to their own 
entanglement in sin, they cannot see any resolution of the conflict. But we should learn to see 
a surplus of grace in conflicting positions once again, and heal with it our own impaired 
vision. Maybe one day, we will then find an entirely new and unprecedented solution to the 
current political problem, to be adopted by the church, and perhaps to be recognised by 
everyone as a grace. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I have shown how Schillebeeckx’s theological engagement with non-
Christian positions was marked by a distinctly merciful approach. His maintenance of a subtle 
critical distance to atheism should also guide contemporary public theology. I have argued 
that Schillebeeckx received his atheist contemporaries’ critique of Christendom imperialism 
as a merciful reminder of the church not to underestimate the importance of praying to God, 
and their preference of plurality over unity as merciful reminder that the church has no 
monopoly on grace, but that God’s superabundant offer of grace is mediated in multiple ways 
in this world. At the same time, Schillebeeckx maintained a critical distance to atheism 
insofar as he warned against the absolutisation of his atheist contemporaries’ insights and 
appealed to the importance of Christianity’s God-centredness. Nevertheless, evidencing the 
merciful intent of his critique, Schillebeeckx did not aim to present Christian theology 
triumphantly as promising to heal atheism’s shortcomings, but his primary interest was in 
correcting Christian theology with what he received as atheist mediations of God’s 
forgiveness. In the same manner, Schillebeeckx also engaged with atheist ideology critiques 
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of his time from which he learned not to exempt the theological vision from the theological 
claim that all human insights are impaired by sin. This shifted Schillebeeckx’s focus even 
more towards recognising how God’s forgiveness is contemporarily mediated in his 
surrounding context despite the church.  
 If my explanation of Schillebeeckx’s Christology, from the previous chapter, might 
still have been dangerously close to presenting Schillebeeckx’s openness to non-Christian 
positions as the best solution for the peaceful co-existence of a pluralist society universally, I 
have highlighted in this chapter that Schillebeeckx’s position is always already the response to 
a specific Christian theological mistake or one-sidedness in the past that can be corrected by 
way of attention to the way in which God’s forgiveness is mediated in the surrounding 
context. Schillebeeckx’s hermeneutic of mercy cannot be universalised, because it is the result 
of the specific dialogue between a Christian theologian and Christianity’s critics and is, thus, 
aimed at overcoming theological problems that might not be present in other positions. I have 
argued that this merciful engagement with the surrounding society would imply that public 
theologians should not offer theological solutions to political problems primarily. Instead, 
public theologians should learn to recognise how God’s grace is mediated in the surrounding 
society’s political disputes, and discern how they reveal the church’s sinful shortcomings as 
well as new hope that these might not ultimately foreclose a better future. This is not to 
distinguish Christianity and atheism as two entirely self-enclosed systems, each with their 
own problems. Christianity’s problems will exhibit similarities with atheism’s problems. 
However, if Christian theologians trust that sin is overcome through God’s forgiveness, and 
not by focussing on the other’s failures, but by showing to them the best version of 
themselves, then it is not the theologian’s duty to point out atheism’s problems before having 
removed the log in our own eye. 
 
 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
 If we ask how to respond theologically to those secularists who vehemently oppose 
any Christian involvement in the politics of post-Christendom societies, contemporary 
theologians will nearly unanimously respond by promising that theology can positively 
influence the entire social order. This positive influence is strongly associated with theology’s 
ability to solve currently existing political problems. Not many might be inclined to object to 
what appears as such a laudable willingness to solve political problems with theological 
resources. Yet, in this dissertation, I have dared to ask the counter-question of whether it 
might be possible that, in their very eagerness to defend Christian theology’s political 
relevance apologetically through promising to solve the surrounding society’s problems, these 
contemporary public and Radical Orthodox theologians might be prematurely rejecting the 
grace God offers. Whereas these apologetic defenders of Christian theology implicitly 
understand the secularist rejection of theologically informed political engagement as 
something that needs to be overcome, I have revisited Edward Schillebeeckx’s Christology in 
order to ask whether it might not just as well be possible that these atheist opponents to 
Christianity follow God, and mediate a grace that Christian theologians should welcome. 
 If we ask about theology’s political role in post-Christendom societies, contemporary 
public and Radical Orthodox theologians nearly unanimously suggest that Christian 
theologians should solve the entire society’s political problems. Through this move, they risk 
overlooking the problem that Christian theology itself could present to secular politics. I have 
argued that contemporary Christian theologians in post-Christendom societies should confess 
that their entanglement in sin blinds their theological vision of a commendable solution, 
because they are themselves in the very midst of the problem they so sincerely hope to 
overcome. The primary task of contemporary public theology should, then, consist of 
discerning God’s forgiveness offered to theology in the contemporary context.  
 If we ask about the political implications of the Christian faith in Christ’s redemption 
of the world, most contemporary public theologians would associate this faith with an ethical 
duty to imitate Christ. Christians are called to imitate, complete or exceed Christ’s work of 
redemption, models which all translate Christ’s redemptive work into the Christian task of 
solving contemporary political problems. I have suggested to uphold that Christ uniquely 
redeems the world, and that Christian theologians should confess that they, like everyone else, 
are primarily sinful beneficiaries of Christ’s redemption which is most often mediated in spite 
of ourselves.  
 This is why I suggest that the strong secularist opposition to Christian theological 
contributions to public politics should be welcomed as a reminder of Christianity’s imperialist 
past, in which Christians intruded into different cultures, promising redemption and, thus, 
providing solutions to problems that these cultures might never have dreamed of. I interpret 
this reminder as an incentive to humble our current theological promises of solving 
contemporary political problems. Should we not be more mindful of the ways in which our 
theological solutions could, at the same time, be the very invention of the problem? Christian 
theologians should welcome any opposition to Christian theological contributions to secular 
politics as incentive to confess that, at this moment in history, looking back at a long and 
often painful history of Christendom imperialism, many of us still suffer from the long-lasting 
effects of Christianity’s sinful disobedience to God during its imperialist past, which tore our 
societies apart. How do we reconcile these societies? How do we show that our Christian faith 
convinces us that we still belong to our brothers and sisters who have left the church?  
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 Both public and Radical Orthodox theologians promise that theology will redeem 
everyone from the pain our forefathers have afflicted upon our societies, perhaps 
unconsciously and without their willing it. I have suggested that Christian theologians should 
not promise to be society’s heroic redeemers, but that we should acknowledge to be so greatly 
entangled in the problem that we cannot see any solution to it clearly. At present, theology’s 
political contribution to post-Christendom societies might primarily consist of healing 
Christianity’s sinful past precisely by overcoming the church’s overzealous tendencies to 
solve the surrounding society’s problems. Consequently, I do not even advocate 
Schillebeeckx’s merciful approach to atheism as being the best remedy to reconciling a 
pluralist society that seems, at times, to be more marked by its many disputes and conflicts 
than by its harmony and peace. I cannot promise that reading one’s contemporary situation 
through a hermeneutics of mercy will reconcile conflicting positions. I simply suggest to my 
Christian readers that they may reconsider the graces they have received, and thank God and 
the ones who mediated them, before they lament about all that which they are still lacking. I 
appeal to them to sharpen their sights in order to see the grace mediated by another person’s 
position, which they might otherwise simply reject as being entirely mistaken.  
 Overall, I contest the claim that all faith-based arguments should be given equal 
hearing in political debates. Assessing the issue from a Christian theological perspective, and 
limiting the issue at hand to Christian theological claims instead of faith-based claims in 
general, I have argued that at the present point in time, Christian theology should contribute 
less actively than others its faith-based insights to political discussions in post-Christendom 
societies. It is time for Christian theologians to confess publicly that all we can do is look 
around for signs of God’s forgiveness as it is offered to us at present, and thereby receive our 
non-Christian contemporaries’ insights as welcome signs of hope. Christian theologians 
should accept this forgiveness in order to be reconciled with God and with the surrounding 
society eventually. 
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SAMENVATTING 
 
Dit proefschrift analyseert de relevantie van Edward Schillebeeckx’ Christologie voor 
de vraag naar de politieke rol van het christendom in een post-christelijke context. Ik benader 
deze vraag uit christelijk theologisch perspectief met een bijzonder oog voor de discussies 
rondom natuur en genade en de Christologie. Ik lever een bijdrage aan de bestaande discussies 
door een alternatief te bieden voor de meest prominente en contrasterende actuele 
antwoorden, namelijk het antwoord van de Britse publieke theologie, enerzijds, en het 
antwoord van Radical Orthodoxy, anderzijds. 
Hoewel ik waardering heb voor het inzicht van de publieke theologie dat de actuele 
post-christelijke context bijzondere aandacht verdient, grijp ik terug op Radical Orthodoxy 
om de publieke theologie te bekritiseren, in zoverre deze de politieke relevantie van het 
christendom poogt te legitimeren met behulp van een seculier kader. Hedendaagse Britse 
publieke theologen die vanuit de traditie van het liberale Protestantisme argumenteren, lopen 
het gevaar om in de neutraliteit van het secularisme te geloven. Ze passen daardoor de 
christelijke traditie niet enkel aan seculaire verwachtingen aan, maar behouden daarmee ook 
een variant van Westerse dominantie. Daarom volgt dit proefschrift de leerzamere intuïtie van 
de publieke theologie dat de publieke relevantie van het christendom in een post-christelijke 
context ook met behulp van een theologisch begrip van de genade kan worden 
gerechtvaardigd. Omdat de publieke theologie zich nog niet voldoende heeft verdiept in het 
theologisch debat rond de genade bouw ik op het gedachtegoed van Radical Orthodoxy voort. 
Deze theologen tonen momenteel bij uitstek de politieke relevantie van theologische 
discussies over natuur en genade.  
De positie van Radical Orthodoxy blijft problematisch in zoverre ze Christus en de 
kerk ineenschuift. Dit maakt dat ze de actieve deelname van kerk aan de verlossing van de 
wereld meer benadrukken dan de afhankelijkheid van de kerk van de genade van Christus. 
Daarom grijp ik terug op de Christologie van John Howard Yoder. Hij voert belangrijke 
theologische redenen op om ieder soort van christelijke dominantie te verwerpen. Omdat zijn 
opvatting van de genade problemen blootlegt die vergelijkbaar zijn met Radical Orthodoxy 
presenteer ik daarna de Christologie van Kathryn Tanner. Zij slaagt er het best in om 
consistent de zonde van de kerk en haar blijvende afhankelijkheid van de genade van Christus 
te beklemtonen. Deze nadruk ontbreekt in alle andere posities. 
Uiteindelijk vormt deze kritische analyse van de hedendaagse Britse publieke 
theologie, Radical Orthodoxy, Yoder en Tanner de voorbereiding voor mijn eigen 
constructieve werk. Hier werk ik systematisch uit hoe Edward Schillebeeckx’ toenmalige 
omgang met diens publiek een concept van genade aan het licht brengt dat genade 
voornamelijk als ontferming beschouwt. Schillebeeckx argumenteert vanuit een perspectief 
dat belangrijke overeenkomsten met de Radical Orthodoxe ontologie van vrede toont, maar 
deelt met de publieke theologie de afwijzing  van ieder overblijfsel van de christelijke 
dominantie uit het verleden. Ik argumenteer dat het Schillebeeckx lukte een evenwicht tussen 
beide posities te bewaren omdat hij de genade als pure positiviteit opvatte. Een genade die 
echter zowel door de kerk als door het buitenkerkelijke publiek op verglijkbaar imperfecte 
wijze bemiddeld wordt. Deze interpretatie van het buitenkerkelijke publiek als medium van 
Gods ontferming over de kerk en deze interpretatie van de kerk als geroepen om de fouten en 
fiasco’s van het buitenkerkelijke publiek met ontferming tegemoet te treden zou opnieuw 
moeten worden opgenomen in de hedendaagse publieke theologie. 
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SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation examines the relevance of Edward Schillebeeckx’s Christology for 
the question of Christianity’s political role in a post-Christendom context. I approach the 
question from a Christian theological perspective insofar as it relates to discussions about 
nature and grace as well as to Christology. My contribution consists in constructing an 
alternative response to the presently most prominent and contrasting ones provided by 
contemporary British public theology on the one hand, and Radical Orthodoxy on the other.  
Whilst appreciative of public theology’s awareness that the contemporary post-
Christendom context deserves particular theological attention, I draw on Radical Orthodoxy 
in order to criticise public theological justifications of Christianity’s political relevance in 
secular terms. Contemporary British public theologians, operating from within the liberal 
Protestant tradition, risk believing in secularism’s neutrality and therefore not only 
accommodating the Christian tradition to secularist expectations but also maintaining a 
version of Western dominance. This dissertation thus takes up the more valuable public 
theological intuition that Christianity’s public relevance in a post-Christendom context could 
equally be justified on the basis of a theological understanding of grace. Since theological 
discussions of grace have not yet been sufficiently developed within the emerging discipline, I 
build on Radical Orthodox theologians, who, at present, most prominently demonstrate the 
political relevance of theological discussions of nature and grace.  
The remaining problems with Radical Orthodoxy are associated with their respective 
conflation of Christ into the church, to the effect that the church’s active participation in the 
world’s redemption is stressed at the expense of the church’s dependence on Christ’s grace. 
Consequently, I draw on the Christology of John Howard Yoder who provides considerable 
theological reasons for the rejection of any kind of Christendom, but whose understanding of 
grace shares similar problems with that of Radical Orthodoxy. Kathryn Tanner’s Christology 
is then presented, since it most coherently stresses the church’s sinfulness and continuous 
dependence on Christ’s grace; an emphasis that remains underdeveloped in all other accounts 
introduced thus far.  
Altogether, this critical assessment of contemporary British public theology’s, Radical 
Orthodoxy’s, Yoder’s, and Tanner’s respective understandings of Christianity’s role in a post-
Christendom public paves the way for my own constructive work. This consists in 
systematically elaborating how Edward Schillebeeckx’s engagement with the surrounding 
public of his time exhibited a certain understanding of grace in terms of mercy. Arguing from 
the perspective of an ontological vision that bears great similarities with a Radical Orthodox 
ontology of peace, Schillebeeckx at the same time shared public theology’s rejection of any 
remnant of Christendom. I argue that he was able to balance the two because he understood 
grace as pure positivity, which is, however, mediated by the church as well as by the extra-
ecclesial public to a similarly imperfect degree. This interpretation of the extra-ecclesial 
public as mediating God’s mercy for the redirection of a sinful church to God, and of the 
church as being called to approach the extra-ecclesial public failures with mercy, should be 
retrieved for a contemporary public theology. 
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